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THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE SOUTHEASTERN
STATES AT THE OPENING OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Joseph W.Dellapenna*
I. INTRODUCTION

The vastly differing experiences of communities in the United States
regarding water has led to very different approaches to property rights in
water.' To the east of Kansas City, people considered water to be readily
available at little or no cost. Although occasionally there were problems
with water quality arising from human activities, shortages historically have
been rare and short-lived. There evolved in this setting a body of law known
as riparian rights, predicated on treating the resource as a species of common property.2 To the west of Kansas City, people considered water to be
scarce, or at least misplaced.3 Therefore, the right to use water in the West
was treated as a species of private property under a body of law now known
as appropriative rights.4
Under a common property system like riparian rights, all co-owners of
the property are left pretty much to their own individual judgment to decide
whether, when, and how to use the resource.5 Each owner receives the full
benefit of any added use, while the cost of this benefit is spread over all
owners. Garrett Hardin explained thirty-four years ago, however, that when
a common property system approaches the carrying capacity of the resource, a "tragedy of the commons" ensues. 6 Acting purely rationally, each
co-owner continues to place ever greater demands on the resource even as it
is exhausted, if only because other co-owners are doing likewise. Adding
* Professor of Law, Villanova University; B.B.A., University of Michigan (1965);

J.D., Detroit College of Law (1968); LL.M. in Public International & Comparative Law,
George Washington University (1969); LL.M. (Environmental Law), Columbia University
(1974); Director, Model Water Code Project, American Society of Civil Engineers.
1. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, Dual Systems, in I WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS ch. 8 (Robert E. Beck ed., LEXIS Repl. 2001); Bernhard Grossfeld, Geography and
Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1510 (1984).
2. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 6.01(b)(1) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Introduction]; Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right To Consume Water Under "Pure" Riparian Rights, in I
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, ch. 7 [hereinafter Dellapenna, "Pure" Riparian
Rights].

3. For the classic statement of this notion, see United States v. GerlachLivestock Co.,
339 U.S. 725 (1950).
4. See generally Owen Anderson et. al, PriorAppropriation,in 2 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 1, chs. 11-17.
5. Dellapenna, "Pure"RiparianRights, supra note 2, §§ 7.02-.03(e).
6. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
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demand is the only way to appropriate a share of a resource being grabbed7
by all. A current example is the exhaustion of fisheries in the high seas.
Among many other examples, one could include national park access and
even the federal treasury.8
In the eastern states, demand for water continues to increase and precipitation patterns seem to have become more erratic, causing recurring
water shortages to become more frequent. 9 There simply no longer is
enough water to satisfy all needs in eastern states. The predictable result is a
considerable increase in the number of disputes over water. The new increase in water shortages has forced many eastern states to reconsider their
law for allocating water among competing users. Many of the eastern states
have abandoned or modified the system of riparian rights that evolved in the
nineteenth century on the assumption of permanent surpluses. These states
have not, however, simply imported appropriative rights to solve these
problems. Rather, eastern states have developed a new system of law based
on treating the water as a species of public property rather than as either
common or private property, a system that is coming to be called "regulated
riparianism."' 0 Not all eastern states have adopted this system, however, and
thus there are now three distinct systems of water law in use in the United
States, each of which requires discussion in order to understand the present
law in eastern states and what is likely to come in the future as more and
more states revise their water law in fundamental ways.
7. See FRANCIS T. CHRISTY, JR. & ANTHONY SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN
FISHERIES (1965); Luz Eugenia Cereceda & Guillermo Wormald, Privatizationof the Seafor
Seaweed Production in Chile, 27 NATURE & RESOURCES 31 (1991); Manjira Datta & Leonard J. Mirman, Externalities,Market Power, and Resource Extraction, 37 J. ENVTL. ECON.
& MGT. 233 (1999); Ronald D. Fischer & Leonard J.Mirman, The Compleat Fish Wars:
Biologicaland Dynamic Interactions, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 34 (1996); J.R. Gould,
Extinction of a Fishery by Commercial Exploitation: A Note, 90 J. POL. ECON. 1031 (1972);
Patrick A. Nickler, A Tragedy of the Commons in Coastal Fisheries: Contending Prescriptions for Conservation, and the Case of the Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REv. 549 (1999); Katharine Marvin, Note, ProtectingCommon Property Resources Through
the Marketplace: Individual Transferable Quotasfor Surf Clams and Ocean Quahogs, 16
VT. L. REv. 1127 (1992); Carrie A. Tipton, Note, ProtectingTomorrow's Harvest:Developing a National System of Individual Transferable Quotas To Conserve Ocean Resources, 14
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381 (1995).
8. See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS (1980) (national parks);
Rodney D. Fort & John Baden, The Federal Treasury as a Common Pool Resource and the
Development of a Federal Bureaucracy, in BUREAUCRACY VERSUS ENVIRONMENT 9 (John
Baden & Richard L. Stroup eds., 1981) (federal treasury).
9. See generally WILLIAM ASHWORTH, NOR ANY DROP To DRINK (1982); Robert
Abrams, Charting the Course of Riparianism: An Instrumentalist Theory of Change, 35
WAYNE L. REv. 1381, 1405-46 (1989); Patrick Corbett, Note, The Overlooked Farm Crisis:
Our Rapidly Depleting Water Supply, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 454 (1986).
10. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, in 1 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1,ch. 9.
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In this article, I discuss the evolving law of water allocation in the
southeastern states of the United States. These states include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. I begin by describing, in Parts II, III, and IV, the three approaches to water allocation law already introduced. In Part V, I summarize the comparable developments regarding groundwater. Finally, in Part VI, I briefly describe the
law of each state as of this writing. I then conclude with a brief comment on
the pattern of evolution in these rights and some suggestions on what the
future might hold.

II. RIPARIAN

RIGHTS

Today, no state relies solely on "pure" riparian rights. All states have at
least a few regulatory statutes that deal with limited aspects of water quantity issues. 1 In nearly half of the eastern states, however, the common law
of riparian rights continues to be the basic law applicable to disputes over
the allocation of water between individual users who withdraw water directly from a natural source. In these states, regulation serves to protect the
public interest in water yet plays little part in the resolution of quantity disputes between such direct water users.
Riparian rights are based on the premise that the right to use water is a
natural attribute of land, dependent on the natural availability of water to the
land.' 2 Indeed, the very word "riparian" derives from the Latin word "ripa"
meaning a riverbank. 13 Land abutting or underlying a watercourse is thus
termed "riparian land.' 4 Some early cases seem to support the theory that
an owner of riparian land is entitled to have the natural flow of a watercourse come down to the land without change in quantity or quality. 5 Under the modern understanding of riparian rights, each owner of riparian land
is entitled to use water from a contiguous watercourse regardless of the ef11. Jd. § 9.02.
12. See Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 Fed. Cas. 472,474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312) ("The
natural stream, existing by the bounty of Providence for the benefit of the land through which
it flows, is an incident annexed, by operation of law, to the land itself."). Justice Story's
opinion in that case is often cited as the first true riparian rights case. See also Hendricks v.
Johnson, 6 Port. 472 (Ala. 1837); Buddington v. Bradley, 10 Conn. 213 (1834); Blanchard v.
Baker, 8 Me. 253 (1832); City of Baltimore v. Appold, 42 Md. 442 (1875); Johnson v. Jordan, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 234 (1841); Coming v. Troy Iron Factory, 40 N.Y. 191 (1869); JOHN
M. GOULD, THE LAW OF WATERS § 148 (3d ed. 1900). For a modem expression of the view
that riparian rights are a natural attribute of the land abutting a watercourse, see Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp. v. Cutler, 492 N.Y.S.2d 137 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985), aff'd mem., 492
N.E.2d 398 (N.Y. 1986).
13. Johnson v. McCowen, 348 So. 2d 357, 360 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
14. For an analysis of what constitutes riparian land, see Dellapenna, "Pure" Riparian
Rights, supra note 2, § 7.02.
15. Id.§ 7.02(c).
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fect on the natural flow of the watercourse so long as each user does not
transgress the equal right of other riparians to use the water. 16 While domestic uses are preferred over other uses, the only real restriction is that no use
is legal if it "unreasonably harms" another riparian use. 17
A.

The Reasonable Use Rule

The case of Harris v. Brooks 18 illustrates the modem application of riparian rights. The plaintiffs in Harris conducted a commercial boat rental
service on land leased on the shore of a small lake; members of the general
public came for fishing and recreational boating. 9 Brooks grew rice on his
land on the shore of the same lake. Brooks began to pump large quantities
of water from the lake for his rice fields during a drought, lowering the lake
level. 20 At about the same time, the public stopped renting boats, and the
fish stopped biting.
Brooks's pumping would clearly have violated the natural flow theory.
Yet to enjoin his pumping under that theory would have required the court
to prohibit virtually all pumping for any purpose whatsoever. Instead, Justice Paul Ward turned to the reasonable use theory, stressing that the court's
goal was to assure the equal rights of each riparian "as near as may be.'
Equality of right needs explanation in a case like Harrisbecause the rights
of different riparians in dissimilar situations simply cannot be identical. One
riparian, who makes a particular use that harms no one, is privileged to do
so, while another riparian, making an identical use but with different effects,
might very well be enjoined or have to pay damages. On the other hand, two
riparians making dissimilar uses of water might be found entitled to equalor vastly different-amounts of water.
What reasonable use theory assures to each riparian is an equal right to
share in the legal process of allocating water to maximize, in so far as possible, the beneficial use of each while minimizing the harm to the others.22
No riparian is free to disregard the needs of others, nor should any riparian
16. Both points trace back to Justice Story's opinion in Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 Fed. Cas.
at 474. That opinion includes several references to the "perfect equality" of the rights of each
riparian while mentioning both a right to the natural flow and a right to make a reasonable
use. The two elements also appear in the even older case of Merrit v. Parker, I N.J.L. 460,
464-66 (1795).
17. See Dellapenna, "Pure"Riparian Rights, supra note 2, §§ 7.02(b)(1), 7.03.
18. 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
19. Id. at 438, 283 S.W.2d at 130-3 1.

20. Id., 283 S.W.2dat 131.
21. Id. at 443, 283 S.W.2d at 133.
22. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 cmt. d (1977) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]; Dellapenna, "Pure" Riparian Rights, supra note 2, §§ 7.03(a), 7.03(b)(2),
7.03(c)(2).
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suffer having her own needs disregarded. Justice Ward sought to simplify
his task by positing four simple rules to capture this limited concept of
equality of right:
(a)

The right to use water for strictly domestic purposes-such as for
household use-is superior to any other uses of water-such as for
fishing, recreation, and irrigation.
(b) Other than the use mentioned above, all other lawful uses of water
are equal. Some of the lawful'uses of water recognized by this state
are: fishing, swimming, recreation, and irrigation.
(c) When one lawful use of water is destroyed by another lawful use
the latter must yield, or it may be enjoined.
(d) When one lawful use of water interferes with or detracts from another lawful use, then a question arises as to whether, under all the
facts and circumstances of that particular case, the interfering use
shall be declared unreasonable and as such enjoined, or whether a
reasonable and equitable adjustment should be made, having due
regard to the reasonable rights of each.23
As both uses were lawful, that is, reasonable as a matter of abstract
analysis, and neither use was domestic, the first two rules provided no help
in resolving the dispute. If one closely considers the third rule, enjoining the
use that destroys the other, one finds that rule, like the second rule, to be
virtually meaningless. As economist Ronald Coase was to point out about
six years later, in a case like this each use necessarily interferes with the
other, and whichever prevails necessarily destroys the other.24 Justice Ward
seemed to realize this-he never adverted to the third rule in his decision of
the case. Instead, he adopted the language of the first Restatement of Torts:
The determination in a particular case of the unreasonableness of a particular use is not and should not be an unreasoned, intuitive conclusion
on the part of the court or jury. It is rather an evaluating of the conflicting interests of each of the contestants before the court in accordance
with the standards of society, and a weighing of those, one against the
other .... [I]t is only when one riparian proprietor's use of the water is
23. Harris,225 Ark. at 444, 283 S.W.2d at 134.
24. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcON. 1, 3-15 (1960). William Rodgers has sought to make light of this insight by using as a model a chicken farmer
competing with a neighboring fox rancher. See 1 WILLIAM RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: AIR AND WATER § 1.1B, at 6 (1986) ("Causation-neutrality that attributes the spillover
damage in equal parts to the hunger of foxes and the tastiness of chickens is a hard sell
among people who can tell the difference between aggressor and victim."). In a contest between a rice farmer and the operator of a boat livery, there is little, if any, of the intuitive
sense of who is in the right that is so appealing in the fox/chicken example; and if one philosophically favors the "natural outcome," does this make one unsympathetic to the fox? See
generally Dellapenna, Introduction,supra note 2, § 6.01(b)(1) nn.341-46.
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unreasonable that another who is harmed by it can complain, even
though the harm is intentional. Substantial intentional harm to another
cannot be justified as reasonable unless the legal merit or utility of the
activity which
produces it outweighs the legal seriousness or gravity of
25
the harm.
What Justice Ward posited was a relational test, a weighing of the social value of the two uses against each other to determine which use is more
valuable to society.26 In Harris,as in many other cases, however, the court
provided no more than a vague discussion of how to balance the uses
against each other. Such a balancing requires a court to undertake a polycentric process that, at the very least, strains the capacity of courts to act in
the traditional mode of disinterested umpire rather than actively involved
manager.2 7 In the end, the court ordered Brooks's pumping to be enjoined
whenever the water fell below 189.67 feet above sea level. Although Justice
Ward acknowledged that this was the "normal level" of the lake, he was
careful to insist that the court chose 189.67 feet not because the chosen level
was normal, but because it was the level at which Brooks's pumping for his
rice fields unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs' use of the lake.2 8
Justice Ward's opinion in Harrisremained unclear about how the court
determined that commercial recreational boating and fishing is a more reasonable use of Horseshoe Lake than growing rice. 29 Frank Trelease, the
associate reporter of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)"), apparently thought that the answer was because the boat livery had
begun operating before the rice farming, at least in terms of the particular
year. 30 As Brooks had been irrigating his rice for more than twenty years
and the immediate plaintiff had only begun his boat livery in the year of the
suit,3 l temporal priority hardly seems the key.32
25. Harris,225 Ark. at 446, 283 S.W.2d at 135 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 852

cmt. c (1939)).
26. See generally Dellapenna, "Pure" RiparianRights, supra note 2, § 7.02(d)(2).
27. See Lon Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, in PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 1,

3-5 (1960). Cf. Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19
STAN. L. REv. 786 (1967). See generally DIANA C. GIBBONS, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF

WATER (1986).
28. Harris,225 Ark. at 447-48, 283 S.W.2d at 135-36.
29. For example, on very similar facts, the Arkansas Supreme Court reached the oppo-

site conclusion when the boating and fishing were for personal, rather than for commercial,
recreation. See Nilsson v. Latimer, 281 Ark. 325, 664 S.W.2d 447 (1984).
30. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 850A app. at 32.
31. Brooks had begun irrigating rice in 1931, although he had not irrigated any in 1953,

the year before the suit, and apparently in some other years as well; thus, Brooks used no
more water in 1954 than he had in 1951 or 1952. Harris,225 Ark. at 437-38, 283 S.W.2d at
130-31.
32. Dean Trelease also seemed uncomfortable with his temporal analysis. In the illustration that he based on Harrisv. Brooks, he suggested that the court ought to have conditioned
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On the other hand, if one supposes that the key to the court's holding is
the economic value of the two activities, the court would have to reopen the
suit whenever the product values at stake changed significantly. Such variations could occur through changes in the market values of the two products,
or if Brooks were to acquire more land and therefore was able to produce
more rice-but only by pumping even more water. Justice Ward was aware
of this problem. He adopted a specific lake level as the point where
Brooks's pumping must cease precisely in order to avoid the possibility of
the frequent relitigation of reasonableness.3 3 Yet it remains impossible to
the question if a
believe that the court would have refused to reconsider
34
sufficient change in the relevant facts were to occur.
Although some courts and many observers have assumed that the rule
of reasonable use requires a simple pro rata sharing among competing users
when there is not enough water to go around,35 that is not actually true, as
the Harris decision demonstrates-the rice farmer was ordered to stop
pumping, rendering his crop a total loss. On the other hand, only minimal, if
any, attention is given to such non-economic questions as the natural characteristics of the stream, general social concerns, or abstract justice.36 The
central concept of the right to use water as being a consequence of the natural features of the land means that any use on non-riparian land is per se
unreasonable.37 Who began the use of water first was simply not relevant.38
Remember, in Harris itself, Brooks had been pumping water from the lake
for years to irrigate his rice fields, while the plaintiffs had opened their boat
livery for the first time during the very year that the litigation began.

the injunction on the plaintiffs reimbursing Brooks for half (yes, only half) the value of his
lost rice crop. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 850A illus.9.
33. Harris,225 Ark. at 448, 283 S.W.2d at 136. Such an approach is more characteristic
of dual-system states in which courts characteristically think in terms of specific appropriations of water even when they are dealing with vestigial riparian rights. See Dellapenna,
supra note 1, § 8.03(b)(2).
34. Forty-five years later, the Arkansas Supreme Court avoided ruling on the need to
maintain the "normal level" of Horseshoe Lake. Taylor v. Zanone Props., 342 Ark. 465, 30
S.W.3d 74 (2000). This might not have been the same Horseshoe Lake.
35. See, e.g., Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228 Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 111 (1957);
White v. E. Lake Land Co., 23 S.E. 393 (Ga. 1895); Bouris v. Largent, 236 N.E.2d 15 (I11.
App. Ct. 1968); Cozy Lake, Inc., v. Nyoda Girls' Camp, Inc., 131 A. 892 (N.J. 1926). See
generallyDellapenna, "Pure" Riparian Rights, supra note 2, § 7.03(c)(1).
36. These principles figure prominently in the Restatement (Second) even if they do not
figure prominently in the cases. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 850A. See generally Dellapenna, "Pure"Riparian Rights, supra note 2, § 7.02(d)(3).
37. See Dellapenna, "Pure" RiparianRights, supra note 2, § 7.02(d)(1).
38. Id. § 7.03(d).
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The Weaknesses of Riparian Rights

Riparian rights suffer from certain weaknesses. These include the
vagueness and unpredictability of the criteria of decision in any conflict
over water, the lack of a process for managing water during extreme shortages or for protecting public values, the systematic bias in favor of large
users, and the impracticality of developing markets under a legal regime
that suffers from such shortcomings. Space allows only a brief mention of
each of these problems.
First, consider the vagueness and unpredictability of the criteria of decision. 39 As in Harris v. Brooks, even long established uses can be cut off
without compensation if a court decides that a recently begun use is more
reasonable. Just as serious is the reality that courts cannot deliver a decision,
even as between the litigants themselves, which will be good for more than
the day on which it is given. If either of the competing uses changes in
physical or economic terms, the calculus of reasonableness will change, and
what was hitherto considered a reasonable use may suddenly become unreasonable. Instability of result is seen by many as the major problem in reasonable use theory, having been used to explain the attempted complete
shift away from riparian rights in western states, and the shift to regulated
riparianism in eastern states.4 ° Courts, as well as scholars, have considered
this a serious impediment to private investment in water development. 4 1
Another problem with riparian rights is that there is no process for
managing water in times of extreme shortage or for otherwise protecting
public values.42 The slow, laborious process of individual litigation is not
adapted to such purposes, yet there is no mechanism for determining and
reviewing the rights of all users on a particular watercourse. Courts nor39. Id. §§ 7.02(d)(3)-.03(e).
40. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882); Drake v. Earhart, 23 P. 541
(Idaho 1890); Jones v. Adams, 6 P. 442 (Nev. 1885). See also FRANK E. MALONEY, RICHARD
AUSNESS, & J. ScoTr MORRIS, A MODEL WATER CODE 189-91 (1972); FRANK MALONEY ET
AL., WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION: THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE

§ 60 (1968); Richard

Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrineand the Protectionof Instream Uses, 1986
U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 416-18; William H. Farnham, The Improvement and Modernization of
New York Water Law Within the Framework of the RiparianSystem, 3 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 378 (1968); M. Mason Gaffney, Economic Aspects of Water Resources Policy, 28 AM.
J. ECON. & SOCIOLOGY 131, 137-38 (1969); Richard S. Harnsberger, Prescriptive Water

Rights in Wisconsin, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 47, 60; T.E. Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism, 35
Mo. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (1970); Ronald B. Robie & Patricia R. Donovan, Water Management
of the Future: A Ground Water Storage Programfor the CaliforniaState Water Project, 11
PAC. L.J. 41 (1979). See generally Dellapenna, Introduction,supra note 2, § 6.01(b); Dellapenna, "'Pure"RiparianRights, supra note 2, § 7.01; Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.01.
41. See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, andInherently Public Property,53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
42. See Dellapenna, "Pure" RiparianRights, supra note 2, § 7.05(a).
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mally consider only the interests of the parties to the actual litigation and
seem ill-equipped to address unrepresented interests of riparians not participating in the suit, let alone the interest of the public generally.4 3
Third, the lack of efficient, system-wide management creates a systematic bias in favor of large users. 4 Small users often will be less able to
afford to litigate or to organize collectively for litigation if the water they
need is taken by another, more affluent riparian. Furthermore, the balancing
process generally strongly favors large users over smaller users. The economic value of the water to the large user usually will outweigh the economic loss of the small user. While smaller users can effectively aggregate
their claims by receiving their water through a public system, the effectiveness of this approach is limited by legal doctrines limiting the "riparianness"
of public systems.45 Moreover, aggregation is brought about only through
submission to yet a different sort of large-scale enterprise.
Finally, persons seeking to acquire the right to use water sometimes
"buy" riparian rights without buying riparian land, in an attempt to create a
"non-appurtenant" riparian right.46 What a buyer obtains in such a transaction remains far from clear. The conveyance binds the seller not to contest
any subsequent use by the buyer so long as it is within the terms of the sale.
Some courts have concluded that the buyer obtains no rights whatsoever
against riparians other than the seller. In such cases, a non-appurtenant riparian right amounts to a contract between the seller and the buyer that prevents the seller from contesting the buyer's right to use water from the
common source. 47 In a few cases, the court held that a buyer of a nonappurtenant riparian right acquired the right to make a reasonable use along
with all the other riparian landowners.48 Yet, it is not clear whether the right
43. Lynda L. Butler, Defining a Water Ethic Through Comprehensive Reform: A Suggested Framework for Analysis, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 439, 451-54; Ezra M. Holczer,
Boomer Revisited: Using Experimental and PartialInjunctions in PrivateNuisance Actions,
64 DEF. COUNS. J. 99 (1997); George D. Marlow, From Black Robes to White Lab Coats:
The Ethical Implications of a Judge's Sua Sponte, Ex Parte Acquisition of Social and Other
Scientific Evidence Duringthe Decision-MakingProcess, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 291 (1998).
44. Dellapenna, "Pure" RiparianRights, supra note 2, § 7.02(d)(3).
45. See Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130 (1854); Wallace v. City of Winfield, 149 P. 693
(Kan. 1915); City of Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588 (1881); Fagen v. Mayor of Wharton,
113 A. 920 (N.J. 1920); Sparks Mfg. Co. v. Town of Newton, 41 A. 385 (N.J. 1898); Smith
v. City of Brooklyn, 54 N.E. 787 (N.Y. 1899); Pemell v. City of Henderson, 16 S.E.2d 449
(N.C. 1941); Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 19 S.E.2d 700 (Va. 1942). See generally Dellapenna, "Pure" RiparianRights, supra note 2, § 7.05(c).
46. See Dellapenna, "Pure"RiparianRights, supra note 2, § 7.04(a)(3).
47. Borough of Media v. Edgmont Golf Club, Inc., 288 A.2d 803 (Pa. 1972).
48. Mianus Realty Co. v. Greenway, 193 A.2d 713 (Conn. 1963); Belvedere Dev. Corp.
v. Dep't of Transp., 476 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1985); Pyle v. Gilbert, 265 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 1980);
Mid-America Terminal of Ky., Inc. v. Owensboro River Sand & Gravel Co., 532 S.W.2d 437
(Ky. 1976); Williams v. Skyline Dev. Corp., 288 A.2d 333 (Md. 1972); Sundell v. Town of
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of use conveyed in these few cases is to be measured by the reasonable
needs of the seller, therefore avoiding possible prejudice to the other riparians, or of the buyer, thus treating the buyer as a full, equal riparian. Given
these uncertainties, the buyer of a non-appurtenant riparian right has obtained little more than a hunting license that might or might not yield water.
These uncertainties explain the continuing dearth of non-appurtenant sales.
III. APPROPRIATIVE RIGHTS

The eastern United States is humid, sufficiently so that early European
settlers seldom faced water shortages. Generally the land becomes drier as
one proceeds west, with truly arid regions between the Rocky Mountains
and the coastal ranges, before reaching another, narrower humid region
along the Pacific Coast.49 European settlers in the West needed water for
mining, irrigation, and later industrial and municipal uses. Westerners concluded that these demands could not be satisfied under riparian rights, particularly in its natural flow version, but also in its reasonable use incarnation. 50 Furthermore, from the earliest years of "Anglo" settlement, the newcomers generally displaced aboriginal and Spanish-Mexican law.5" AborigiNew London, 409 A.2d 1315 (N.H. 1979); Donaghey v. Croteau, 401 A.2d 1081 (N.H.
1979); Borough of Media, 288 A.2d at 803; Thomas v. Clark, 346 A.2d 189 (Vt. 1975);
Commonwealth v. Forbes, 197 S.E.2d 195 (Va. 1973).
49. See generallyDellapenna, supra note 1, § 8.01; Grossfeld, supranote 1.
50. For a critique of the assumptions courts made on these issues, see Eric T. Freyfogle,
WaterJustice, 1986 ILL. L. REV. 481. See also MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 33-53 (1977); LUDWIK A. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN
HISTORY AND LAW

(1967);

LUDWIK A. TECLAFF, WATER LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

(1985); DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE
AMERICAN WEST (1985); Gordon Morris Bakken, The Influence of the West on the Development of Law, 24 J.W. 67 (1985); John Clayberg, The Genesis and Development of the Law of
Waters in the Far West, 1 MICH. L. REV. 91 (1902); Robert Dunbar, The Adaptability of
Water Law to the Aridity of the West, 24 J.W. 57 (1985); Lucien Shaw, The Development of
the Law of Waters in the West, 10 CAL. L. REV. 443 (1922). Complicating such concerns was
the tendency of Westerners to assume that eastern water law was a relatively static, unchanging system. See, e.g., WALTER PRESCOTT WEBB, THE GREAT PLAINS 432 (1931); Gordon R.
Miller, Shaping California Water Law, 1781 to 1828, 55 S. CAL. Q. 9, 23, 34 (1973); Donald
Pisani, Enterprise and Equity: A Critique of Western Water Law in the Nineteenth Century,
18 WESTERN HIST. Q. 15, 19 (1987); Harry Scheiber & Charles McCurdy, Eminent Domain
Law and Western Agriculture, 1849-1900, 49 AGRIC. HIST. 113 (1975).
51. The few apparent survivals of Spanish-Mexican law seem actually to have been
fictions invented by the imagination of common law judges. See City of Los Angeles v. City
of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1265-67, 1273-77 (Cal. 1975); City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co., 287 P. 475 (Cal. 1930); Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 715 (Cal. 1886); City
of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73 (N.M. 1962); Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co. of
N.M., 343 P.2d 654 (N.M. 1958); N.M. Prods. Co. v. N.M. Power Co., 77 P.2d 634 (N.M.
1937); State ex rel. Cmty. Ditches v. Tularosa Cmty. Ditch, 143 P. 207 (N.M. 1914); State ex
rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 880 P.2d 868 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); In re Contests of the
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nal law, which might have proven better adapted to local conditions, was

simply ignored. Even in5 2Hawaii, where it had some vitality, aboriginal law

became at best vestigial.
In this context, the westerners developed their own approach to water
allocation. This approach, which came to be known as a system of prior
appropriation, gave rise to a scheme of appropriative rights. Appropriative
rights are basically a private property approach to water allocation in which
the water right is defined as to quantity, time, place, manner of use,5 3 and
most importantly, according to its priority relative to other uses. 54 Legislators in eastern states must examine appropriative rights not only in terms of
how they operate in western states, but more importantly, in terms of
whether they could be adopted in a contemporary eastern setting. Careful
analysis suggests that they could not be adopted successfully in an eastern

state.

City of Laredo, 675 S.W.2d 257, 267-78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). See also Dellapenna, supra
note 1, § 8.02(a)-(b) nn.92-108 & § 8.02(c) nn.200-22. See generally NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR.,
THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER, 1770s-1990s, at 1-77 (1992); DONALD J.
PISANI, To RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST: WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1848-1902, at
38-46 (1992); DANIEL TYLER, THE MYTHICAL PUEBLO RIGHTS DOCTRINE: WATER
ADMINISTRATION IN HISPANIC NEW MEXICO (1990); Hans W. Baade, The Historical Background of Texas Water Law--A Tribute to Jack Pope, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 80-87 (1986);
Gregory Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, 1 WATER L. REV. 1
(1997); Peter L. Reich, The "Hispanic" Roots of PriorAppropriation in Arizona, 27 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 649 (1995) [hereinafter Reich, Hispanic Roots]; Peter L. Reich, Mission Revival
Jurisprudence: State Courts and Hispanic Water Law Since 1850, 69 WASH. L. REV. 869
(1994) [hereinafter Reich, Mission Revival Jurisprudence];David A. Reichard, The Politics
of Village Water Disputes in NorthernNew Mexico, 1882-1905, 9 W. LEGAL HIST. 9 (1996);
Anthony Scott & Georgina Coustalin, The Evolution of Water Rights, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J.
821, 909-10 (1995); Anastasia S. Stevens, Pueblo Water Rights in New Mexico, 28 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 535 (1988); Pierre Ldvy, Note, Which Right Is Right: The Pueblo Water Rights
Doctrine Meets PriorAppropriation,35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 413 (1995).
52. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Related Systems of Water Rights, in 2 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 10.01; Elizabeth Ann Ho-oipo Kala'ena'auao Pa Martin et
al., Cultures in Conflict in Hawaii: The Law and Politics of Native Hawaiian Water Rights,
18 U. HAW. L. REv. 71 (1996); Douglas W. MacDougal, PrivateHopes and Public Values in
the "ReasonableBeneficial Use" of Hawaii's Water: Is Balance Possible?, 18 U. HAW. L.
REV. 1 (1996) [hereinafter MacDougal, PrivateHopes]; Douglas W. MacDougal, Testing the
Current: The Water Code and the Regulation of Hawaii's Water Resources, 10 HAW. L.
REv. 205 (1988) [hereinafter MacDougal, Testing the Current].
53. See, e.g., Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1988);
Rominiecki v. McIntyre Livestock Corp., 633 P.2d 1064 (Colo. 1981); Rencken v. Young,
711 P.2d 954 (Or. 1985); Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557
(Wyo. 1978).
54. See, e.g., TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.027 (Vernon 2000); Coffin v. Left-Hand
Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882); State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 292 N.W. 239 (Neb.
1940).
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The Origins of Appropriative Rights

Appropriative rights did not emerge from a careful analysis of the legal
needs of western states. Instead, a legal regime of appropriative rights grew
out of the simple fact that the early miners in California and elsewhere were
trespassers. 5 5 The sudden peopling of California occurred without any organized government in place.5 6 The Yankee intruders swept away any reliance on Spanish-Mexican law or concern about aboriginal practices. 57 To a
greater extent than is often appreciated, these Yankee intruders brought with
them and used the only law with which they were familiar-the common
law as found in the eastern United States. 8 Yet regarding the two most material factors in their lives-land and water-they were unable to use this
law.
The lands in question were deemed to belong to the federal government (the public domain), while, under riparian rights, the right to use water
was held by the owner of the land. Because the "forty-niners" were unwilling to wait for the establishment of a regular government and the completion of the comprehensive land surveys that would be necessary before the
government would sell the land, the miners simply trespassed on the land
55. Dellapenna, supranote 1, § 8.01.
56. The non-aboriginal population of California jumped from around 15,000 to about
100,000 in the single year of 1849, and grew to 300,000 within five years. See HUNDLEY,
supra note 51, at 64; LEONARD PIr, THE DECLINE OF THE CALIFORNIOS: A SOCIAL HISTORY
OF THE SPANISH-SPEAKING CALIFORNIANS, 1846-1890, at 52 (1966); Andrew P. Morris,
Miners, Vigilantes and Cattlemen: Overcoming Free Rider Problems in the Private Provision of Law, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 581, 594 (1998); Doyce B. Nunis, Jr., Historical
Introduction, in FROM MEXICAN DAYS TO THE GOLD RUSH xlvii-xlviii (Doyce B. Nunis, Jr.,
ed. 1993); Juan F. Peres, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages,
Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 318 (1990); Shaw, supra
note 50, at 445-46. See also PISANI, supra note 51, at 12-14. See generally CLESSON
SELWYNE KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION 155 (1894); CHARLES SHINN, MINING CAMPS: A
STUDY IN AMERICAN FRONTIER GOVERNMENT 132 (Rodman Wilson Paul ed., Harper
Torchbooks 1965) (1885).
57. While early statutes in several states, including California, sought to preserve the
Spanish-Mexican irrigation law, such rights were always subordinated to the needs of miners. See GORDON MORRIS BAKKEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW ON THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN
FRONTIER: CIVIL LAW AND SOCIETY, 1850-1912, at 34 (1983); BETTY EAKLE DOBKINS, THE
SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW 136-39 (1959); HOWARD ROBERTS LAMAR, THE
FAR SOUTHWEST, 1846-1912: A TERRITORIAL HISTORY 91 (1966); PISANI, supra note 51, at
38-44. See also Dellapenna, supra note 1, § 8.02(b) nn.92-108 & § 8.02(c) nn.200-22.
58. See, e.g., JOHN PHILLIP REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL (1980). See also PISANI, supra note 51, at 14; SHINN,

supra note 56, at 11-35; Mark T. Kanazawa, Efficiency in Western Water Law: The Development of the CaliforniaDoctrine, 1850-1911, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 162-65 (1998); Leon
R. Yankwich, Social Attitudes as Reflected in Early CaliforniaLaw, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 250
(1959); Edwin W. Young, The Adoption of the Common Law in California,4 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 355 (1960).
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and took what water they needed. 59 The miners quickly sought to bring order to their lives through vigilante law. The result was the creation of a national mythology based on stories that were all too true-violent disputes,
blood feuds, and sudden death.
Vigilante law was based upon the most elementary notion of justicefirst in time, first in right.60 If someone were found occupying another person's mining claim, the new occupant would most likely hang if he could
not provide justification for his presence. When governments were finally
organized after 1850, they could do little more than ratify the customs of the
miners. 6 1 The mining camps applied precisely the same principles to water
as they did to land. Once again, organized governments had little choice but
to follow along and ratify the customs of the miners.62 After 150 years, the
miner's rule has been developed with considerable elaboration into a complex and sophisticated system of water
administration found, in one form or
63
another, in every appropriation state.
Successive mining rushes to other western territories brought the same
miners who had begun their hunt for wealth in California. They in turn
brought the customs of the California mining camps with them. In some
states, these customs were blended with ill-understood principles of Spanish-Mexican law. 64 Often, when farmers settled part of a state before or simultaneously with miners, they tended to apply riparian rights. Eventually,
nearly everywhere across the West appropriative rights displaced these alternative systems. 65 In the plains states and on the Pacific Coast, the alterna-

59. Moore v. Smaw, 17 Cal. 199 (1861) (overruling Hicks v. Bell, 3 Cal. 219 (1853)).
60. See generally HUNDLEY, supra note 51, at 67-73; PISANI, supra note 51, at 31;
Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American
West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975); Kanazawa, supra note 58, at 165-67. Historian Donald
Pisani, however, has documented the rather considerable support small miners gave to the

riparian tradition in the face of the increasing concentration of water in the hands of large,
capital intensive mining companies.

PISANI,

supra note 51, at 23-26, 35-38. On the appeal

and functioning of the first in time rule, compare Dean Lucek, The Rule of FirstPossession
and the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393 (1995), with Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, If
Your Grandfather Could Pollute, so Can You: Environmental "Grandfather Clauses" and
Their Role in EnvironmentalInequity, 45 CATH.U. L. REV. 131 (1995).
61. Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457 (1878) ("[T]he miners ... were emphatically the

law-makers, as respects mining, upon the public lands in the State.").
62. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
63. C. Peter Goplerud II1, The Permit Process and Colorado'sException, in 2 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 15.
64. See generally DOBKINS, supra note 57; MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE
HISPANIC SOUTHWEST: A SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY (1984); Reich, Hispanic Roots, supra

note 51; Reich, Mission Revival Jurisprudence,supranote 51.
65. Dellapenna, supra note 1, § 8.02.
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tive systems remain vestigial, but usually with little actual impact on how
66
water is managed in western states.
B.

Evaluating Appropriative Rights

As developed in the courts and later by legislation, the appropriative
rights doctrine always remained true to its origins. In significant respects,
the doctrine did not serve its communities well-not only failing to prevent
wasteful and other bad practices but actually encouraging such practices
under particular circumstances. 67 First of all, appropriative rights also exhibit more uncertainty than the underlying principle-first in time, first in
right-suggests. The earliest priorities predate the establishment of the
modern administrative machinery. 68 Despite statutes and legal proceedings
to facilitate putting these claims on record, it is still true on some watercourses that the most valuable rights to use water have never been precisely
quantified.69 Prescriptive, abandoned, or forfeited rights also create gaps in
the official record. 70 The following analysis briefly describes the shortcom66. Id. §§ 8.03-.04(b).
67. See Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search
for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919 (1998); Steven J. Shupe, Waste in
Western Water Law: A Blueprintfor Change, 61 OR. L. REV. 483 (1982).
68. The first statute creating a formal administrative system was enacted in 1890 in
Wyoming; the most recently enacted was in Oklahoma in 1963. See Franco-Am. Charolaise,
Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990); Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P.
258 (Wyo. 1900). See generally Dellapenna, supra note 1, § 8.02(c). Anglo settlement, with
claims of appropriative rights, began as early as 1849 in California, and at later dates in other
states, always well before the creation of administrative machinery.
69. See generally C. Peter Goplerud III, Adjudication of WaterRights, in 2 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, ch. 15; Douglas L. Grant, Registration of Constitutional
Method Water Rights, 17 IDAHO L. REV. 7 (1980).
70. For cases recognizing prescriptive rights, see Gibbons v. Globe Development, Nevada, Inc., 553 P.2d 1198 (Ariz. 1976); Sears v. Berryman, 623 P.2d 455 (Idaho 1981);
Hammond v. Johnson, 66 P.2d 894 (Utah 1937). For states refusing to recognize prescriptive
rights, see ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.040(a) (LEXIS 2000); IDAHO CODE § 42-607 (Michie
1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-705 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.060 (Michie Repl.
1995 & LEXIS Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-1 (2001); People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d
859 (Cal. 1980); Mountain Meadow Ditch & Irrigation Co. v. ParkDitch & Reservoir Co.,
277 P.2d 527 (Colo. 1954); Campbell v. Wyoming Development Co., 102 P.2d 745 (Wyo.
1940). For cases dealing with abandonment, see City of Denver v. Snake River Water District, 788 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1990); Jenkins v. State Department of Water Resources, 647 P.2d
1256 (Idaho 1982); Crandall v. Water Resources Department, 626 P.2d 877 (Or. 1981);
Cundy v. Weber, 300 N.W. 17 (S.D. 1941); Provo River Water Users Ass 'n v. Lambert, 642
P.2d 1219 (Utah 1982); Okanogan Wilderness League, Inc. v. Town of Twisp, 947 P.2d 732
(Wash. 1997). For forfeiture cases, see Jenkins, 647 P.2d at 1256; State v. Oliver Bros., 228
N.W. 864 (Neb. 1930); Town of Eureka v. State Engineer of Nevada, 826 P.2d 948 (Nev.
1992); Jones v. Anderson, 467 P.2d 995 (N.M. 1970); In re Cancellation of the Stabio Ditch
Water Right, 417 N.W.2d 391 (S.D. 1987); Texas Water Rights Commission v. Wright, 464
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ings of the doctrine, shortcomings that became ever more pronounced as
less and less water remained unappropriated and especially with the growing recognition of the importance of nonconsumptive uses of water.71
The "first in time, first in right" principle fosters premature development because one seeks to capture unappropriated waters in order to enjoy
their later rents. 72 To capture the waters one must invest real social capital in
diverting, storing, and applying water. Capital is diverted from socially productive uses to the task of capturing submarginal resources. Excessive diversion capacity is the rule. 73 This significant investment of social capital is
not, however, continued in the post-diversion treatment of water and most
appropriative takings of water are characterized by inadequate investment in
post-diversionary aspects of development, especially those designed to save
water.74 The introduction of conditional rights made it even easier to capture
S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1971); Provo River Water Users Ass 'n., 642 P.2d at 1219; Sheep Mountain
Cattle Co. v. Department of Ecology, 726 P.2d 55 (Wash. App. 1986); In re North Laramie
Land Co., 605 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1980). See generally C. Peter Goplerud III, Protection and
Termination of Water Rights, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, ch. 17; V.
Lane Jacobson, Note, Snake River Basin Adjudication Issue 10: PartialForfeiturefor NonUse of a Water Right in Idaho, 35 IDAHO L. REv. 179 (1998).
71. See generally Gaffney, supra note 40.
72. See generallyAmy Beatie & James Fosnaught, The City of Golden's Applicationfor
Surface Water Rights: A Kayak Course, Instream Flow, Dilution, or What?, 2 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 273 (1999). The notion of capturing rents has been developed in the body of
political and economic theory that goes by the name of "public choice theory." See generally
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991); lArN MCLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION (1987); DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II

(1989);

PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND

COMMENTARY (Maxwell Steams ed. 1997); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of

the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 703, 710-17 (1984); Chulho Jung et al., The Coase
Theorem in a Rent-Seeking Society, 15 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 259 (1995); Jonathan R.
Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986); William T. Mayton, The Possibilitiesof
Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to
Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948; Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and
the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263 (1982); Edward L.
Rubin, Public Choice and Legal Scholarship, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 490 (1996); David A.
Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-InfluencedLegal Scholarship, 50
VAND. L. REv. 647 (1997); Maxwell L. Steams, Restoring Positive Law and Economics:
Introduction to Public Choice Theme Issue, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 709 (1998).
73. See Neuman, supra note 67; Shupe, supra note 67.
74. See, e.g., Salt River Valley Users' Ass'n v. Kovacovich, 411 P.2d 201 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1966); Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal.
1935); Krieger v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 173 Cal. Rptr. 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Wilder
Irrigation Dist. v. Jorgensen, 136 P.2d 461 (Idaho 1943); State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 292
N.W. 239 (Neb. 1940); Oliver v. Skinner, 226 P.2d 507 (Or. 1951); City of Corpus Christi v.
City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1955); Provo River Water Users Ass'n., 642 P.2d
at 1219; Carbon Canal Co. v. Cottonwood-Gooseberry Irrigation Co., 427 P.2d 396 (Utah
1967); Fuss v. Franks, 610 P.2d 17 (Wyo. 1980); Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n, 307 P.2d
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rents-by establishing an intent to appropriate that might not be realized for
many years. 75
In order to capture rents, appropriators use as much water as they possibly can.76 To an appropriator, withdrawing water, a social cost, is a private
gain, creating a basis for a claim to water in the future. Appropriators thus
live in an environment where it is smart to overirrigate. Much of the water
shortage of the arid west would disappear overnight if appropriators had to
start paying an economic price for water, and the water shortage would
greatly abate if appropriators simply started thinking in terms of a zero
price, instead of, as now, regarding the price as negative because of the gain
they realize by piling up a great history of use.77
Under the "first in time, first in right" doctrine, appropriators are senior
and junior to one another along a scale from first to last. When water is
short, juniors drop out first and lose everything before the next senior appropriator loses anything. 78 There is no pooling of risk whatsoever. The
senior appropriator is protected by exaggerating the risk to junior appropriators. Two basic economizing principles are denied. One is marginal productivity. 79 A junior appropriator who loses all access to water obviously loses
593 (Wyo. 1957). See generally Ernest C. Brown & Nathaniel Weinstock, Legal Issues in
Implementing Water Reuse in California,9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243 (1981); Clayton K. Yeutter, A
Legal-Economic Critique of Nebraska WatercourseLaw, 44 NEB. L. REV. 11, 39-43 (1965).
Western courts have begun to penalize wasteful practices. See Erickson v. Queen Valley
Ranch Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Glenn Dale Ranches, Inc. v. Shaub, 494
P.2d 1029 (Idaho 1972); Estate of Steed Through Kazan v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 846
P.2d 1223 (Utah 1992). See also Krista Koehl, PartialForfeiture of Water Rights: Oregon
Compromises TraditionalPrinciplesTo Achieve Flexibility, 28 ENVTL. L. 1137 (1998); Mark
Honhart, Comment, Carrotsfor Conservation: Oregon's Water Conservation Statute Offers
Incentives To Invest in Efficiency, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 827 (1995). How effective these legal
changes will prove in practice remains to be seen.
75. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Bd. of Water Works, 831 P.2d 470 (Colo.
1992); City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1992); Colo. River
Water Conserv. Dist. v. City of Denver, 642 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1982); Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. City of Denver, 640 P.2d 1139 (Colo. 1982); Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist.
v. Twin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co., 506 P.2d 1226 (Colo. 1973); City of Denver v. N.
Colo. Water Conserv. Dist., 276 P.2d 992 (Colo. 1954); In re Water Appropriation, 280
N.W.2d 75 (Neb. 1979); In re Application No. 5189-3, 467 N.W.2d 907 (S.D. 1991); Carbon
Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Ass'n, 425 P.2d 405 (Utah 1967); Green River Dev. Co. v.
FMC Corp., 660 P.2d 339 (Wyo. 1983). See generally Jackson B. Battle, Paper Clouds over
the Waters: Shelf Filings and Hyperextended Permits in Wyoming, 22 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 673 (1987); Beatie & Fosnaught, supra note 72.
76. Charles W. Howe et al., The Performanceof Appropriative Water Rights Systems in
the Western United States DuringDrought, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 379 (1982).
77. Neuman, supra note 67.
78. For one of the most extreme examples of this pattern, see State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 292 N.W. 239 (Neb. 1940).
79. See generally ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 20-33 (1990); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
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some marginal units of high productivity, while the senior appropriator retains marginal units of low productivity. The other is pooling of risk. One's
supply is a piece of the larger common supply, but one's piece is defined in
a way that greatly increases the aggregate variability of supply above its
natural variability and distributes these increased risks unequally.
There never has been a market for appropriative rights to any significant extent. 8° Appropriative rights simply are not bought and sold freely,
despite crying needs for water transfers in every area. 8' The recognition and
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1 (5th ed. 1998); Herbert Hovenklamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase
Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 783 (1990).

80. See

RODNEY SMITH, TRADING WATER: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR

WATER MARKETING 28-52 (1988); Bonnie G. Colby, Economic Impacts of Water Law-State
Law and Water Market Development in the Southwest, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 721 (1988);

Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: The Myth of Markets for
Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 317 (2000); Freyfogle, supra note 50, at
510-14; Zachary McCormick, Institutional Barriers to Water Marketing in the West, 30
WATER RESOURCES BULL. 953 (1994); Kevin O'Brien, Water Marketing in California, 19
PAC. L.J. 1165 (1988); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., InstitutionalPerspectives on Water Policy
and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671, 723-39 (1993); Robert A. Young, Why Are There So Few
Transactions Among Water Users?, 68 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1143 (1986). See generally
RICHARD WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 197-289 (1989).

81. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE
INVISIBLE PUMP (1997); CLAY J. LANDRY, SAVING OUR STREAMS THROUGH WATER MARKETS
(1998); NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND

THE ENVIRONMENT (1992); BONNIE COLBY SALIBA & DAVID B. BUSH, WATER MARKETS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE: MARKET TRANSFERS, WATER VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 45-46
(1987); SMITH, supra note 80; WAHL, supra note 80, at 140-44; RICHARD WAHL, WATER
MARKETING IN CALIFORNIA: PAST EXPERIENCE, FUTURE PROSPECTS 11-12 (Reason Found.,
Policy Study No. 162, 1993); THE WATER TRANSFER PROCESS AS A MANAGEMENT OPTION
FOR MEETING CHANGING WATER DEMANDS (Lawrence J. MacDonnell ed., 1990); Michael C.
Blumm, Seven Myths of Northwest Water Law and Associated Stories, 26 ENVTL. L. 141,
145-46 (1996); Colby, supra note 80; James N. Corbridge, Jr., HistoricalWater Use and the
Protection of Vested Rights: A Challengefor Colorado Water Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 503
(1998); James D. Crammond, Leasing Water Rights for Instream Flow Uses: A Survey of
Water Transfer Policy, Practices,and Problems in the Pacific Northwest, 26 ENVTL. L. 225
(1996); Ariel Dinar & J. Letey, Agricultural Water Marketing, Allocative Efficiency, and
DrainageReduction, 20 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 210 (1991); Andrew K. Dragun & Victor
Gleeson, From Water Law to Transferability in New South Wales, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J.
645 (1989); Thomas J. Graff & David Yardas, Reforming Western Water Policy: Markets
and Regulation, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 165 (1998); Brian E. Gray, The Modern Era
in CaliforniaWater Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 249 (1994); Ronald C. Griffin & Fred 0. Boadu,
Water Marketing in Texas: Opportunitiesfor Reform, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 265 (1992);
Charles Howe et al., The Economic Impacts ofAgriculture-to-Urban Water Transfers on the
Area of Origin: A Case Study of the Arkansas River Valley in Colorado, 72 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 1200 (1990); Morris Israel & Jay R. Lund, Recent California Water Transfers:
Implicationsfor Water Management, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1995); Ronald A. Kaiser &
Laura M. Phillips, Dividing the Waters: Water Marketing as a Conflict Resolution Strategy
in the Edwards Aquifer Region, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 411, 436-43 (1998); Ronald A.
Kaiser, Texas Water Marketing in the Next Millennium: A Conceptual and Legal Analysis,
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protection of third-party rights precludes true market transactions.82 Even
the highly touted California Water Bank turns out, upon close examination,
Texas Water Marketing in the Next Millennium: A Conceptual and Legal Analysis, 27 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 181, 185-92 (1996); Ronald A. Kaiser & Shane Binion, Untying the Gordion
Knot: Negotiated Strategiesfor ProtectingInstream Flows in Texas, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J.
157 (1998); Lawrence J.MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, Moving Agricultural Water to the
Cities: The Searchfor Smarter Approaches, 2 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J.ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 27,
45-46 (1994); Steven J.Shupe et al., Western Water Rights: The Era of Reallocation, 29
NAT. RESOURCES J. 413 (1989); Jack Sterne, Instream Rights andInvisible Hands: Prospects
for Private Instream Water Rights in the Northwest, 27 ENVTL. L. 203 (1997); Mark W.
Tader, Reallocating Western Water: Beneficial Use, Property,and Politics, 1986 U. ILL. L.
REV. 277; A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western
Water Law: From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
163, 168-69 (1999); Gregory A. Thomas & Tara L. Miller, Reflections on the "Model Water
TransferAct" by the National HeritageInstitute, 4 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
91, 99-101 (1996); Thompson, supra note 80; Kenneth R. Weber, Effects of Water Transfers
on RuralAreas: A Response to Shupe, Weatherford, and Checchio, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 13
(1990); Paul R. Williams & Stephen J. McHugh, Water Marketing and Instream Flows: The
Next Step in Protecting California's Instream Values, 9 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 132 (1990);
Young, supra note 80; Jennifer L. Cordua, Comment, The Searchfor New Supplies: Salvaging the Remains of Agricultural Water Conservation in California, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
591 (1998).
82. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1702 (West 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(3)
(1999); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 85-2-402 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.370(3) (Michie
Repl. 1995 & LEXIS Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-23 to -25 (Michie 1997); OR.
REV. STAT. § 540.530(1) (2001); TEX. WATER CODE § 11.134(b)(3)(B) (Vernon 2000); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 73-3-3 to -8(1)(b) (2001); WYO.STAT. ANN. § 41-3-104 (Michie 1999); Santa
Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46 (Colo. 1999); In re May, 756
P.2d 362 (Colo. 1988); Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217 (Colo.
1988); CF&I Steel Corp. v. Rooks, 495 P.2d 1134 (Colo. 1972); Thompson v. Harvey, 519
P.2d 963 (Mont. 1974); W.S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Co., 439 P.2d 715 (N.M. 1968); In re
Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); Crandall v. Water Res. Dep't, 626 P.2d 877
(Or. 1981); White v. Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 595 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1979). See generally HAROLD
CARTER & HENRY VAUX, JR., THIRD-PARTY EFFECTS: THE RESEARCH CHALLENGE (1994);
DAVID MITCHELL, WATER MARKETING IN CALIFORNIA: RESOLVING THIRD-PARTY IMPACT
ISSUES (1993); NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 81, at 5-6, 38-42, 73-78, 189-91, 225-28,
254-57, 263-65; SMITH, supra note 80, at 17-26; Bonnie G. Colby, Transaction Costs and
Efficiency in Western Water Allocation, 72 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1184 (1990); Corbridge,
supra note 81, at 507-13; Dellapenna, supra note 80, at 350-56; Willis H. Ellis, Water
Transfer Problems: Law, in WATER RES. 233 (Allen Kneese & Stephen C. Smith eds. 1965);
Casey S. Funk & Amy M. Cavanaugh, Basic Exchange 101, 1 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 206
(1998); George A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects, 23 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 1 (1988); John S. Harbison, Waist Deep in the Big Muddy: Property Rights,
Public Values, and Instream Waters, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 535, 546-49 (1991);
Charles W. Howe et al., TransactionCosts as Determinantsof Water Transfers, 61 U. COLO.
L. REV. 393 (1990); Kaiser, supra note 81, at 213-14, 246-47; Avery Katz, JudicialDecisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1988); Jay R. Lund,
Transaction Risk Versus Transaction Cost in Water Transfers, 29 WATER RESOURCES
RESOURCES 3103 (1993); MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 81, at 29-3 1; Kevin M. O'Brien &
Robert R. Gunning, Water Marketing in CaliforniaRevisited: The Legacy of the 1987-92
Drought, 25 PAC. L.J. 1053, 1062-74 (1994); Young, supranote 80.

2002]

THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION

to have been an instance of administrative reallocation masquerading as a
market.83
The case of City of Denver v. Fulton IrrigatingDitch Co.8 4 provides
the classic example of what happens when a buyer seeks water for a use that
is fundamentally different or at a considerable remove from that of the
seller. The case arose from the attempt of the City of Denver to trade its
sewage water for a brewery's "clear mountain stream." Coors Beer, a popular brewer in the suburbs of Denver, heavily advertised the high quality of
the water used in its brewing. Coors, however, was unable to produce
enough beer to satisfy the demand for its product without a greatly enlarged
supply of water. The City of Denver, consistently one of the fastest growing
cities in the United States, is always on the look out for new sources of potable water for its residents and businesses. Denver offered a swap to which
Coors was all too ready to agree.
Denver would take Coors's clear mountain stream to augment its municipal supplies; Coors would have the right to use unlimited quantities of
Denver sewage water for its brewery.8 5 The transaction failed not because of
fears over possible outrage on the part of beer drinkers, but because a group
of farmers downstream from Denver, organized as the Fulton Irrigating
Ditch Co., obtained an injunction against this trade because it would deprive
them of the water on which they were relying. 6 The outcome in the case is
all the more remarkable as the City and Coors were contracting regarding
"imported water"--water from outside the watershed-over which the City
would have even greater rights than it would have had if it were merely
claiming the rights of a senior appropriator.8 7 In this case, the farmers had
contractually recognized the seniority of Denver's rights over their own in a
settlement of an earlier dispute in exchange for Denver's promise not to
reuse any water, regardless of source, that "shall have been once used
through its municipal water system" for the benefit of the farmers. 88 The
outcome in Fulton IrrigatingDitch Co. would not have depended on the
existence of the contract if the water had not been imported from outside the
watershed. 9

83. Dellapenna, supra note 80, at 358-65.
84. 506 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1972). See generally Stephen F. Williams, Optimizing Water
Use: The Return Flow Issue, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 301, 311-21 (1973).
85. Fulton IrrigatingDitch Co., 506 P.2d at 151.
86. Id. at 151-53.
87. Id. at 146-49.
88. Id. at 151.
89. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46 (Colo.
1999); Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1988); CF&I Steel
Corp. v. Rooks, 495 P.2d 1134 (Colo. 1972).
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Where administered by irrigation districts, appropriative rights are applied to contained service areas. Where claimed by individuals, or smaller
districts, service areas from given streams are generally scattered. "First in
time, first in right" puts a premium on jumping the gun. The farther one is
from a source, and the more convenient it is to others, the greater the motive
to get there first to preclude them. So, typically, the first claimants on a
source are scattered; soon the supply is fully claimed, and the included dry
lands can never get water from this source. They can, however, search about
for other more remote sources. The results need not be imagined; they may
be observed throughout the arid states. 90 Recent legal innovations
designed
91
to protect areas of origin have had very limited impacts.
The amount of water that complaisant courts will recognize as being
used beneficially is a function of, among other things, the amount of land
that the user has.92 So this doctrine tends to distribute public water to those
who already own private land, in proportion to the size of the landholding.
Traditionally, no effort was made to protect the public interest in the waters
93
of the state or to distribute their fruits among the disadvantaged of society.
Many appropriative rights states have now enacted statutes to require consideration of the public interest in evaluating applications to make a new
appropriation. 94 These statutes, however, do not apply to existing water
rights and thus have little practical effect in most water basins in which
most or all available water has already been appropriated. 95 Whether in to90. See State ex rel Carey v. Cochran, 292 N.W. 239 (Neb. 1940).
91. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10505, 10505.5 (West 1992). See generally
LAWRENCE

J.

MACDONNELL

ET AL.,

GUIDELINES

FOR

DEVELOPING

AREA-OF-ORIGIN

(1985); NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 81, at 78-79, 114-15, 225-32,
243-44, 257-59; Robert Abrams, Interbasin Transfer in a Riparian Jurisdiction,24 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 591 (1983); J. David Aiken, New Directions in Nebraska Water Policy, 66
NEB. L. REV. 8 (1987); Kaiser, supra note 81, at 215-18, 251-53; Lawrence J. MacDonnell
& Charles W. Howe, Area-of-Origin Protection in Transbasin Water Diversions:An Evaluation of Alternative Approaches, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 527 (1986); Gregory S. Weber, Twenty
Years of Local Groundwater Export Legislation in California:Lessons from a Patchwork
Quilt, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 657 (1994).
92. This is made explicit in laws defining a "duty of water"--amount of water that may
be used lawfully to irrigate acreages of particular crops. See, e.g., Farmers Highline Canal &
Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629 (Colo. 1954); McDonald v. State, 722 P.2d
598 (Mont. 1986); Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Willis, 284 N.W. 326 (Neb. 1939); State
Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044 (Wash. 1993); Quinn v. John Whitaker Ranch
Co., 92 P.2d 568 (Wyo. 1939).
93. Gaffney, supra note 40, at 138.
94. See, e.g., E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 35 P.2d 1027 (Cal. 1934);
Collins Bros. v. Dunn, 759 P.2d 891 (Idaho 1988); Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho
1985); Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045 (N.M. 1910). See generally Goplerud,
supra note 63, § 15.03(c)(3).
95. See, e.g., Collins Bros., 759 P.2d at 891; Shokal, 707 P.2d at 441. Two states seem
to have defined the "public interest" as depending upon a cost-benefit analysis rather than
COMPENSATION
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day's economy distributive equity favors protecting endangered species and
providing water for
other public values rather than for irrigation is at least
96
an open question.
C.

The Failure of Appropriative Rights in the East

Despite the difficulties in the actual realization of private property
rights in water under appropriative rights, the Pacific coast states, from
Alaska to California, and the high plains states, from North Dakota to
Texas, all eventually adopted appropriative rights to replace an earlier system of riparian rights. 97 Generally, legislation brought about the change.
The legislatures were unable to abolish riparian rights completely through
inability or unwillingness to compensate the owners of riparian rights. Instead, the legislature chose to preserve as valid riparian rights uses that existed on the effective date of the first appropriative rights statute. 98 Even
something more wide-ranging than a purely economic analysis. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 46.15.80(b) (LEXIS 2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.54.020(2) (2000); Stempel v. Dep't of
Water Res., 508 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1973). See generally Norman K. Johnson & Charles T.
DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western Water Law in Response to Changing Economic and PublicInterest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347 (1989).
96. See, e.g., Reed Benson, A Watershed Issue: The Role of Streamflow Protection in
Northwest River Basin Management, 26 ENVTL. L. 175 (1996); Lawrence J. MacDonnell,
Managing Reclamation Facilitiesfor Ecosystem Benefits, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 197 (1996);
Michael R. Moore et al., Water Allocation in the American West: EndangeredFish Versus
Irrigated Agriculture, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 319 (1996); Carmen Sower-Hall & Holly I.
Holder, Water Quality Issues in Augmentation Plans and Exchanges, 1 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV. 96 (1997); A. Dan Tarlock, River Management in the Twenty-First Century: The Vision
Thing, 6 RIVERS 43 (1997); Alexandra E. Viscusi, Conflicting Directives: Water Quality and
Appropriative Water Rights in the West, 20 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 121
(1995); Wendy Weiss, The FederalGovernment's Pursuit of Instream Flow Water Rights, 1
U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 151 (1998).
97. See Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886). See generally Dellapenna, supra note 1,
ch. 8.
98. See Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935);
Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1956), aff'd mem., 352 U.S. 863 (1956); F.
Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164 (Kan. 1981); City of Hesston v. Smrha, 391
P.2d 93 (Kan. 1964); Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578 (Kan. 1962), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 7 (1963); State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 207 P.2d 440 (Kan. 1949); Hickman v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 113 N.W.2d 617 (Neb. 1962); In re Application of
Ainsworth Irrigation Dist., 102 N.W.2d 429 (Neb. 1960); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d
728 (N.D. 1968); City of Stillwater v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 524 P.2d 938 (Okla. 1974);
Okla. Water Res. Bd. v. Cent. Okla. Master Conservancy Dist., 464 P.2d 748 (Okla. 1969);
In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065 (Or. 1924), appeal dismissed sub nom. Pac. Power Co. v.
Bayer, 273 U.S. 647 (1926); Norwood v. E. Or. Land Co., 227 P. 1111 (Or. 1924); In re
Willow Creek, 144 P. 505 (Or. 1914), modified on reh'g, 146 P. 475 (1915); Belle Fourche
Irrigation Dist. v. Smiley, 176 N.W.2d 239 (S.D. 1970); Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708
(S.D. 1964); In re Medina River, 670 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. 1984); In re Upper Guadalupe River,
642 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1982); In re Deadman Creek, 694 P.2d 1071 (Wash. 1985); Brown v.
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though most transitions took place when existing water uses were relatively
few in these states, the result99was a dual system that combined the worst
features of both bodies of law.
Mississippi became the only state to the east of Kansas City to adopt a
dual system in 1955.100 Mississippi's experience suggests why it would be
futile to import appropriative rights into the hydrologically more developed
regions east of Kansas City.'0 1 During the thirty years that Mississippi had
an appropriative rights statute on the books, not one court in Mississippi
ever referred to that statute 10
even
though there were numerous legal disputes
2
over the allocation of water.
Maybe the lack of mention of an appropriation statute in any Mississippi case during this period simply reflects a failure to educate the bar and
the judiciary on its existence or its provisions. Still, it is remarkable that not
one judge (and presumably not one lawyer) found the statute and considered
it worth mentioning in any relevant reported case decided during this period. On deeper reflection, however, one might conclude that the appropriation statute was not mentioned because it could have had little to contribute
to the resolution of disputes over water in Mississippi. The reason is fairly
obvious. Most consumptive uses of water had begun before 1955, and
claiming an appropriative right would only concede priority to an opponent
claiming a riparian right. Either the riparian right would prevail as the earliest appropriation,0 3 or the appropriative right would be a permissive
non04
riparian use that must fail in competition with a riparian use.'
The best that an appropriator could hope would be that the appropriative use would be balanced against the complaining riparian's use, which
05
brings one full circle back to the reasonable use version of riparian rights.'
If an acute general water shortage should develop, rather than having a more
secure title than a riparian, the appropriator would simply find no water.
Chase, 217 P. 23 (Wash. 1923). But see Franco-Am. Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res.
Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990) (attempting to cut-off unused riparian rights is void as an
attempted taking without compensation).
99. Dellapenna, supra note 1, §§ 8.03-.04.
100. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-3(g)(3) to 51-3-7 (1972). See generally William Champion, PriorAppropriationin Mississippi-A Statutory Analysis, 39 Miss. L.J. 1 (1967).
101. Dellapenna, supra note 1, § 8.05.
102. See Anderson-Tully Co. v. Franklin, 307 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Haisch v.
Southhaven Land Co., 274 F. Supp. 392 (N.D. Miss. 1967); Phillips v. Davis Timber Co.,
468 So. 2d 72 (Miss. 1985); Black v. Williams, 417 So. 2d 911 (Miss. 1982); Hinds-Rankin
Metro. Water Ass'n v. Reid, 256 So. 2d 373 (Miss. 1971); Downes v. Crosby Chem., Inc.,
234 So. 2d 916 (Miss. 1970).
103. See Dellapenna, supra note 1, § 8.04(a).
104. Id. § 8.04(b).
105. See, e.g., Wasserburger v. Coffee, 141 N.W.2d 738 (Neb. 1966), modified on other
grounds, 144 N.W.2d 209 (Neb. 1966); Franco-Am. Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res.
Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990). See Dellapenna, supra note 1, § 8.04(b) nn.441-47.
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Finally, the added level of uncertainty that the duality of the system provides would actually ensure that no markets would arise to remedy the dethat would have been established to adminfects of the bureaucratic system
06
ister appropriative rights.
When Mississippi repealed its appropriative rights statute, it gave all
persons claiming rights vested under the appropriation statute one year 1to
07
file a document expressing an intent to preserve their appropriative right.
So far as I have been able to determine, no such documents were filed. Mississippi did not, however, abandon the sort of regulated system of water
allocation that characterizes modem appropriative rights'0 8 in favor of a
return to the unregulated system of traditional riparian rights. Instead, Mississippi replaced its appropriative rights system with another highly regulated system of water allocation-the public property system of regulated
riparianism.' 0 9
In short, the Mississippi example strongly suggests that adding appropriative rights to an economically mature, humid eastern state hitherto
committed to riparian rights would add little, if anything, in terms of rational water management at a cost of establishing and maintaining the considerable bureaucratic machinery inherent to modem appropriative rights.
This reality ought to be quite enough to preclude serious consideration of
western-style appropriative rights in the eastern United States even without
considering the further arguments about the monopolistic and environmentally unsound biases of appropriative rights." 0 As a result, eastern states
wishing to make a sharp departure from the more or less pure riparian rights
tradition uniformly have gone not in the direction of appropriative rights but
in the direction of the fundamentally different system of regulated riparianism.
IV. REGULATED RIPARIANISM

Since the 1950s, about half of the states east of Kansas City, along
with Hawaii, have deployed administrative permit systems to replace tradition riparian rights."' Rather than importing appropriative rights into the
East, however, these states have developed a highly regulated system of
water administration based on riparian principles that could best be de-

106. See supra note 80 for authorities on the dearth of true markets for water. See generally supra text accompanying notes 46-48, 79-88.
107. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-5(2)-(3), 51-3-29(a)-(c) (2002).
108. See generally Anderson et al., supra note 4, at chs. 14-17.
109. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to -15 (2002).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 67-78, 89-94.
111. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 10.
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scribed as a transition to a system of public property. 112 The transition from
extremely limited regulatory intervention to more or less comprehensive
regulation often occurred incrementally rather than from a conscious design
to revolutionize the system of water rights. As a result, there is disagreement over when to date the emergence of a true regulated riparian system,
and even today one could debate whether certain states have in fact crossed
the boundary from relying largely on unregulated common law riparian
rights to a regulated riparian system. Bearing this in mind, the following list
indicates the states that have enacted regulated riparian systems and the
113 Arkansas (1957); 114
approximate date of that adoption: Alabama (1993);
Connecticut (1982);' 15 Delaware (1959);1 16 Florida (1972);117 Georgia
(1977); 118 Hawaii (1987); 119 Iowa (1957);120 Kentucky (1966);12 1 Maryland
(1957); 122 Massachusetts (1985); 123 Minnesota (1973); 124 Mississippi
(1985); 125 New Jersey (1965);126 North Carolina (1973); 127 New York
(1979);128 Virginia (1989);129 and Wisconsin (1957).130 In addition, several
states have applied a regulated
riparian system to groundwater without ap1 31
plying it to surface waters.
Even now, there is no fully recognized name for the new system of water allocation law. Peter Davis has suggested that the new regulatory system
should be called "non-temporal priority permit systems. ' , 132 This term certainly aptly describes the new system, but it is a bit too much of a mouthful
to expect people to say (or write) very often. Others have simply given up
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Dellapenna, Introduction, supra note 2, § 6.01(b)(1).
ALA. CODE §§ 9-10B-1 to -30 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-201 to -622 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-365 to -380 (1995).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6001-6031 (Michie Repl. 2001).
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.012-.619 (West 2000 & Supp. 2001).
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-20 to -31, 12-5-43 to -53 (LEXIS 2001).

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-1 to -101 (Repl. 1993 & Supp. 2001).
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.261-.281 (West 1997 & Supp. 2002).
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 151.010-.600, 151.990 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 5-501 to -514 (Michie Repl. 1996).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21G, §§ 1-19 (1994).
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 103G.001-.315 (West 1997).
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to-55 (1999).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:lA-1 to-17 (West 1992).

127. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 15-1501 to-1529 (McKinney 1997).
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.11-.22K(2001).
129. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-242 to -253 (Michie Repl. 2001).

130. WIs. STAT. §§ 30.18, 30.28, 30.292-.298, 281.35 (1999-2000).
131. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-401 to -655 (West 1994 & West Supp. 2001); 525
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 45/1-45/7 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002); IND. CODE §§ 14-25-4-1 to
-21 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN.

§§

49-5-10 to-150 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & West Supp. 2001).

132. Peter Davis, Australian and American Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 647, 697-705 (1968).

20021

THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION

trying to use a name that tells anything about the system, tending to call the
new system simply "eastern permit systems.' 33 The name "regulated riparianism," which I devised some twenty years ago, 134 offends those to whom
the words "regulate" and "riparian" are polar opposites.' 35 It has the virtue,
however, of emphasizing both that the administrative permit process proceeds on essentially riparian principles and that the new system is a regulation of-rather than a taking of-riparian rights.1 36 In short, "regulated riparianism" appears to be about as succinctly descriptive a name as one can
In recent years, this name has begun to gain a more general accephope for.
37
tance.1
Little has been written about regulated riparianism, and most of what
has been written on the topic viewed regulated riparian statutes as minor
modifications superimposed on the riparian rights that the authors saw as
remaining the core of the law in these states. 138 Others construed regulated
riparian statutes as inartfully drafted appropriative rights statutes. 39 Few
commentators have realized that regulated riparianism represents a truly
different model of water law. The following summary description of regulated riparianism is based on the common core principles found from exam133. See, e.g., A

SUMMARY DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS

22-23 (Richard Dewsnup &

Dallin Jensen eds., 1973).
134. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Owning Water in the Eastern United States, in 6 PROC. E.
MINERAL L. FNDTN.

at 1-33 to 1-34 (1985).

135. See, e.g., Frank J. Trelease, The Model Water Code, the Wise Administrator, andthe
Goddam Bureaucrat,14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 207, 211-13 (1974).
136. Dellapenna, supranote 10, § 9.01.
137. See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 80-92 (3d
ed. 2000); Robert E. Beck, The Regulated Riparian Model Water Code: Blueprint for
Twenty-First Century Water Management, 25 WM. & MARY L. & POL'Y REV. 113 (2000);
William Cox, 111, The Alabama Water Resources Act: A Hybrid Model of "Regulated Riparianism," in WATER LAW: TRENDS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 151, 163 n.4 (Kathleen Marion
Carr & James Crammond eds., 1995); MacDougal, Private Hopes, supra note 52, at 18;
Judith V. Royster, Winter in the East: Tribal Reserved Water Rights to Water in Riparian
States, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 169, 188-91 (2000); George William
Sherk, The Regulated Riparian Model State Water Code: Perspectives on the Relationship
Between Water Quantityand Water Quality, 7 RIVERS 1 (1999); A. Dan Tarlock, Reconnecting Property Rights to Watersheds, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 69, 90-91
(2000).
138. See, e.g., Scott & Coustalin, supra note 51, at 899-901 (describing statutory-i.e.,
regulated riparian-permit systems as hastily enacted and not fitting with other bureaucratic
systems in the state or province of enactment, as well as being of little consequence and not
robust enough to deal with any true crisis). See also Richard Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Programfor Reform, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 547 (1983); Peter Davis,
Eastern Water Diversion Permit Statutes: Precedentsfor Missouri, 47 Mo. L. REV. 429
(1982).
139. See, e.g., George William Sherk, Eastern Water Law, 1 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 7
(1986); Frank J. Trelease, A Water Management Lawfor Arkansas, 6 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L.J. 369 (1983).
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ining the actual regulated riparian statutes and also on the Regulated Riparian Model Water Code ("Model Water Code") of the American Society of
Civil Engineers ("Society"). 140 The Model Water Code is now in the process
of being approved as an official standard of the Society. No state has a system precisely like the one described here, although several come very
close. 141 References here are provided in the text to the Model Water Code
that deal with the points being mentioned and to the relevant chapter of the
treatise Waters and Water Rights. These are the most convenient sources for
understanding the structure and application of regulated riparianism. Both
include detailed commentaries explaining the various provisions and exhaustive references to actual regulated riparian statutes.
A.

Differences from Riparian Rights

The most fundamental departure from common law riparian rights in
the regulated riparian statutes is the requirement that generally no water is
to be withdrawn from a water source without a permit from the state where
the withdrawal occurs. 142 The rights of water users are determined by the
permits, not by the riparian nature of the use, yet the criterion by which
permit applications are judged is whether the proposed use is a reasonable
use of the water. 143 Under regulated riparianism, the criterion of reasonable
use is applied very differently than at common law. The most important
difference is that an administering agency decides before a use begins
whether it is reasonable, both in terms of general social policy
and in terms
44
of the effects of the proposed use on other permitted uses. 1
The administering agency is charged to make the permit subject to
conditions designed to protect other lawful users and public values. 145 The
statutes often contain preferences for certain classes of uses. 146 Temporal
47
priority has been accorded a strictly limited role in the permit process.
140. AM. Soc'Y OF CIVIL ENG'RS, THE REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE:
FINAL REPORT OF THE WATER LAWS COMMITrEE (Joseph W. Dellapenna ed., 1997) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].

141. See Dellapenna, supra note 10.
142. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, § 6R-1-01; Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(a).
143. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, §§ 2R-1-01, 2R-2-20, 6R-3-01 to -02; Dellapenna,
supra note 10, § 9.03(b). Some jurisdictions would substitute the terms "beneficial," "reasonable-beneficial," or "equitable" for "reasonable."
144. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, §§ 6R-2-01 to -08, 6R-3-02, 6R-3-05; Dellapenna,
supra note 10, §§ 9.03(a)(5)(A), 9.03(b).
145. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, § 7R-1-01; Dellapenna, supra note 10, §§ 9.03(a)(5)(A),
9.05.
146. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, §§ 6R-1-02, 6R-3-04; Dellapenna, supra note 10,
§§ 9.03(a)(3), 9.05(c).
147. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, §§ 6R-1-03, 6R-3-02; Dellapenna, supra note 10,
§ 9.03(a)(b)(3).
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Nor are the traditional preferences for riparian land continued. Uses on nonriparian land are no longer unreasonable per se; often one of the principle
motives of the enactment of a regulated riparian statute is to authorize the
use of water on non-riparian land.148 Finally, in many states, permits are
issued only for a period of time (three to twenty years).149 When a permit
expires, the continued reasonableness of the use can be reexamined. The
Model Water Code sets twenty years as the duration of the permits.
Regulated riparian statutes contain elaborate enforcement provisions,
including criminal penalties,' 50 civil penalties, 151 injunctions, 152 administrative orders, and actions for public and private damages. 154 Such statutes
also provide for hearings within the agency' 55 and judicial review of agency
decisions. 5 6 The Model Water Code also includes provisions designed to
support alternative dispute resolution' 57 and the administrative resolution of
disputes among permit holders'-provisions not generally found in actual
regulated riparian statutes.
While users are sometimes required to pay fees to the agency for the
permits based on the amount of water they will use, these fees cannot be
considered payment for the water itself.159 This is clear when the fees are a
set, uniform charge irrespective of the nature of the use or the amount of
water used. Even when the fee is variable, however, it is set according to the
presumed ability of the user to pay, rather than according to the value that
could be created through use of the water. The Model Water Code breaks
use fees that, to some extent at
new ground in this respect, requiring water
60
least, reflect the use value of the water.'
Such extensive statutory requirements are based on a state's police
power to regulate water withdrawal and use in order to protect the public
148. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, § 2R-1-02; Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(a)(2).
149. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, § 7R-1-02; Dellapenna, supranote 10, § 9.03(a)(4).
150. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, §§ 5R-5-01 to -03; Dellapenna, supra note 10,
§ 9.03(a)(5)(B) nn.479, 484, 499-536, 547-50.
151. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, §§ 5R-4-06 to -08; Dellapenna, supra note 10,
§ 9.03(a)(5)(B) nn.480, 534-41.
152. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, § 5R-4-04; Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(a)(5)(B)
nn.478, 535, 542-46.
153. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, § 5R-4-03; Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(a)(5)(B)
nn.482-83, 537-38.
154. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, § 5R-4-05; Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(a)(5)(B)
nn.485,498.
155. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, §§ 5R-1-01 to -03.
156. Id. Courts have generally been very deferential in reviewing agency decisions under
regulated riparian statutes.
157. Id. §§ 5R-2-01 to -02; Dellapenna, supra note 10, nn.486-88, 494-97.
158. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, § 5R-2-03; Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(c).
159. Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(a)(5)(C).
160. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, § 4R-1-08.
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health, safety, and welfare.161 Still, fear of the political (if not the legal) repercussions of such radical interference with traditional water rights has led
many state legislatures to exempt from the permit requirement some large
classes of users (usually agricultural) who were using water when the new
statute came into effect. 162 This introduces a significant temporal element. A
more sophisticated solution to this problem is to guarantee existing users an
initial permit, thereafter subject to renewal on the same terms as any other
permit. 163 This approach limits the temporal preference to a single permit
cycle.' 64 Users who refuse to apply for a permit within a short period65 of
time can then be conclusively presumed to have abandoned their claim. 1
Regulated riparian statutes create mechanisms for long-term planning 166 and otherwise provide for the public interest in the waters of the
state. 167 One of the major purposes of regulated riparian permits is to assure
the gathering of the necessary information to enable such planning to occur
on an on-going basis. The Model Water Code would establish a particularly
comprehensive statewide data system. 68 The administering agency is usually given broad discretion to plan for and to deal with crises brought on by
extreme water shortages. 169 The agency can incorporate permit conditions
based on its plans.' 70 The administering agency also is often authorized to
restrict uses should the agency's plans prove inadequate to an actual shortage notwithstanding any inconsistency with a permit.' 71 There is some evidence, however, that administering agencies prefer to use temporal priority
or pro rata sharing as the allocative methods least likely to provoke litigation or other difficulties for the agency. 172 This approach sabotages the
whole scheme of regulated riparianism, based as it is on expert appraisal of
161. State v. Braun, 378 A.2d 640 (Del. 1977); Viii. of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp.,
371 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979); Iowa Natural Res. Council v. Van Zee, 158 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa
1968); Crookston Cattle Co. v. Minn. Dep't of Natural Res., 300 N.W.2d 769 (Minn. 1980);
Herschman v. State, 225 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. 1975); State v. Kuluvar, 123 N.W.2d 699
(Minn. 1963); Omernik v. State, 218 N.W.2d 734 (Wis. 1974). See generally Dellapenna,
supra note 10, § 9.04(a).
162. Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(a)(3).
163. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, § 6R- 1-03.
164. Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(b)(3).
165. Cf United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (cutting off mining claims); In re
Deadman Creek Drainage Basin, 694 P.2d 1071 (Wash. 1985) (cutting off riparian rights in
favor of appropriative rights).
166. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, §§ 4R-2-01 to -04; Dellapenna, supra note 10,
§ 9.05(a).
167. Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.05(b)-(d).
168. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, § 4R-2-03.
169. Id. §§ 7R-3-01 to -07; Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.05(d).
170. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, § 7R-1-01.
171. Id. § 7R-3-01.
172. Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.05(d) n.954.
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which uses will best serve the needs of society and eschewing any simple
rule of allocation without evaluation of social utility.
Today, the main threats to the availability of water in eastern states, as
to both quantity and quality, are not pollution or withdrawal, but the manmade physical and ecological transformation of water sources and the lands
on or in which the sources are found. Regulated riparian water statutes address these problems in two ways that are very different from the statutes in
western states. First, in eastern states both the management of water allocation and water quality issues are usually vested in a single agency-an
agency charged to integrate the consideration and granting of permits for
water use in light of both sets of policies. 173 Second, regulated riparian
codes usually require the agency to define and protect some minimum flow,
whether historic average low flow, the amount necessary for the preservation of certain kinds of wildlife, or the amount necessary to protect human
health or well-being. 74 In a few states whole streams may be withdrawn
from private use except for those uses existing before the transition to the
new system of law. There may be provisions authorizing yet other kinds of
conditions designed to protect aesthetic or ecological concerns. The Model
Water Code requires the protection of the biological, chemical, and physical
integrity of the 1water
source, defined in terms of federal and other relevant
75
legal standards.
B.

Unsolved Problems

Regulated riparianism has certain as yet unsolved problems relating to
the protection of private values and to the furtherance of public values. Two
problems relate to private values-security of investment and the transfer of
water to higher valued uses. Investment security would appear to be a problem if the time period of a permit is too short, leaving too little time for the
initial cost of a project to be recovered before the permit expires. 176 Additional uncertainty could arise when the administering agency has the power,
as is often the case, to modify permits in light of new developments, such as
unforeseen water shortages.177 In the actual operation of regulated riparian
systems, however, neither investment nor transfer insecurities seem to have
caused actual difficulty. If anything, administering agencies might be accused of being too sensitive to the fears of large institutional investors in
water. Administering agencies seldom flatly refuse to renew a permit, although new and more stringent conditions are sometimes attached at the
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

§§ 4R-3-04, 6R-4-04.
Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.05(b).
MODEL CODE, supra note 140, §§ 3R-2-01 to -05.
Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(a)(4).
Id. §§ 9.03(d), 9.05(d).
MODEL CODE, supra note 140,
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time of renewal. Furthermore, administering agencies have consulted with
major water users in crafting responses to water emergencies
rather than
78
matter.1
the
regarding
determinations
expert
own
their
making
Usually there is no express provision for the transfer of water rights or
permits between potential users.1 79 The Model Water Code actually charges
the administering agency to encourage market transfers of water.1 80 Given
the dearth of markets under appropriative rights, however, it remains unclear whether a market could develop to facilitate the transfer of water used
under regulated riparian permits to higher valued uses. 18' Theoretically, one
purpose of the regulated riparian system is to enable the administering
agencies to force such transfers through the non-renewal of permits. 18 2 In
practice, however, the agencies free up far less water through the renewal
process than theory suggests because the agencies prefer to tighten conditions on existing uses rather than to deny renewals outright.18 3 Non-renewal
of permits will remain an infrequent and cumbersome device unless the
state is willing to create a good deal of investment insecurity.
Occasional preferences regarding fees are based on relative inability to
pay rather than the value of the use.' 84 These provisions can be seen as a
form of distributive equity. Such equity arguably justifies exemptions from
the permit requirement or other preferences conferred on small users or on
other users unable to pay for the full value of the water they need. The result, however, will be the continued use of water for low-value uses rather
than its transfer to higher value uses for which, in extreme cases, water
might not be available.

178. See, e.g., Greg Bouwer, Water Resources. East Coast Drought Could Challenge
Outdated Plans, CIVIL ENG'G, Apr. 2002, at 30; Lesley-Ann Dupigny-Giroux, Towards
CharacterizingandPlanningfor Droughtin Vermont-PartI: A ClimatologicalPerspective,
37 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES Ass'N 505 (2001); Tom Avril & Edward Colimore, The
Drought and How We Got There. Lack of Rain a Factor; so Is Poor Planning, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Apr. 14, 2002, at Al; Tom Avril, There Are No Limits on Biggest Water Users:
Drought Rules Don't Apply to Industry and Farms, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 11, 2002, at Al;
John-Thor Dahlburg, Drought Compounded by Error in Judgment, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr.
22, 2001, at A21.
179. Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(d).
180. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, §§ IR-1-07, 7R-2-01 to -04, 7R-3-05, 9R-1-01 to
-02.
181. See supra note 80 for authorities on the dearth of true markets for water. See generally supra text accompanying notes 46-48, 79-88.
182. MODEL CODE, supra note 140, § 7R-1-02.
183. See Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(a)(4) nn.428-32.
184. Id. § 9.03(a)(5)(C). See also Frank E. Matthews & Gabriel E. Nieto, Florida Water
Policy: A Twenty-Five Year Mid-Course Correction, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 365, 373-75
(1998).
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This analysis leads to the bottom line: Is such a system worth its
costs? 185 Clearly there will be significant financial costs in administering a
regulated riparian system, and the tendency of government bureaucracies to
replicate their errors throughout the state is another substantial cost. Yet
given the increasing failure of traditional riparian rights (a common property system) to cope with the needs of modem societies,1 86 and the only
slightly better performance of appropriative rights (as close to a private
property system as we are likely to achieve), there seems little choice but to
move to a regulated riparian system (a public property system). 187 Regulated
riparianism is not a perfect system, but it would appear to be best suited to
the cultural, economic, legal, hydrologic, and political settings of eastern
states.
V. GROUNDWATER

"Groundwater" refers to all water beneath the surface of the ground,
and in particular to water that can extracted by a well or water that gives
forth a spring.1 88 Scientists have long delighted in pointing out to lawyers
that all waters are interrelated in one continuous hydrologic cycle. 189 As a
185. Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.05(a)(5)(D). See also Robert Abrams, Water Allocation by Comprehensive Permit Systems in the East: Consideringa Move Away from Orthodoxy, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 255, 257-70 (1990); Butler, supra note 43; Davis, supra note 138, at
453-56; Dellapenna, supra note 80, at 367-70, 375-77; Freyfogle, supra note 50, at 510-19;
James M. Klebba, Water Rights and Water Policy in Louisiana: Laissez-FaireRiparianism,
Market-Based Approaches, or a New Managerialism, 53 LA. L. REV. 1779 (1993); J.W.
Looney, An Update on Arkansas Water Law: Is the Riparian Rights Doctrine Dead?, 43
ARK. L. REv. 573 (1990) [hereinafter Looney, Update]; J.W. Looney, Modification of Arkansas Water Law: Issues and Alternatives, 38 ARK. L. REv. 221 (1984) [hereinafter
Looney, Modification]; Rose, supra note 41; Carol Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the
Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990); Trelease, supra
note 135; Trelease, supra note 139; David Yoskowitz, Markets: Mechanisms, Institutions,
and the Future of Water, 31 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10237 (2001).
186. See supra Part II.
187. See supra Part III.
188. MICHAEL BARCELONA ET AL., HANDBOOK OF GROUNDWATER PROTECTION 73-74
(1988); RAM GUPTA, HYDROLOGY AND HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS 121-39 (1989); ZACHARY
SMITH, GROUNDWATER IN THE WEST 3-4 (1989); Earl Finbar Murphy, Geology and Hydrology, in 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 18.01; Steven Levine, Note, Ground
Water: Louisiana's Quasi-Fictionaland Truly Fugacious Mineral, 44 LA. L. REv. 1123,
1123 (1984).
189. See, e.g., LEONARD RICE & MICHAEL WHITE, ENGINEERING ASPECTS OF WATER LAW
1-11 (1987); J.G. Arnold et al., Large Area Hydrologic Modeling and Assessment-Part I:
Model Development, 34 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 73 (1998); Sydney Bacchus, UncalculatedImpacts of UnsustainableAquifer Yield Including Evidence of Subsurface Interbasin Flow, 36 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 457 (2000); Herman Bouwer & Thomas
Maddock III, Making Sense of the Interaction Between Groundwater and Streamflow: Lessons for Water Masters andAdjudicators, 6 RIVERS 19 (1997); Brian Katz et al., Interactions

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

result, it has become fashionable to argue that an effective legal regime
should govern water in all of its forms and uses in a consistent and uniform
manner. 190 The law is otherwise. Common law courts and legislatures, both
Between Ground Water and Surface Water in the Suwanee River Basin, Florida,33 AM. J.
WATER RESOURCES Ass'N 1237 (1997); R. Srinivasan et al., Large Area Hydrologic Modeling and Assessment-Part I: Model Development, 34 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 91
(1998); Harold Thomas, Hydrology v. Water Allocation in the Eastern United States, in
WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 9-10 (David Haber & Stephen Bergen
eds., 1956).
190. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 1994); Baumler v.
Town of Newstead, 668 N.Y.S.2d 814 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); State ex rel. Johnny Appleseed Metro. Park Dist. v. City of Delphos, 750 N.E.2d 1158 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001), appeal
denied, 747 N.E.2d 253 (Ohio 2001); Tex. Rivers Prot. Ass'n v. Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation

Comm'n, 910 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). See also CHARLES CORKER & JAMES
CROSBY III, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 48-81, 96-97
(1971); 1 WELLS

HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES

(Harold Ellis & J. Peter DeBraal eds., 1971);

59

NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR

232 (1973); Robert Adler & Michelle Straube, Watersheds and the Integration
of U.S. Water Law and Policy: Bridging the Great Divides, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POLY REV. 1 (2000); Jennie L. Bricker & David E. Filippi, Endangered Species Act Enforcement and Western Water Law, 30 ENVTL. L. 735 (2000); Lynda L. Butler, The Pathology of Property Norms: Living Within Nature's Boundaries, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 927 (2000);
Sherry Caloia et al., The Water Rights Determination and Administration Act of 1969: A
Western Slope Perspectiveon the First Thirty Years, 3 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 39 (1999);
Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENvTL.
L. & POL'Y REV. 379 (2000); James Castleberry, Jr., A Proposalfor Adoption of a Legal
Doctrine of Ground-Stream Interrelationshipin Texas, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 503 (1975); Peter
Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship at Law, 37 Mo. L. REV. 189 (1972); Alyson C.
Flournoy, Restoration Rx: An Evaluation and Prescription,42 ARIZ. L. REV. 187 (2000);
Frank Foley, Water and the Laws of Nature, 5 U. KAN. L. REV. 492 (1957); Robert Jerome
Glennon & Thomas Maddock III, In Search of Subflow: Arizona's Futile Effort To Separate
Groundwaterfrom Surface Water, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 567 (1994); Janet S. Herman et al.,
Groundwater Ecosystems and the Service of Water Purification,20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 479
(2001); Richard G. Hildreth, Water Law at the Crossroads, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIGATION 1,
2-5 (1999); John D. Leshy & James Belanger, Arizona Law Where Ground and Surface
Water Meet, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 657 (1988); Stephen D. Mossman, "Whiskey Is for Drinkin'
but Water Is for Fightin' About ": A First-HandAccount of Nebraska's IntegratedManagement of Ground and Surface Water Debate and the Passageof L.B. 108, 30 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 67 (1996); Earl Finbar Murphy, Economics and Groundwater Interconnections, in 3
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 19.03; C. Luther Propst & Peter W. Culp,
Searchingfor Cibola: A Community-Based EnvironmentalRestoration in the ColoradoRiver
Watershed, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 259 (2000); Joseph L. Sax, EnvironmentalLaw at the Turn of
the Century: A Reportorial Fragment of Contemporary History, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2375
(2000); Veronica Sperling & David Brown, Outline of Colorado Ground Water Law, 1 U.
DENy. WATER L. REV. 275, 286-94 (1998); Tarlock, supra note 137; Samuel Wiel, Need of
Unified Law for Surface and Underground Water, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 358 (1929); Charles
Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317, 321-22 (1985);
Scott Anderson, Comment, Watershed Management and Nonpoint Source Pollution: The
Massachusetts Approach, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 339 (1999); Benjamin R. Vance,
Comment, Total Aquifer Management: A New Approach to Groundwater Protection, 30
THE FUTURE
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historically and currently, have generally divided water into two general
categories-surface water and groundwater. 19' Surface waters in turn are
192
classified as either waters in defined bodies or diffused surface waters.
Different, albeit often related, legal regimes and doctrines evolved to handle
each of these major categories of water, producing law that is so well established that one cannot simply ignore or discard it. 193 Further complicating
this picture was the rule defining surface waterbodies, which applies to
streams but not percolating groundwater, even though
underground streams
194
are legally considered a part of the groundwater.
A.

The Absolute Ownership Rule

When the law of groundwater was first formulated in the nineteenth
century, courts and legislatures were explicit that their decisions were based
upon the fact that they could not determine how groundwater behaved or
how it was being used. 195 Thus, courts and legislatures retreated into the
proposition that the owner of land held "absolute ownership" of percolating
water in the ground. 196 Thus, for example, the Georgia General Assembly
indicated explicitly that this lack of knowledge underlay Georgia's adoption
of the absolute ownership theory, enacting a statute in 1863 that reads: "The
course of a stream of water underground and its exact condition before its
first use are so difficult of ascertainment that trespass may not
be brought
' 97
for any supposed interference with the rights of a proprietor."'
Courts limited the theory of absolute ownership only in instances
where they found that the water was withdrawn maliciously-for the purU.S.F. L. REv. 803 (1996).
191. See Robert E. Beck, The Legal Regimes, in I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra
note 1, ch. 4; Dellapenna, Introduction, supra note 2, §§ 6.02, 6.04; Earl Finbar Murphy,
Legal Classifications,in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, ch. 20.
192. Dellapenna, supra note 52, § 10.03(a).
193. Id. § 10.03 (diffused surface water); Earl Finbar Murphy, Quantitative Groundwater
Law, in 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1,chs. 18-24.
194. See, e.g., Lingo v. City of Jacksonville, 258 Ark. 63, 522 S.W.2d 403 (1975);
Prather v. Hoberg, 150 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1944); City of Colo. Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552
(Colo. 1961); Gorman v. Connell, No. Civ.A.15424, 2001 WL 332054 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30,
2001); Maddocks v. Giles, 686 A.2d 1069 (Me. 1996). See generally Dellapenna, Introduction, supra note 2, § 6.04; Murphy, supra note 191, § 20.07.
195. See generally Murphy, supra note 191, §§ 20.02-.03; Kevin Patrick & Kelly
Archer, A Comparison ofState Groundwater Laws, 30 TULSA L.J. 123, 125-29 (1994).
196. See, e.g., Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861), overruledon other grounds
by Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984) (describing knowledge
regarding groundwater as "occult"); Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49, 54 (1855). See also
Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1228 (Ex. Ch. 1843). See generally Earl Finbar Murphy,
The Absolute Dominion Rule, in 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, ch. 21.
197. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-9-8 (2001).
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pose of hurting another landowner.1 98 Courts also found that landowners
could be liable for creating a private nuisance or other tort through the pollution of the groundwater.199 Notwithstanding these limitations, the theory
of absolute ownership created the same sort of tragedy of the commons for
groundwater as did riparian rights for surface water.2 °°
Consider the situation that arises when there is a significant overdraft
or even a threat of a significant overdraft on an aquifer, leading to falling
water tables, surface subsidence, or (near the coast) salt-water intrusion.
Forbearance by any particular absolute owner does nothing to protect the
aquifer from the overdraft, but it does deprive the forbearing owner from the
benefits of using the resource that is being exhausted by others. As with any
tragedy of the commons, the benefit of overpumping is realized almost entirely by those who grab the most, while the cost of overpumping is spread
out over all who use water from the same aquifer. The only rational course
for each absolute owner is to continue to pump, and indeed to pump at the
fastest possible rate in order to maximize that owner's share of the resource
before it is exhausted by others. As the resource approaches exhaustion,
each water user pumps even faster rather than cutting back, for cutting back
only benefits those who continue to pump without abatement while each
198. See, e.g., St. Armand v. Lehman, 47 S.E. 949 (Ga. 1904); Gagnon v. French Lick
Springs Hotel, 72 N.E. 489 (Ind. 1904); Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 27 S.W. 862
(Mo. 1895); Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 310-11.
199. See, e.g., Mongrue v. Monsanto Co., 249 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2001); Dodge v. Cotter
Corp., 203 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2000); Bradley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 130 F.3d 168 (5th
Cir. 1997); Schuefler v. Gen. Host Corp., 126 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 1997); Vector-Springfield
Prop., Ltd. v. Cent. 111.Light Co., 108 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 1997); Conoco Inc. v. ONEOK,
Inc., 91 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir. 1996); Westfarm Assocs. L.P. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary
Comm'n, 66 F.3d 669, 683-90 (4th Cir. 1995); Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chem. Co.,
29 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1994); McDowell v. State, 23 P.3d 1165 (Alaska 2001); Parks Hiway
Enter., LLC v. CEM Leasing, Inc., 995 P.2d 657 (Alaska 2000); Keeney v. Town of Old
Saybrook, 686 A.2d 991 (Conn. 1997); Superior Farm Mgmt., LLC v. Montgomery, 513
S.E.2d 215 (Ga. 1999); Tri-County Inv. Group, Ltd. v. S. States, Inc., 500 S.E.2d 22 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1998); Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 705 N.E.2d 962 (Ind. 1998); Bartlett v. Browning-Ferris
Indus., 683 So. 2d 1319 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Millett v. Atl. Richfield Co., 760 A.2d 250
(Me. 2000); JBG/Twinbrook Metro Ltd. P'ship v. Wheeler, 697 A.2d 898 (Md. 1997);
Blackmore v. Mass. Tpk. Auth., No. CA 990971A, 2000 WL 420844 (Mass. Jan. 6, 2000);
Mirra v. Murphy, No. 910703, 1999 WL 1318981 (Mass. Jan. 4, 1999); Kempinski v. Mass.
Tpk. Auth., No. CA 991277B, 2000 WL 420742 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 6, 2000); Zagloba v.
Mass. Tpk. Auth., No. CA 941910A, 2000 WL 430854 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 6, 2000); Richmond Realty, Inc. v. Town of Richmond, 644 A.2d 831 (R.I. 1994); Coastal Corp. v. Garza,
979 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. 1998). See generally Gerry Cross, Does Only the Careless Polluter
Pay?: A Fresh Examination of the Nature of Private Nuisance, 111 L.Q. REV. 445 (1995);
Christine Rosen, Differing Perceptions of the Value of PollutionAbatement Across Time and
Place: Balancing Doctrine in Pollution Nuisance Law, 1840-1906, 11 LAW & HiST. REV.
303 (1993); Tom Kuhnle, Note, The Rebirth of Common Law Actions for Addressing Hazardous Waste Contamination, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 187 (1996).
200. See Hardin, supra note 6. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
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gallon of water pumped is more value captured for the operator of the well.
The result is a race to pump that only accelerates the destruction of the aquifer. 20 1 Furthermore, each absolute owner is constantly at risk that someone
will install
a more powerful pump and simply pump the first user's well
2
20

dry.

Today, a great deal is known about how groundwater behaves, and information can be obtained about how it is used. To do so, however, is time
consuming and expensive. 20 3 Still, courts and legislatures can no longer rely
on an inability to determine the characteristics of an aquifer to justify continued adherence to the rule of absolute ownership. Some courts have, however, refused to change the rule based on the conclusion that to change it
would amount to a taking of property.2 °4 In a state like Texas, the reaffirmation was all the more remarkable given that the state's legislature only two
years before had introduced major changes in the regulatory regime for
groundwater, without, however, addressing explicitly the basic question of
the ownership of groundwater.2 °5
B.

Alternatives to Absolute Ownership

Given the likely consequences of adhering to the rule of absolute ownership, courts across the land have abandoned that rule in favor of either a
201. Ronald Kaiser & Frank Skillem, Deep Trouble: Options for Managing the Hidden
ThreatofAquifer Depletion in Texas, 32 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 249 (2001).
202. See, e.g., MacArtor v. Graylyn Crest III Swim Club, Inc., 187 A.2d 417 (Del. Ch.
1963) (providing no explanation why the court chose to make an equal division of the cost of
deepening MacArtor's 200-year-old well that the swim club dewatered when it installed
high-powered pumps to fill its pools).
203. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Gould Elec., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 436 (M.D. Pa. 1998);
Land v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 231 (1997); City of Mobile v. Lester, 804 So. 2d 220 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2001); Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 730 N.E.2d 68 (111.App. Ct. 2000);
Kaufman v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 762 So. 2d 644 (La. Ct. App. 2000);
Pank v. Vill. of Canajoharie, 712 N.Y.S.2d 210 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). See generally Russell
Adams, Updating GroundwaterLaw: New Wine in Old Bottles, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 520,
531-40 (1978); Davis, supra note 190, at 236-37; Symposium, New Science and Technology, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENvT. 507 (1999).
204. Wiggins v. Braz. Coal & Clay Corp., 452 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1983); Sipriano v. Great
Springs Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999); Drinkwine v. State, 300 A.2d 616
(Vt. 1973); Langbrook Props., Ltd. v. Surrey County Council, 3 All E.R. 1424 (Ch. 1969).
See also Murphy, supra note 196, §§ 21.04-.05; Gary Linn Evans, Comment, Texas Landowners Strike Water-Surface Estate Remediation and Legislatively EnhancedLiability in
the Oil Patch-A Proposalfor Optimum Protection of GroundwaterResourcesfrom Oil and
Gas Exploration and Production in Texas, 37 S. TEX. L. REv. 477 (1996); Stephanie E.
Hayes Lusk, Comment, Texas Groundwater:Reconciling the Rule of Capture with Environmental and Community Demands, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 305 (1998).
205. Act of June 1, No. 1010, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3610. See also C. Richard Bath, A
Commentary on Texas Water Law and Policy, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 121 (1999).
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reasonable use theory of groundwater rights or a correlative rights theory of
groundwater ownership, while legislatures in other states have applied either appropriate rights or regulated riparianism to those waters. 20 6 Moving
away from absolute ownership is actually fairly easy because the predicate
for the rule-the impossibility of knowing how groundwater behaves-is no
longer true. Still, acquiring that information can involve considerable time
and expense. 207
New Hampshire applied the rule of reasonable use to groundwater in
the middle of the nineteenth century,20 8 but other states initially rejected that
approach in favor of the absolute ownership rule. 209 In recent decades, a
large number of states have embraced the reasonable use rule for groundwater in a process that continues to this day. 210 The rule is essentially the same
as the reasonable use rule applied to surface water. 21 1 By this rule, each
landowner is free to make any use of the groundwater underlying the land
so long as the use is on land overlying the aquifer and the use does not
cause unreasonable injury to other lawful users.212
Unfortunately the rule of reasonable use does little to prevent the tragedy of the commons for the same reasons it fails to prevent such a tragedy
for surface water.213 Thus we have witnessed the wholesale abandonment of
riparian rights in favor of regulated riparianism in eastern states, regarding
both surface water and groundwater. This problem has been dramatically
demonstrated in a western state-Arizona.2 14 Once again, a system of fully
206. Murphy, supra note 191, § 20.04.
207. See supra note 199.
208. Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 28 N.H. 438 (1854). See generally Earl Finbar Murphy, Reasonable Use Rule, in 3 WATERS AND WATER

RIGHTS,

supra note 1, § 23.01.

209. Murphy, supra note 208, § 23.01(c).
210. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Linden, 667 So. 2d 732 (Ala. 1995); Bristor v.
Cheatham, 255 P.2d 173 (Ariz. 1953); Stidham v. Algonquin Lake Ass'n, 348 N.W.2d 46
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Cline v.
Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984); Rauthrauff v. Sinking Spring Water
Co., 14 A.2d 87 (Pa. 1940); State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339 (Wis.
1974). See generally Murphy, supra note 208, § 23.02.
211. Higday, 469 S.W.2d at 869-70; Michels Pipeline,Inc., 217 N.W.2d at 345-46.
212. See, e.g., Ripka v. Wansing, 589 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Higday, 469
S.W.2d at 870-72; Nolte v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 265 N.W.2d 482, 486-87 (Wis.
1978). See generally Freyfogle, supra note 50, at 506-09. Some courts and commentators
used the term "correlative rights" to mean the reasonable use rule as defined here. See, e.g.,
Woodsum v. Pemberton Township, 412 A.2d 1064 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980), aff'don
othergrounds, 427 A.2d 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Davis, supra note 138, at 441
n.49.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10.
214. See Desmond Connell, A History of the Arizona Groundwater Management Act,
1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313; Robert Jerome Glennon, "Because That's Where the Water Is":
Retiring Current Users To Achieve the Safe-Yield Objective of the Arizona Groundwater
Management Act, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 89 (1991).
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individual decision-making with no effective mechanism for resolving disputes sets up a race to pump, particularly if well owners anticipate a shift to
a legal system that allocates groundwater in proportion to the amount used
on a particular date.215
Other courts have opted for an approach known as "correlative
rights. 216 The correlative rights rule allows unlimited pumping until there is
an overdraft on the aquifer. When the water table begins to fall precipitously, a court or administrative agency is called upon to determine the safe
yield of the aquifer and then to allocate that amount of water strictly among
overlying landowners according to a mathematical formula. Some courts, in
disputes among farmers or ranchers, have allocated water according to the
amount of land each one owns.2 17 That remedy will not work if other significant users are involved. In such cases, the safe yield has been allocated
according to the amount of water being pumped during some selected period of time.21 8 This last possibility leads back to a race to pump and the
tragedy of the commons. In any event, more than a few courts and legislatures have considered the correlative rights approach unworkable because of
the large amounts of information it requires (just what really is the safe
yield and how much water has been pumped from which wells) and because
of the complex requirements for an effective on-going administration of the
system.2 19
Legislatures in many, but not all, of the western states have enacted
statutes creating appropriative rights systems for the state's groundwater.22 °
215. See, e.g., State ex rel. Morrison v. Anway, 349 P.2d 774 (Ariz. 1960); Vance v.
Lassen, 310 P.2d 510 (Ariz. 1957); Southwest Eng'g Co. v. Ernst, 291 P.2d 764 (Ariz. 1955).
See also City of L.A. v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1299 (Cal. 1975) (describing a
"race to the pumphouse"). See generally Robert Emmett Clark, Ground Water Management:
Law and Local Response, 6 ARIZ. L. REV. 178 (1965); Dean Mann, Law and Politics of
Groundwater in Arizona, 2 ARIZ. L. REv. 241 (1960); Murphy, supra note 208, § 23.03(c);
Michael Mallery, Comment, Groundwater:A Callfor a Comprehensive Management Program, 14 PAC. L.J. 1279 (1983).
216. See, e.g., City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000); Prather
v. Eisenmann, 261 N.W.2d 766 (Neb. 1978). See generally Eric Garner & Steven Anderson,
The CaliforniaSupreme Court Reviews the Mojave River Adjudication, 2 U. DENY. WATER
L. REv. 26 (1998); Earl Finbar Murphy, The Status of the CorrelativeRights Doctrine in
Groundwater Today, in 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, ch. 22. Some courts
and commentators used the term "correlative rights" to mean the reasonable use rule. See,
e.g., Woodsum, 412 A.2d at 1064; Davis, supra note 138, at 441 n.49.
217. See, e.g., Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228 Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 111 (1957);
Prather,261 N.W.2d at 766. See generally Frank Trelease, Legal Solutions to Groundwater
Problems-A GeneralOverview, 11 PAC. L.J. 863, 868-69 (1980).
218. See, e.g., Lingo v. City of Jacksonville, 258 Ark. 63, 522 S.W.2d 403 (1975).
219. See Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859, 866-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (rejecting
the correlative rights rule on grounds of excessive complexity).
220. See generally Earl Finbar Murphy, Groundwater Law and the Appropriative Doctrine, in 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, ch. 24.
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These statutes operate much like appropriative rights systems for surface
waters, with the same sort of problems. In most states, the appropriation
systems for surface waters and groundwater have been kept separate, unless
the groundwater is treated as subflow of the surface water source. 221 This

has produced a complex scheme in which some aquifer waters are subject to
surface priorities and to groundwater priorities, and some aquifer waters are
subject only to groundwater priorities.2 22 Where surface water and groundwater priorities are unified (whether because the state applies the same
statutory scheme to both sorts of water or because the groundwater is tributary to the surface water), groundwater users generally are subordinated to

surface users because most people make use of surface water first if it is
available. 223 The rigidities of this approach simply do not allow considera-

tion of the relative efficiencies that could arise from a balanced approach to
selecting a source of water for particular purposes or at particular places.
Finally, many of the eastern states (and Hawaii) have applied their
224
regulated riparian statutes to groundwater as well as to surface waters.
Several other regulated riparian states have applied separate regulatory statutes to groundwater and to surface water, although such separate statutes
involve application of the same legal principles. 225 Furthermore, several
states-including Arizona, which follows pure appropriative rights for surface waters-have enacted regulated riparian statutes that apply only to
221. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001); City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5
P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000); Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 5 P.3d 1206 (Utah 2000);
Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 11 P.3d 726, 733-41 (Wash. 2000); Hubbard v.
State, 936 P.2d 27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). See generally Bouwer & Maddock, supra note
189; Garner & Anderson, supra note 216; Katz et al., supra note 189; Sperling & Brown,
supra note 190; Rebecca Sugarman, Comment, The Mohave Basin Physical Solution: It's a
Good Idea, But Is It GoodLaw?, 6 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 307 (2000).
222. See, e.g., In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights To Use Water on the Gila River Sys.
& Source, 9 P.3d 1069 (Ariz. 2000); In re Application of Park County Sportsmen's Ranch
LLP, 986 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1999); Chatfield E. Well Co. v. Chatfield E. Prop. Owners Ass'n,
956 P.2d 1260 (Colo. 1998); Cent. Platte Natural Res. Dist. v. Wyoming, 513 N.W.2d 847
(Neb. 1994); Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1993).
223. See Murphy, supra note 220, § 24.01(b).
224. See ALA. CODE § 9-1OB-3(3), (19) (LEXIS Repl. 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 22a-367(9), -368 (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6003(a)(3), (b)(4) (2001); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 373.019(17), .023(1) (West 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-3, -4(a) (1993); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 455B.264(l), .268(1)(a) (West 1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 151.120(1),
.150(2) (LEXIS 2001); MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 5-101(j)(1), -501(a), -502(a) (1996);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21G, §§ 2, 7 (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 103G.005(17), .271(1)
(West 1997 & Supp. 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1, 51-3-5 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:lA-3(g) (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.21(3), (5) (2001). See generally
Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(a)(1).
225. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-302 (LEXIS Repl. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-90 to
-107 (2001); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-527 (McKinney 1997) (applying to Long
Island counties only); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-254 to -270 (LEXIS 200 1).
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groundwater.226 These statutes regarding groundwater have similar features
weaknesses as do regulated riparian
and operate with similar strengths and
227
statutes addressed to surface waters.
VI. THE SOUTHEASTERN STATES AT THE OPENING OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY

I am using the term "southeastern states" to describe the seven states of
the deep Confederacy (excepting Texas)-Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Except for Louisiana,
all of these states adhered to the common law and its tradition of riparian
rights. Louisiana's law is based upon the civil law tradition, but its law of
water allocation is very similar to riparian rights.228 Space does not allow a
detailed examination of each of these states. Instead, I briefly summarize the
law in each state, placing it in the broad picture I have delineated above
regarding the evolution of the law of water allocation generally.22 9
A.

Alabama
Until quite recently, Alabama followed the reasonable use rule of ri-

parian rights and the absolute ownership rule for groundwater. 230 Alabama's
courts evaded the worst effects of the absolute ownership rule by applying
nuisance law, rather than groundwater law, to cases where someone, typically in order to work a mine, dewaters an aquifer without using the wa226. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-401 to -655 (West 1994); 525 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.

§§ 45/1-45/7 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002); IND. CODE §§ 14-25-4-1 to -4-21 (1998); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 49-5-10 to -150 (Law. Co-op. 1987). See generally Clark, supra note 215;
Mann, supra note 215.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 111-87.
228. Dellapenna, supra note 52, § 10.02(a). I have excluded Texas because it has a rather
different legal tradition relating to water allocation, mixing elements of Spanish-Mexican law
with common-law riparian rights and a strong dose of appropriative rights. Dellapenna, supra
note 1, § 8.02(c) nn.200-22. Thus, its legal characteristics are so different that examining its
law of water allocation would be of little help in understanding the situation in what I am
calling the southeastern states.
229. I do not discuss issues of water pollution or certain specialized questions of water
allocation, such as federal reserved rights or the rights of Indian tribes to water. These specialized questions of water allocation are important, but thus far they have little figured in the
southeastern states. See Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.06(b)(2).
230. Corona Coal Co. v. Thomas, 101 So. 673, 675 (Ala. 1924) (groundwater); Ulbricht
v. Eufaula Water Co., 6 So. 78, 79 (Ala. 1889) (surface water). See generally William L.
Andreen, Alabama, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 185-89; Cox, supra
note 137; Murphy, supra note 216, § 22.06(d)(1) (concluding that Alabama follows the correlative rights rule); Larry O'Neil Putt, An Analysis and Evaluation of Water Rights in Alabama in Perspective with Other States in the South Atlantic and Gulf Region, 12 CUMB. L.
REv. 47, 59-64 (1981).
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ter.2 3 1 In 1989 the Alabama Supreme Court in Adams v. Long232 indicated
that it was applying the reasonable use rule for groundwater when it declined to enjoin a farmer who dewatered an aquifer in order to maintain a
catfish pond despite the diminution of the flow of an artesian well on
neighboring land. While the court stated that it was using the reasonable use
theory, in fact it seems to have applied the absolute ownership rule. The
court indicated that because the water was withdrawn for a beneficial use on
the overlying land, the defendant was not liable for any injury to neighboring landowners.2 33 The court made no attempt to balance the several uses
against each other to determine the comparative reasonableness of the two
uses-something that is at the heart of reasonable use doctrine. Such balancing, apparently, would be done only through the application of nuisance
theory when the aquifer was dewatered for some other reason than making a
beneficial use of the water on the overlying land.234
The Alabama Supreme Court revisited this question in Martin v. City
of Linden235 some six years after deciding Adams, but did nothing to clarify
the matter. The court held then that the city's proposed well field, designed
to allow the export of 500,000 gallons per day for use in the city, was unreasonable per se because the water would not be used on the overlying land.236
Perhaps the court simply sought to avoid the complexities of applying the
reasonable use or the correlative rights rule by adopting a rule that basically
allows the biggest and most powerful pump to win. It does so, however,
through fostering the tragedy of the commons for both surface water and
groundwater.
Prompted by three major droughts in the 1980s and a severe dispute
with Georgia over transboundary rivers, the Alabama legislature enacted the
Alabama Water Resources Act in 1993.237 The Act declares that the welfare
231.
232.
233.
234.

Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel Co., 388 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 1980).
553 So. 2d 89 (Ala. 1989).
Id. at 91-92.
See City of Mobile v. Lester, 804 So. 2d 220 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (applying nui-

sance theory to damage to homes caused by the city's dewatering of an aquifer through repairs to a street). See also Peters v. Amoco Oil Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (M.D. Ala. 1999)
(applying nuisance theory to pollution from leaking underground storage tanks).
235. 667 So. 2d 732 (Ala. 1995).
236. Id. at 736-40. See also Ross v. Luton, 456 So. 2d 249 (Ala. 1984). See generally
Kimberly Till Lisenby, Comment, Rights to Groundwater in Alabama and the Reasonable
Use Doctrine:An Assessment of Martin v. City of Linden, 48 ALA. L. REv. 1045 (1997).
237. ALA. CODE §§ 9-1OB-1 to -30 (2001). See generally Andreen, supra note 230, at
190-91. On the importance of the interstate disputes, see ALA. CODE §§ 9-10B-5(5)-(6),
(14), -6; Cox, supra note 137, at 153. See generally Carl Erhardt, The Battle over "The
Hooch ": The Federal-InterstateWater Compact and the Resolution of Rights in the Chattahoochee River, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 200 (1992); David Lewis Feldman, Southeastern Water
Conflicts: Can a Stakeholder Forum Enhance Long-Term Planning?, 7 RIVERS 191 (2000);
C. Grady Moore, Water Wars: Interstate Water Allocation in the Southeast, 14 NAT.
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of the state depends on "the dedication of the water resources of the State of
Alabama to beneficial use to the fullest extent to which they are capable
through the development and implementation of plans and programs to
manage such quantitative water resources., 238 Beneficial use is defined as
"[t]he diversion, withdrawal, or consumption of the waters of the state in
such quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient utilization consistent with the interests of this state., 239 The Act does not protect minimum
flows in surface sources or minimum levels of groundwater. This approach
presumably reflects fears that less than complete development of the state's
waters will leave those waters subject to claims in neighboring states.
By this Act, Alabama appeared to join the move to regulated riparianism. The Act establishes and specifies the powers and duties of the Office of
Water Resources ("Office") as a division of the Department of Economic
and Community Affairs. 240 The Office is charged with developing long-term
strategic plans and policies for the use of state waters.24 The Office,
through the Alabama Water Resources Commission ("Commission"), can
promulgate rules and regulations and "implement quantitative water resource programs and projects for the coordination, conservation, development, management, use, and understanding of the waters of the state. 24 2
The Office serves as the repository for the state's water data.243 It is authorized to cooperate with other state or federal agencies, and has the power to
negotiate interstate compacts. 244 In general, the Office is "to monitor, coordinate, and manage the waters of the state" as set out in the Act.245
The Act also establishes the Commission as a nineteen member body
of political appointees.246 The Commission is charged with advising the
governor and the legislature concerning water related matters.247 The Commission also provides guidance to the Office and advises it on the formulaRESOURCES & ENv'T 5 (1999); Jeffrey Uhlman Beaverstock, Comment, Learning To Get
Along: Alabama, Georgia,Florida and the ChattahoocheeRiver Compact, 49 ALA. L. REV.

993 (1998); David Copas, Jr., Note, The Southeastern Water Compact, Panacea or Pandora's Box? A Law and Economics Analysis of the Viability of Interstate Water Compacts,
21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 697 (1997); Mary R. Hawk, Legislative Review,
14 GA. ST. U.L.REV. 47 (1997); Robert E.Vest, Note, Water Wars in the Southeast: Alabama, Florida,and Georgia Square Off over the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-FlintRiver
Basin, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 689 (1993).
238. ALA. CODE § 9-10B-2(4) (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
239. Id. § 9-10B-3(2).
240. Id. §§ 9-10B-2(5),-3(13),-4.
241. Id. § 9-10B-5(1), (13)-(14).
242. Id.§ 9-10B-5(3).
243. Id. § 9-10B-5(4).
244. ALA. CODE §§ 9-10B-5(5), -5(7), -5(10), -5(20), -6 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
245. Id. § 9-10B-5(12). See also id. § 9-10B-5(3).
246. Id. §§ 9-IOB-12 to -13.
247. Id. § 9-10B-16(1).
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tion and implementation "of policies, plans, and programs., 248 The Commission has the power to establish and adopt rules or regulations and to hear
and determine administrative appeals of the Office.24 9
The Act creates a simple registration and reporting requirement. 250 It
requires certain users of water, including both surface water and groundwater, to file a Declaration of Beneficial Use with the Office. 251 The entities
required to file such a declaration include:
252

(1) public water systems;
(2) persons who divert, withdraw, or consume more
than 100,000 gal253
lons from the waters of the state on any day;
(3) and persons who have an irrigation system with a capacity to withdraw 100,000 gallons per day from the waters of the state. 254
The Declaration must
(1) set forth the source of the water;
(2) state the estimated quantity used on an annualized daily basis;
(3) estimate the quantity of water withdrawn or consumed on any
given day; and
(4) provide
the facts indicating the actual or proposed use is "benefi255
cial."
If the Declaration of Beneficial Use is complete, the Office must issue
a Certificate of Use conditioned on the submission of annual reports of the
256
amount of water diverted, withdrawn, or consumed on a monthly basis.
The Office makes no determination of the reasonableness or lawfulness of
the use. The only real limitation on the Office's obligation to issue the Certificate of Use is that the Office is not to issue it unless the office determines
that the proposed use does not interfere with "any presently known existing
legal use." 257 How one is to square this requirement with the Act's declaration that "nothing" in the Act supercedes the common-law riparian rights of
"existing or future riparian owners concerning the use of the waters of the
248. Id. § 9-10B-16(2), (3), (5).
249. Id. §§ 9-10B-16(4), -16(6), -18.
250. ALA. CODE §§ 9-IOB-19 to -20 (LEXIS Repl. 2001). See Cox, supra note 137, at
154-55.
251. ALA. CODE § 9-10B-20 (LEXIS Repl. 2001). See also id. § 9-10B-3(8) (defining
"Declaration of Beneficial Use").
252. ld. §§ 9-10B-3(15),-20(a)-(b).
253. Id. § 9-1OB-20(a).
254. Id. § 9-10B-20(d).
255. Id. § 9-10B-3(8).
256. ALA. CODE §§ 9-10B-3(4) (defining "Certificate of Use"), -19, -20(e), -20(f), -22
(LEXIS Repl. 2001).
257. Id. § 9-10B-20(e). See Cox, supra note 137, at 154-55.
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state" is not clear.2 Persons who fail to submit a Declaration of Beneficial
Use or who make a false statement are subject to administrative or civil
enforcement actions brought by the Office.259
The Office is authorized to conduct a "critical use study" to determine
whether particular areas of the state should be declared to be "capacity
stress areas" in which the available water is less than the existing or foreseeable future demand for water. 260 If the Commission determines that the
implementation of restrictions on water use are necessary in a capacity
stress area, the Commission shall issue a rule designating the capacity stress
area and establishing "appropriate conditions or limitations" for all Certificates of Use within the area. 261 No organ of the state has the power to restrict quantitatively any person's use of water
except through such condi262
tions or limitations within a capacity use area.
The Act does provide some guidance on priorities to be followed in establishing conditions and limitations in capacity stress areas. It declares that
"[t]he use of waters of the state for human consumption is recognized as a
priority use of the state and... no limitation upon the use of water for human consumption shall be imposed except in emergency situations after the
Office has considered all feasible alternatives to such limitations. 2 63 Unusually, the statute contains no explicit preference for agricultural uses. The
Act also includes the following priority scheme for impoundments of water
that could indirectly serve that purpose:
(1) all impoundments entirely on the impounder's property when incidental to a use "acknowledged in a certificate of use";
(2) "waste water treatment ponds" or impoundments, including
RCRA 2 64 actions; and
(3) instream uses, including hydropower
generation, navigation, rec265
reation, and water oxygenation.

258. Id. § 9-1OB-27 (LEXIS Repl. 2001). The statute also requires that Certificates of
Use include the following: "THE ISSUANCE OF THIS CERTIFICATE OF USE SHALL
NOT CONFER OR MODIFY ANY PERMANENT INTERESTS OR RIGHTS IN THE
HOLDER THEREOF TO THE CONTINUED USE OF THE WATERS OF THE STATE
OF ALABAMA." Id. § 9-10B-20(e).
259. Id. § 9-1OB-5(18), (19).
260. Id. §§ 9-10B-3(3) (defining a "capacity stress area"), -3(7) (defining a "critical use
study"), -21, -25 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
261. ALA. CODE §§ 9-10B-2(6)(a), -22 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
262. Id. § 9-1OB-2(6).
263. Id. § 9-1OB-2(2). On priorities generally, see Dellapenna, supra note 10,
§ 9.03(a)(3).
264. RCRA refers to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act found at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6908 (2000).
265. ALA. CODE §§ 9-10B-2(7), -20 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
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In adopting restrictions on water use in capacity stress areas, the
Commission is charged only to consider impacts on "the uses of water under each certificate of use within such area" along with other relevant factors not including temporal priority.26 6 Within the foregoing constraints, the
Commission is largely free to exercise its discretion in devising such conditions and limitations as it deems appropriate.267 Nothing in the statutory
scheme explicitly requires the Commission to consider the plans adopted
pursuant to the statutory scheme.2 68 The Commission must review and if
necessary revise its conditions and limitations every twelve months. 269 The
Commission may also issue rules to initiate additional conservation measures and to authorize various water resource projects. 270 The Commission
can also issue rules allowing the transfer of Certificates of Use on such
terms as it determines. 271 Enforcement of the conditions or limitations on
Certificates of Use is to be by the Department of Environmental Management, rather than by the Office.272
Despite all of this, the statute is a very incomplete form of a regulated
riparian statute that places very few restrictions on common law rights and
leaves far more questions unresolved than resolved. The Commission has
not established any capacity stress areas, meaning that the elaborate regulatory machinery has no effect on actual water use within Alabama. Water
users of the state are left to litigate under the common law should they suffer injury from the actions of their neighbors.27 3
B.

Arkansas

Arkansas's water allocation law is similar to Alabama's. Arkansas follows the reasonable use version of riparian rights, having given us the paradigm case for that approach in 1955-Harrisv. Brooks.274 The Arkansas
Supreme Court also embraced the reasonable use approach to groundwater
in 1957.275 Unlike Alabama,276 however, this appears to be the true form of
Id. § 9-10B-22(b).
Id. § 9-10B-22(b)-(c). See Cox, supranote 137, at 154-57.
See ALA. CODE § 9-1OB-5(1), (13)-(14) (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
Id. § 9-1OB-22(c). See Cox, supranote 137, at 156-57.
270. ALA. CODE § 9-1OB-21 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
271. Id. § 9-10B-19(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
272. Id. §§ 9-10B-2(6)(b), -23. The Office, however, is the agency that assesses civil
penalties for violations of the Act. Id. § 9-1OB-5(19).
273. Id. §§ 9-1OB-20(e), -27.
274. 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955). See supra text accompanying notes 18-38.
See also Harrell v. City of Conway, 224 Ark. 100, 271 S.W.2d 924 (1954). See generally
Phillip E. Norvell, Arkansas, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 227-30.
275. Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228 Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 111 (1957). See generally Murphy, supranote 216, § 22.05(a) (calling the Arkansas approach "correlative rights").
266.
267.
268.
269.
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the doctrine in which competing uses are balanced against each other to
determine the specific allocation to each user.277 Furthermore, Arkansas
allows the export of water for use off the overlying land if there is no injury
to the water uses of the owners of land overlying the aquifer.278
Several decades ago, Arkansas began to experience the entirely predictable problems inherent in the common law reasonable use approach to
water management.2 79 In particular, leaving to the owner of each lawful well
the individual determination of whether, when, and how to use water led to
a tragedy of the commons, with widespread overdrafts of aquifers leading to
the drying of wells, subsidence of the land, and even salt water intrusion as
ever bigger cones of depression spread across the state.28 °
Arkansas has also enacted a limited regulated riparian system. The earliest such scheme was adopted in Arkansas in 1957 when the legislature
directed the Soil and Water Conservation Commission ("Commission") to
allocate water during times of shortage. 28 ' This system was reformed by
amendments in 1969 and by the Act for Determination of Water Use Requirements in 1985.282 Finally, in 1991 the legislature enacted the Arkansas
Groundwater Protection and Management Act.283
The Arkansas statutory scheme generally requires permits only for the
building of a dam and for the diversion of "excess surface water., 284 The
latter refers to proposals for interbasin diversions or transfers to nonriparians. To determine the extent of excess surface water, the Commission
is required to inventory surface water sources, to determine the water needs
for various purposes, and to establish minimum streamflows. 285 The Commission can only declare that there is excess surface water if it finds a water
surplus over "the foreseeable economic development needs" of the basin of
origin.28 6 Even then, the Commission can only allocate water for such trans276. See supra text accompanying notes 232-38.
277. See Norvell, supra note 274, at 234-36.
278. Lingo v. City of Jacksonville, 258 Ark. 63, 522 S.W.2d 403 (1975).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 39-48.
280. See generally Looney, Update, supra note 185, at 622; Norvell, supra note 274, at
236.
281. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-201 to -220 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
282. Id. §§ 15-22-301 to -304. See generally Looney, Update, supra note 185; Looney,
Modification, supra note 185; Norvell, supra note 274, at 230-34; Trelease, supra note 139,
at 369.
283. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-901 to -914 (LEXIS Repl. 2000 & Supp. 2001). See
generally J.W. Looney, Enhancing the Role of Water Districts in GroundwaterManagement
and Surface Water Utilization in Arkansas, 48 ARK. L. REv. 643 (1995); Norvell, supra note
274, at 236-40.
284. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-205(a)(1), -210 to -214, -216 (dams), -304 (surplus water). See generally Norvell, supra note 274, at 230-31.
285. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-301 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
286. Id. § 15-22-301(13)-(14).
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fers up to twenty-five percent (calculated annually) of the amount of water
available in excess of the needs of all riparian users, the requirements of
federal water projects, and the firm yield of all relevant reservoirs in existence on June 28, 1985, as well as the needs for minimum streamflows, aquifer recharge, and projected in-basin demand.2 87 Finally, the Commission
cannot authorize interbasin transfers or use within the basin on non-riparian
land unless the Commission finds that the proposed use is "reasonable. 288
The Commission can also condition the permit on the transferee providing
water to other water uses within the vicinity of the transportation system at a
charge equal to the cost of transportation.289
All users of water, whether from surface or subterranean sources, other
than those who use excess surface water or water impounded behind a dam
290
are merely required to register their uses of water with the Commission.
Upon registration, such water users are issued a Certificate of Registration
that amounts to an automatic permit without any evaluation of the reasonableness of the use being made. 29' This procedure is so simple, with only a
requirement of the filing of a report that there has been no change from the
previous year's pattern of use after the initial registration,2 92 that the annual
registration requirement would not appear to be a serious impediment to
investment.
If the Commission determines that a water shortage exists, Arkansas
subjects all surface water users within the region suffering from the shortage
to an apparently complete system of regulation. 293 The Arkansas statutory
scheme largely cuts off unregistered uses of water from participating in the
allocation process.294 In addressing water shortages, the Commission must
follow a priority scheme that was first enacted in 1957 and was substantially
modified in 1989 with the addition of three rather specific priorities ahead
of the original three general priorities.29 5 The result is a somewhat overlapping hodgepodge of priorities:
296
domestic supplies;
(1) domestic and municipal297
(2) minimum streamflows;

287. Id. § 15-22-304(b).
288. Id. § 15-22-304(c).
289. Id. § 15-22-304(d).
290. Id.§§ 15-22-215, -302. See generally Norvell, supra note 274, at 231-33.
291. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-215(e) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
292. Id. § 15-22-215(d).
293. Id. §§ 15-22-205(a)(3), -217 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
294. Id. § 15-22-215(f). See also Looney, Update, supra note 185, at 597-98.
295. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(a)(3).
296. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-217(e)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). "Domestic use" is defined
as "use of water for ordinary household purposes." Id. §§ 15-22-202(5), -903(8) (LEXIS
Repl. 2000 & Supp. 2001).
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298
"federal water rights";
the sustaining of life;2 99
the maintenance of health; 300 and
the increase of wealth.3 °1

Like Alabama, Arkansas does not give any direct preference to agricultural
uses.

302

The Arkansas statute provides the highest priority for "domestic and
municipal domestic" uses by indicating that water for those purposes must
be reserved before allocating the remaining water to other uses.303 The statute takes the same approach for minimum streamflows and federal water
rights.30 4 In the context of the unusual Arkansas regulatory scheme, however, this simply is an allocation mechanism by another name. Furthermore,
it is not clear how meaningful this preference actually is. While the preference exempts domestic and municipal uses from the registration obligation,
failure to register arguably cuts off the right to take water for domestic or
municipal uses relative to registered riparian uses. 30 5 Read in this fashion,
the exemption from registration would benefit domestic users only relative
to non-riparian uses. The priority of domestic and municipal uses and of
minimum streamflows over federal water rights, however, is highly unlikely
to be upheld should it be tested in court.3 0 6 Insofar as the federal authorities
(legislative and administrative) choose to follow those priorities themselves,
the issue might never be tested.
The Arkansas system for allocating surface water shares most of the
other features of the more usual regulated riparian systems, including the
authorization (to a limited extent) of non-riparian uses, 3 07 the protection of
public values, 30 8 and provision for the protection of minimum stream30 9
floWS.
The process of setting minimum flows has proven highly political,
297. Id. § 15-22-217(e)(2) (LEXIS Repl. 2000). See also id. §§ 15-22-202(6), -222, 301(4), -301(14).
298. Id. § 15-22-217(e)(3).
299. Id. § 15-22-217(c)(1).
300. Id. § 15-22-217(c)(2).
301. Id. § 15-22-217(c)(3).
302. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-217(c), (e) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
303. Id. § 15-22-217(d).
304. Id. § 15-22-217(e).
305. Seeid. § 15-22-215(f).
306. See, e.g., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976). See also Robert E. Beck, Use Preferencesfor Water, 76 N.
DAK. L. REv. 753, 767-68 (2000).
307. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-304 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
308. See id. § 15-22-217(d), (e).
309. See id. §§ 15-22-222, -301(4), -301(14). See also P. Douglas Mays et al., History of
Instream Flow Issues in Arkansas, 1 RIVERs 313 (1990).
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however, with considerable pressure brought to bear on the Commission,
both from other branches of the state government and from private interests. 310 The result was a considerable modification (and reduction) of the
proposed original levels of protection.
The 1991 Groundwater Protection Act ("Protection Act") applies the
same approach to groundwater--defined as "water beneath the surface of
the ground., 311 The Protection Act requires the Commission to classify
groundwater and to handle the "management of groundwater. ' , 31 2 As with
surface water sources, the Protection Act authorizes the Commission to designate critical groundwater areas.313 After designating the area, the Commission must make a formal determination that it is necessary to impose
regulatory controls on withdrawals of groundwater within the critical
groundwater area. 314 Thereafter, the Commission will control such withdrawals by issuing "water right[s]. 315
Even after issuing water rights, the Commission cannot order preexisting wells to reduce pumping unless substitute water is available from
an alternative supply at no greater cost than the cost of procuring water from
the user's wells,3" 6 and the Commission cannot order any reduction at all
when a well-owner drawing water from an "alluvial aquifer" has reduced
pumping by twenty percent or more since 1986 through water conservation
measures. 317 The Commission cannot even order a reduction of or limitation
on pumping from existing wells or from wells drilled within the first year of
the initiation of regulatory authority until four years have passed from that
initiation.31 8 The Commission is also denied authority to regulate wells
pumping less than 50,000 gallons per day, or wells supplying individual
households solely for domestic purposes. 3t 9 The Commission is further
prohibited from regulating vendors of bottled water and public water supply

310. See Looney, Update, supra note 185, at 608-13 (describing the minimum streamflows process); Mays et al., supranote 309.
311. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-903(9) (LEXIS Supp. 2001).
312. Id. § 15-22-906 (LEXIS Repl. 2000 & Supp. 2001). See generally Looney, supra
note 283; Norvell, supra note 274, at 236-40.
313. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-903(6), -904(1), -908, -909, -914, 26-51-1003(4)
(LEXIS Repl. 2000 & Supp. 2001).
314. Id. § 15-22-909(a)(2), (3), (5).
315. Id. §§ 15-22-903(13), -909(a)(1), -909(a)(4), -910(b), -911 (LEXIS Repl. 2000 &
Supp. 2001).
316. Id. §§ 15-22-905(1), -910(a) (LEXIS Supp. 2001). On the intricacies of Arkansas
law regarding the making of water available from alternative sources, see Looney, supra note
283, at 657-708.
317. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-905(2)(A) (LEXIS Supp. 2001). The term "alluvial acquifer" is not defined either in the statute or in case law.
318. Id.§ 15-22-909(b).
319. Id. § 15-22-905(3), (4). See id.15-22-903(8) (defining "domestic use").
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systems.320 Within these rather serious limitations on the Commission's
regulatory authority, the Commission is charged to give first preference in
issuing water rights to sustaining life, followed by maintaining health, and
finally to increasing wealth. 321 There is no reference to the other priorities
that apply to surface water sources in the Protection Act.322
As with surface water sources, the Commission was slow to declare
critical groundwater areas. 3 The Commission has finally done so, but it is
too soon to evaluate the effectiveness of the process. And while some might
see in the duty to manage the groundwater of the state a rather far-reaching
authority to act independently of the rather restrictive standards for regulating critical groundwater areas,324 the Commission has taken no real steps
here. In areas that have not been declared critical groundwater areas or that
have a shortage of water in a stream, water users in the state still must resort
to traditional riparian rights and reasonable use groundwater law to resolve
water allocation problems.
On the other hand, because of concern about
disrupting the authority of the administering agency, the Arkansas Court of
Appeals has construed the Arkansas statute's silence on the matter as making the agency the only forum in which a riparian owner can attack the reasonableness of a competing use, and then only through the hearing on a
permit application.32 6 This solution is not an entirely satisfactory solution,
however, because administering agencies have no authority to3 27"adjudicate
private damage claims" or "to provide general equitable relief.
Arkansas law does not support market or other voluntary transfers of
the right to use water. The provisions relating to the allocation of surface
water make no mention of the possibility of transferring an allocation. The
Protection Act does speak to the question, providing that persons withdrawing water under water rights pursuant to it are not allowed to assign a water
right apart from a conveyance of the land to which the right is attached.
For surface water sources, Arkansas requires the Commission to give
priority to the needs for water within the state, 329 while banning (except for
bottled water or municipal systems in operation in 1984) the diversion of
water for use outside the state without either the approval of the legislature

320. Id.§ 15-22-905(6).
321. Id. § 15-22-910(c).
322. See supra text accompanying notes 295-306.
323. See Looney, supra note 283, at 654.
324. Id. at 654-57.
325. See, e.g., Lingo v. City of Jacksonville, 258 Ark. 63, 522 S.W.2d 403 (1975).
326. Styers v. Johnson, 19 Ark. App. 312, 315-16, 720 S.W.2d 334, 337 (1986).
327. See, e.g., In re Buttolph, 527 A.2d 1147, 1148 (Vt. 1987).
328. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-911(g), (h) (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
329. Id § 15-22-303. See also id.§15-22-301(14), (15) (providing a similar preference
for in-basin uses over interbasin transfers).
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or pursuant to an interstate compact.330 Arkansas modeled this statute on the
New Mexico statute that was found to violate the interstate commerce
clause in City ofEl Paso v. Reynolds.33' The relatively greater availability of
water in Arkansas compared to New Mexico332suggests that the validity of the
Arkansas statute is suspect, to say the least.
A registration scheme such as Arkansas's does at least facilitate shortand long-range planning. Comprehensive long-range planning often is the
first step that a riparian rights state takes in transforming itself into a regulated riparian state.3 33 The Arkansas scheme requires extensive planning by
the Commission, particularly regarding possible water emergencies.334 The
Commission is also charged to gather data on water needs and water usage
in the state and to make that data available both to government officials and
to the public.335 The situation in Arkansas is rather different from the other
states that require emergency plans due to the different structure of the Arkansas regulated riparian scheme.33 6 Nor does the regulatory authority to
deal with shortages require that the Commission's action be based upon or
consistent with the previously prepared plans. One is left to presume that the
Commission nonetheless
will be guided by its plans in implementing the
337
statutory priorities.
The Arkansas system operates largely on the basis of statewide administration. The Arkansas system does, however, authorize the Commission to delegate its allocation authority to regional conservation districts or
regional water districts.338 The legislature, in fact, expressed a strong preference for regional districts in the management of groundwater, but left the
decision in this regard to the Commission. 339 The regional districts are also
authorized to perform the ministerial act of receiving the registration of a
water use, although the statute is not clear whether this power exists independently of the delegation of authority to allocate.3 4 °

330. Id. § 15-22-303(d).
331. 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983), ajfdon reh'g, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
See generally Richard S. Harnsberger et al., Interstate Transfers of Water: State Options
After Sporhase, 70 NEB. L. REV. 755, 817-30 (1991).
332. See Abrams, supra note 91, at 620-21; Looney, Update, supra note 185, at 613-15,
618-20.
333. See Looney, Update, supra note 185, at 577-80.
334. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-220, -301, -503, -504 (LEXIS Repl. 2000).
335. Id. §§ 15-22-220,-301.
336. See Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.05(d).
337. See generally Looney, Update, supra note 185, at 591-608.
338. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-202(2), -202(4), -202(9), -221, -902, -903(5), -903(7),
-903(11), -904(8), -904(10) (LEXIS Repl. 2000 & Supp. 2001). See City of Fort Smith v.
River Valley Reg'l Water Dist., 344 Ark. 57, 37 S.W.3d 631 (2001).
339. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-908, -909 (LEXIS Repl. 2000 & Supp. 2001).
340. Id § 15-22-215(a).
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Florida

Florida abandoned the common law of riparian rights and the reasonable use approach to groundwater in 1972 with the enactment of the Florida
Water Resources Act of 1972 ("Florida Act").34 ' The Florida Act declares
the policy of the state to control fully the waters of the state in order to "realize their full beneficial use" and to assure their "sustainability." 342 It applies equally to surface water and to groundwater. 343 Unlike Alabama and
Arkansas, Florida has applied its regulated riparian scheme so thoroughly
that there is no point in considering the old law relative to that state. In fact,
the Florida statute is one of the primary models for the regulated riparian
system in the United States. 344
The Florida regulated riparian statute originated in a study by the dean
and two law professors at the University of Florida-Frank Maloney, Richard Ausness, and Scott Morris. They published their study under the title of
A Model Water Code.3 45 The core of the Maloney, Ausness, and Morris
Model Water Code was adopted virtually verbatim in Florida. The same
three professors also drafted the Florida Act, and thus, are responsible
for
3 46
most of the differences between their model code and the Florida Act.
The Florida Act vests the Department of Environmental Protection
("Department") with responsibility for planning and managing the state's
waters.347 The Department also is to serve as a repository for all scientific
and factual information generated by local governments, water management
districts, and state agencies relating to water resources and, to that end, collect, maintain, and make available such information to public and private
users within the state and assist in the acquisition of scientific and factual
data from water management districts, local governments, and the United
States Geological Survey. 348 As the reference to the United States Geological Survey suggests, the Department is charged to cooperate with federal
and local agencies that deal with water. 349 When the Department completed
341. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.013-.619 (West 2000 & Supp. 2001). See generally Donna
R. Christie, Florida,in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 289; Murphy, supra
note 216, § 22.06(b).
342. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.016(1), (2) (West 2000).
343. Id. §§ 373.019(17), .023(1).
344. Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03 nn.236-42.
345. MALONEY, AusNEss, & MORRIS, supra note 40.
346. Richard Ausness, The Influence of the Model Water Code on Water Resources
Management Policy in Florida,3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (1987). See also MALONEY,
AUSNESS, & MoRRis, supra note 40, at viii.
347. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.019(2), .019(5), .026(1), .026(7), .036, .129 (West

2000).
348. Id. § 373.026(2), (4).
349. Id.§§ 373.026(3), .026(6), .026(8)(b), .026(9), .036, .046, .196 (West 2000 & Supp.
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the state water plan, however, it was not accepted350by the state legislature
and thus, became (at least technically) a dead letter.
The Florida Act has several unique features when compared to other
regulated riparian statutes. Florida, alone among regulated riparian states,
chose to divide the power and responsibility for administering its regulated
riparian statute among five regional water management districts. 35 ' Florida's
legislature decided that these districts correspond to the diverse matches
across the state between need and availability of water. 352 The districts are
vested with a great deal of the planning responsibility. 353 The districts set
the protected minimum flows and levels for the state's water resources.3 54
role is aptly described as a "general supervisory authorThe Department's
5
'35

ity.

The legislature left the authority to each of the several water management districts to determine whether to implement the permit requirement of
the Florida Act and whether to extend this requirement to groundwater as
well as surface water. 356 So diverse are the districts that the two northernmost districts did not implement the permit system until the 1990s, leaving
water users in those districts to continue under the common law of riparian
rights for twenty years after the adoption of Florida's regulated riparian
system.3 57 Even after all of the districts were ready to implement the regulated riparian system, wide variations existed in how they implemented it.
2001).
350. Ausness, supra note 346, at 23-24. Of course, if the Department or other agencies
defer to the plan despite its legislative rejection, it can still carry significant weight in fact.
351. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.069-.083, .136, .171, .216 (West 2000 & Supp. 2001). See
Southwest Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Charlotte County., 774 So. 2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001); Southwest Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So. 2d 594
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Consol.-Tomoka Land Co.,
717 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), superceded by statute as stated in Southwest Fla.
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So. 2d 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000). See also Christie, supra note 341, at 289-90; Joseph Schilling, Special Forces,
ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 30; Martha C. Mann, Note, St. Johns River Water Management District v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co.: Defining Agency Rulemaking Authority
Under the 1996 Revisions to the FloridaAdministrative ProcedureAct, 26 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 517 (1999). See generally Robert Verchick, Critical Space Theory: Keeping Local
Geography in American and EuropeanEnvironmentalLaw, 73 TUL. L. REV. 739 (1999).
352. See generally FRANK MALONEY ET AL., FLORIDA WATER LAW 1980, at 191-329
(1980).
353. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.036-.0397, .199, .1995 (West 2000 & Supp. 2001).
354. Id. §§ 373.042-0421 (West 2000).
355. Id.§ 373.026(7).
356. Id.§§ 373.069 to .0695, .103(1), .219(1). Florida's statute also includes elaborate
provisions regarding interdistrict transfers of ground water. Id.§ 373.2295 (West 2000 &
Supp.2001).
357. Id. § 373.216 (West 2000). See also MALONEY, AUSNESS, & MORRIS, supra note 40,
at 223-24.

2002]

THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION

Thus, one empirical study of the Florida permit system found that at least
one water district, in order to avoid conflict, routinely granted irrigators'
requests for more water than they actually needed.3 58
Except for domestic uses, all water users in the state are required to obtain a permit for their use from the appropriate water management district
once the district initiates the permit requirement. 35 9 Florida provides that
permits are to be for twenty years, but for municipalities or governmental
bodies the permits can be issued for up to fifty years. 360 Florida adopted as
its criterion the concept of "reasonable-beneficial use., 3 61 Apparently the
influential trio of Maloney, Ausness, and Morris believed that if either criterion alone was too vague, together they might somehow synergize to create
the elusive objective criterion so dear to those who fear excessive administrative discretion.362
Florida's regulated riparian statute defines the term "reasonablebeneficial use" as "the use of water in such quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient utilization for a purpose and in a manner which is both
reasonable and consistent with the public interest., 363 Here, "beneficial"
appears to mean two things-economic and efficient, which perhaps mean
respectively non-wasteful and economically efficient. "Non-wasteful" simply means not using more water than is necessary for the planned use, while
"economically efficient" can mean putting water to its most profitable use,
taking all costs into account.364 The Florida legislature provided virtually no
guidelines to control the administering agency's discretion in determining
what is a reasonable use, except for some exceptionally vague declarations
of policy. 365 Even assuming that it is objectively clear which uses qualify as
beneficial (an assumption that often will not hold), administering agencies
still have considerable discretion to determine whether the manner and pur366
pose of the use are "reasonable" and "consistent with the public interest."

358. See Gary D. Lynne et al., Water PermittingBehavior Under the 1972 Florida Water
Resources Act, 67 LAND ECON. 340 (1991).
359. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.219(1). See generallyChristie, supra note 341, at 290-95.
360. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.236 (West 2000).
361. Id. § 373.223(1)(a).
362. MALONEY, AusNESS, & MORRIs, supra note 40, § 1.03(4), at 86, § 2.02(1)(a), at
179. See also Frank E. Maloney et al., Florida's "ReasonableBeneficial" Water Use Standard: Have East and West Met?, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 253 (1979).
363. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.019(4) (West 2000). See generally MacDougal, Private
Hopes, supra note 52, at 18.
364. See POSNER, supra note 79, § 1.2; Phyllis Saarinen & Gary Lynne, Getting the Most
Valuable Water Supply Pie: Economic Efficiency in Florida's Reasonable-Beneficial Use
Standard,8 J.LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 491 (1993).
365. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.016 (West 2000).
366. See MacDougal, PrivateHopes, supra note 52, at 45-55.
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Florida has certain specific provisions that further extend the discretionary authority of the water districts over water use permits. Florida authorizes the issuances of "general permits" for classes of use having "minimal adverse impact" on water resources.3 67 Florida also authorizes temporary permits pending a decision on the application. 368 Additionally, Florida
provides for permits to divert "ground or surface water beyond the overlycounty boundaries, or outside the watershed from which it
ing land, 36
across
9
is taken.,

The Florida Act thus clearly rules out the watershed rule, but it leaves
one to infer that the non-riparian use rule is also eliminated by analogy to
the elimination of the overlying land rule for groundwater. 370 While no judicial decision in Florida has yet considered this question, in Osceola County
v. St. Johns River Management District, 71 the Florida Supreme Court did
uphold the right of the water management districts to authorize the diversion
of water from one district for use in another district.372 On its face, this result poses no problems relative to interstate commerce, although the statutory system might become problematic if one can prove that the evaluation
of the public interest discriminates against out-of-state users. These provisions have been criticized as the weakest part of the Florida regulatory
scheme.373
The Florida Act, again alone among the regulated riparian statutes that
have been enacted over the past forty-five years, addresses explicitly the
question of civil liability in favor of a permittee injured by another permittee's violation of the terms or conditions of a permit.3 74 The Florida Act
creates a problem for a permittee who seeks relief under this provision,
however. The right to sue for damages accrues only to "abutting consumptive use permit holders, 37 5 as if only abutting permittees could possibly
first applied for
injure one another. Even they cannot sue until they have
376
district.
management
water
the
by
relief
denied
been
and
The Florida Act makes no express provision for voluntary transfers. A
provision for the voluntary modification of permits seems to address only a
modification that does not change the purpose of the use or the identity of
367. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.118 (West 2000).
368. Id. § 373.244.
369. Id. § 373.223(2).
370. See also id. § 373.2295 (West 2000 & Supp. 2001) (interdistrict transfers of
groundwater).
371. 504 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1987).
372. Id. at 388.
373. Ronald A. Christaldi, Comment, Sharing the Cup: A Proposalfor the Allocation of
Florida'sWater Resources, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1063 (1996).
374. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.245 (West 2000).
375. Id.
376. Id.
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the user. 377 Once water is fully allocated, a new water user apparently can
obtain water only by filing a competing application for a permit when an
existing permittee applies for renewal of a permit. While in principle, as
between two qualified applicants, the permit should go to the one that best
serves the public interest, 378 the Florida Act provides a preference for renewal applications over initial applications-if competing applications
"qualify equally" for the permit, an existing permit should be renewed.379
Of course, the water management district can easily determine that the applications do not qualify equally if the district is so inclined.
Florida authorizes water management districts to curtail water uses
during water emergencies. 380 The Florida Act not only requires the districts
to prepare emergency plans, 381 but also authorizes the water management
districts to impose further restrictions on water users should their plans
prove inadequate to the crisis, without regard to any inconsistency with the
permits as issued.382
Despite the broad discretion given in so many respects to the water
management districts, there have not been many legal challenges to the actions of the districts or to the delegation of authority to the districts. In the
few cases in which such challenges were brought, Florida's courts generally
have been deferential to the decisions made by the districts. Two panels of
the Florida appellate court upheld the regulations adopted by a district that
were challenged based on improper delegation despite a rather restrictive
view of the standards necessary to uphold a delegation in that state.383 A
different Florida panel, however, struck down regulations that the court
found were not authorized by the state's regulated riparian statute-a
somewhat different question.3 84 Riparian users of water have faired no better with claims that their property-riparian rights-was taken because they
were assured only an initial permit upon the effective date of the Florida
Act, 385 with no assurance that they would be renewed upon the expiration of
the first permit some twenty years later.386 Florida courts rejected such
377. See id. § 373.239.
378. See id. § 373.233(1).
379. Id. § 373.233(2).
380. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.175, .246 (West 2000).
381. Id. § 373.246(1).
382. See id. §§ 373.246(7)-(8).
383. Southwest Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Charlotte County, 774 So. 2d 903, 909 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001); St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Consol.-Tomoka Land Co., 717
So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), superceded by statute FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.52(8)
(West 2000). See also Southwest Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773
So. 2d 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). See generally Mann, supra note 351.
384. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So. 2d at 594.
385. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.226 (West 2000).
386. Id. § 373.236(1). If the existing user is a municipality, the first permit would not

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

claims,7 finding instead that it was a reasonable regulation of the property
38
right.
Finally, unlike Alabama and Arkansas, Florida has a large native
American population with claims to water rights derived from federal law
rather than Florida law.388 Florida and the Seminole Tribe have reached a
settlement by a compact between the tribe and the state that could serve as a
model for such issues in other regulated riparian states. 389 Florida recognized a Seminole's right to a percentage of the water available from specified sources (usually fifteen percent), and the Seminoles agreed to abide by
most non-procedural aspects of Florida's regulated riparian statute. The
tribe has the exclusive right to regulate Indian water usage, but must provide
annual notice of the patterns of use to state authorities. This approach would
appear to be based on riparian principles rather than on appropriation principles. In fact, so alien is the approach of this eastern Indian water settlement that a purportedly comprehensive study of Indian water settlements
did not even mention the Seminole agreement. 390 This agreement might
presage an attempt to market Indian
water rights-a development finding
391
increasing support in western states.

expire for fifty years. Id. § 373.236(2).
387. Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663 (Fla.). See also supra note
163-64 and accompanying text.
388. See generally JON HARE, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT AND
PENDING WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENTS (1996); PETER SLY, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
SETTLEMENT MANUAL (1988); Judith V. Royster, A Primer on Indian Water Rights: More
Questions Than Answers, 30 TULSA L.J. 61 (1994).
389. 25 U.S.C. § 1772e (2000). See Royster, supra note 388, at 101-02; Royster, supra
note 137, at 199-200; Jim Shore & Jerry C. Straus, The Seminole Water Rights Compact and
the Seminole Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1987, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1
(1990); Barbara S. Monahan, Note, Florida's Seminole Indian Land Claims Agreement:
Vehicle for an Innovative Water Rights Compact, 15 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 341 (1991). Water
management districts are explicitly authorized to act consistently with the compact. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 373.200 (West 2000 & Supp. 2001).
390. Elizabeth Checchio & Bonnie G. Colby, The Context for Indian Water Settlements,
in WATER LAW: TRENDS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 179 (Kathleen Marion Carr & James
Crammond eds., 1995).
391. See, e.g., David H. Getches, Management and Marketing of Indian Water: From
Conflict to Pragmatism, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 515 (1988); Jack D. Palma II, Considerations
and Conclusions Concerning the Transferability of Indian Water Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 91 (1980); Karen M. Shapiro, An Argument for the Marketability of Indian Reserved Water
Rights: Tapping the Untapped Reservoir, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 277 (1987); Christine
Lichtenfels, Comment, Indian Reserved Water Rights: An Argument for the Right to Export
and Sell, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 131 (1989); Chris Seldin, Comment, Interstate Marketing of Indian Water Rights: The Impact of the Commerce Clause, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1545
(1999); Lee Storey, Comment, Leasing Indian Water Off the Reservation: A Use Consistent
with the Reservation's Purpose, 76 CAL. L. REV. 180 (1988).
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Georgia

For more than a century, Georgia was formally committed to what has
been described by Justice Harold Hill, Jr., as a version of "the natural flow
theory of riparian rights doctrine as modified by a reasonable use provision. ' ' 392 This self-contradictory description derives from two Georgia statutes that read together adopt the reasonable use theory while also embracing
the natural flow theory.393 In fact, as is true in all states committed to riparian rights, Georgia courts apply the reasonable use theory rather than the
natural flow theory whenever they have to make a choice. 394 Thus, when a
landowner allowed beavers to dam a pond, the landowner was held not to be
liable for any resulting backflooding on a neighbor's property, 395 but neither
would that landowner gain anything in terms of water rights relative to other
landowners based upon such beaver impoundments.3 96
Georgia courts generally have followed a standard reasonable-use riparian theory. Thus the right to use water is restricted to those who own
riparian land.397 Such owners are allowed individually to decide when,
where, and how to use the water, with the only limitation being that the use
must be reasonable relative to a competing user. Georgia generally leaves it
to the jury to decide what is reasonable under riparian rights with little or no
392. Stewart v. Bridges, 292 S.E.2d 702, 704 (Ga. 1982); Pyle v. Gilbert, 265 S.E.2d 584,
587 (Ga. 1980).
393. One section of the Georgia Code provides that: "Running water belongs to the
owner of the land on which it runs; but the landowner has no right to divert the water from its
usual channel nor may he so use or adulterate it as to interfere with the enjoyment of it by the
next owner." GA. CODE ANN. § 44-8-1 (2002). Another section provides that:
The owner of the land through which nonnavigable watercourses flow is entitled
to have the water in such streams come to his land in its natural and usual flow,
subject only to such detention or diminution as may be caused by a reasonable
use of it by other riparian proprietors. The diverting of the stream in whole or in
part from its natural and usual flow, or the obstructing thereof so as to impede its
course or cause it to overflow or injure the land through which it flows or any
right appurtenant thereto, or the polluting thereof so as to lessen its value to the
owner of such land shall constitute a trespass upon the property.
Id. § 51-9-7 (2000).
394. See generally James L. Bross, Georgia, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra
note 1, at 301-04. For an example of a similar confusion in Arkansas, see Harris v. Brooks,
225 Ark. 436, 443-44, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133-34 (1955), noting that Arkansas had not yet
definitely selected between the two theories, but then choosing the reasonable use theory.
Harrisis analyzed in the text supra at notes 18-38.
395. Bracey v. King, 406 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). Note that in Georgia, as in
most states, backflooding without permission is a classic trespass notwithstanding any claim
of riparian rights. Rushing v. Akins, 80 S.E.2d 813 (Ga. 1954); Wright v. Lovett, 209 S.E.2d
15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).
396. Dawson v. Wade, 361 S.E.2d 181 (Ga. 1987).
397. Moulton v. Bunting McWilliams Post No. 658, 102 S.E.2d 593 (Ga. 1958).
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instruction from the court. 3 98 Municipalities are treated just like private riparians-meaning that their sale of water to users within the city who are
not themselves riparian is considered to be a non-riparian use that is per 3se
99
unreasonable should a riparian owner challenge the municipality's use.
The reasonable use theory is also applied to disputes arising from the pollu400
tion of surface water.
Georgia courts have remained committed to ignoring temporal priorities in deciding the reasonableness of water usage. Both dimensions of riparian rights in Georgia are illustrated by the leading case of Pyle v. Gilbert.40 1 Pyle involved a dispute between the owners of a 140-year-old gristmill and five irrigating farmers, with at least one farmer having begun to
divert water barely three years before the suit began. The Georgia Supreme
Court posed the problem before it as a choice "between the past and the
present.,40 2 While the court ordered a new trial to determine whether the
irrigation was unreasonable relative to plaintiffs' uses, 0 3 the court not only
saw nothing in the plaintiffs' temporal priority worth commenting on, but
also held that a statute barring the diversion of water did not apply to irrigation 4°4 and overruled a case in which the court had held non-riparian uses to
be per se unreasonable. 40 5 Both rules would have resulted in an easy victory
for the plaintiffs.
Justice Harold Hill, Jr., indicated in Pyle that the ban on diversion applied only to the diversion of water into another watershed and not to the
withdrawal of water for reasonable use within the basin of origin. 40 6 Barely
two years later, the Georgia Supreme Court reaffirmed the irrelevancy of
temporal priority in its decision in Stewart v. Bridges.4 °7 Stewart concerned
a dispute between an irrigating farmer and a group of homeowners who
used the lake in question for personal recreation.40 8 In both Pyle and Stewart, the court refused to adopt a rule protecting some judicially prescribed
minimum level for the stream or lake and remanded both cases for a full
.398. See, e.g., Stewart v. Bridges, 292 S.E.2d 702, 703-04 (Ga. 1982); Price v. High
Shoals Mfg. Co., 64 S.E. 87, 90 (Ga. 1909).
399. City of Elberton v. Pearle Cotton Mills, 50 S.E. 977 (Ga. 1905).
400. Superior Farm Mgmt., LLC v. Montgomery, 513 S.E.2d 215 (Ga. 1999) (speaking
in terms of "nuisance"); Vickers v. City of Fitzgerald, 117 S.E.2d 316 (Ga. 1960) (same),
overruled on other grounds by City of Chamblee v. Maxwell, 452 S.E.2d 488 (Ga. 1994);
Cairo Pickle Co. v. Muggridge, 55 S.E.2d 562 (Ga. 1949) (based upon riparian rights).
401. 265 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 1980).
402. Id. at 585.
403. Id. at 588.
404. Id. at 586-87.
405. Id. at 588-89 (overruling Hendrix v. Roberts, 165 S.E. 223 (Ga. 1932)).
406. Id. at 586-87. Cf McNabb v. Houser, 156 S.E. 595 (Ga. 1931) (applying the ban on
diversion to a gold mine).
407. 292 S.E.2d 702 (Ga. 1982).
408. Id. at 703.
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trial on whether one use was "more reasonable" than the other.409 In Pyle,
Justice Hill specifically found it inappropriate to grant a summary judgment
based on suppositions about the economic utility of irrigation versus a mill
or recreation. 1 Justice Hill, who was by then Presiding Justice, also wrote
the opinion in Stewart. While Justice Hill's Stewart opinion was much
shorter and said little about how to balance agriculture against recreation, he
again emphasized the need to try the issue contextually on the basis of riparian theory, and not on some a priori property theory.411 In both cases, he
refused to intimate to the trial court anything about how the balance ought
to be struck, perhaps for fear of treading on the jury's role. The coolness of
Georgia's courts to claims of prescriptive rights underlines the irrelevance
of temporal priority to riparian rights in Georgia.4 12
In Pyle, however, the court did make a limited effort to accommodate
the idea of markets to Georgia riparian rights.41 3 Apparently all that the
buyer in Pyle acquired was the right to claim a reasonable use of the common pool resource. Even accepting that the right to make a consumptive use
of water is transferable to a non-riparian, Pyle left unsettled whether the
reasonable needs of the grantor (therefore avoiding possible prejudice to the
other riparians) 4 14 or of the grantee (thus treating the grantee as a full, equal
riparian) 415 is the measure of the transferred right. These uncertainties are
significant enough to make the purchase of a non-appurtenant riparian right
little more than a hunting license that might or might not yield water. Unsurprisingly, markets do not appear to have become a major activity in
Georgia.
In Georgia, courts and legislatures indicated that they could not determine the facts relating to ground water usage and thus they retreated into the
proposition that the owner of land held "absolute ownership" of percolating
water in the ground even when the pumping of groundwater affected a surface stream.41 6 Georgia does apply riparian rights in the rare case in which a
409. Id. at 704; Pyle, 265 S.E.2d at 587-89. This part of the Pyle opinion elicited a single
dissent, the only point on which anyone dissented in either case. Pyle, 265 S.E.2d at 589.
410. Pyle, 265 S.E.2d at 588.
411. Stewart, 292 S.E.2d at 704.
412. See Brown v. Tomlinson, 272 S.E.2d 258, 260 (Ga. 1980) (holding that laches prevented the enforcement of prescriptive rights to a reservoir); Kingsley Mill Corp. v. Edmonds, 67 S.E.2d 111, 112 (Ga. 1951) (holding that the plaintiff failed to plead prescriptive
rights adequately); Anneberg v. Kurtz, 28 S.E.2d 769, 771 (Ga. 1944) (upholding a prescriptive right to pollute).
413. Pyle, 265 S.E.2d at 588-89.
414. See, e.g., State v. Apfelbacher, 167 N.W. 244 (Wis. 1918). See also Lynda Butler,
Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a RiparianJurisdiction:Defining the Relationship
Between Public and PrivateInterests, 47 U. PiTT. L. REv. 95, 152-53 (1985).
415. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, §§ 856(2), 857(2).
416. City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 19 S.E.2d 508, 516 (Ga. 1942); Saddler v. Lee, 66 Ga.
45 (1879). See generally Bross, supra note 394, at 304-05; Murphy, supra note 196,
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court finds "underground streams. 4 17 Georgia's courts limited the theory of
absolute ownership in instances where they found that the water was withdrawn "maliciously"-for the purpose of hurting another landowner.4 18
Georgia's courts also found potential landowner liability for creating a private nuisance through the pollution of groundwater. 9
Reliance on riparian rights and the absolute ownership theory, notwithstanding the several limitations propounded by Georgia's courts, produced
the predictable tragedy of the commons with the attendant problems reasonably to be expected when water becomes scarce relative to demand. 2 °
Over the past forty years, the Georgia General Assembly has enacted a
broad range of statutes that regulate various aspects of water use in the state.
Two statutes directly address the allocation of water to particular uses
through the requirement of permits for the use of water-The Ground-water
Use Act of 1972 ("Ground Water Act") 42 1 and a 1977 amendment to the
Georgia Water Quality Protection Act of 1964 ("Protection Act").422 These
statutes impose similar permit systems on water users; the first applies to
users of groundwater and the second to users of surface water. Both statutes
are premised on the idea that the general welfare and public interest require
that the water resources of the state be put to beneficial use to the fullest
extent to which they are capable subject to reasonable regulation in order to
conserve the waters and to provide and maintain conditions which are conducive to the development and use of water resources.4 23
The Ground Water Act defines "groundwater" as including all underground water, including underground streams.424 The Protection Act defines
the term "surface waters" as any body of water on the surface that lies
within or along the boundary of the state, whether natural or artificial, although springs are included only if they produce more than 100,000 gallons
per day.425 The Environmental Protection Division ("Division") of the Department of Natural Resources has the sort of extensive planning responsi§ 21.07(b), at 162-63.
417. Stoner v. Patten, 63 S.E. 897 (Ga. 1909). See also Robertson v. Arnold, 186 S.E.

806 (Ga. 1936) (stopping a spring violates riparian rights).
418. St. Amand v. Lehman, 47 S.E. 949, 950 (Ga. 1904).
419. Tri-County Inv. Group, Ltd. v. S. States, Inc., 500 S.E.2d 22, 25-26 (Ga. 1998);
Hoffman v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 426 S.E.2d 387, 390 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
420. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8, 200.
421. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-90 to -107 (2001). See generally Bross, supra note 394, at
306; Murphy, supra note 196, § 21.07(b), at 163-69; H. Floyd Sherrod, Jr., The Groundwater Use Act of 1972: Protectionfor Georgia's GroundwaterResources, 6 GA. L. REV. 709

(1972).
422.
423.
424.
425.

GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-31 (2001). See generally Bross, supra note 394, at 306-07.
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-21(a), -91 (2001).

Id. § 12-5-92(6).
Id. § 12-5-31(b)(5).
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bilities that are customary under regulated riparian statutes.426 To support
these planning responsibilities, both Acts authorize the Division to require
extensive reporting of data and, for surface waters, to maintain a data bank
on the usage of water in any area of the state.427
The core of both statutes is a requirement that any user who withdraws
or impounds more than 100,000 gallons per day from a water source in the
state must have a permit to do so that is issued by the Division.428 Applications for permits are to be evaluated according to the same criteria of reasonableness that apply under common law riparian rights.429 The Ground
Water Act does not guarantee existing users a permit, but requires the Division to grant a permit for the reasonable needs of the water user as of July 1,
1973 .430 For surface waters, Georgia directs the Division to simply give a
preference to an existing use over an initial application to begin a use.43 1
There is no comparable provision in the Ground Water Act.
The Director of the Division determines the duration of permits, generally within upper and lower limits of ten to fifty years.432 The Ground Water
Act authorizes temporary permits.433 Both Acts require holders of water use
permits to report periodically on the amounts withdrawn or used, identifying
the particular source of the water, and specifying the nature of the use.434
The Ground Water Act authorizes the Division to conduct investigations to
verify this data, including a right to enter onto a water users' land to conduct
such investigations.4 35
For surface water, if the Division discovers a violation of an applicable
law, regulation, or permit, the Protection Act authorizes the Director of the
Division to revoke the permit, but only for a period of one year.436 Georgia
goes on to allow the Director to revoke, suspend, or modify a permit for the
use of surface water "for any other good cause consistent with the health
and safety.., and with this article. ' ' 37 For groundwater, Georgia authorizes
the Director to conciliate with a violator, but if that fails, however, the Director can issue orders for any necessary corrective action. 438 Once such an
order has become final (with or without an appeal), Georgia courts must
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

Id. §§ 12-5-92(5), -96(e), -584 (2001 & Supp. 2001).
Id. § 12-5-31(m), -98(d) (2001).
Id.§§ 12-5-31(a)(1), -96(a)(1).
See GA. CODEANN. §§ 12-5-31(e), (g), -96(d), -97(a) (2001).
Id.§ 12-5-97(f), (g).
Id. § 12-5-31(f), (j).
Id. §§ 12-5-31(h), -97(a).
Id. § 12-5-96(c)(2).
Id. §§ 12-5-31(m), -97(d), -97(e).
GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-98 (2001).
Id. § 12-5-31(k)(3).
Id. § 12-5-31(k)(8).
Id. § 12-5-99.
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enforce the order without modifying it. 439 It is not clear whether such an
order could include suspending or revoking the permit.
The Director may also seek an injunction without satisfying the usual
requirement of showing the lack of an adequate remedy at law. 440 For
groundwater violations, the Director is authorized to impose civil penalties
of up to $1000, with additional penalties of $500 per day for continuing
violations. 44' For surface water, civil penalties for wrongful diversion are
included in the civil penalty provisions for pollution, and thus the limits are
much larger-up to $50,000 per day and up to $100,000 per day if a separate violation occurs within one year of the original violation. 442 Violations
of the Ground Water Act also constitute a misdemeanor. 44 3 Again, violasubject to harsher pentions regarding surface water permits are potentially
44
felonies.
are
violations
such
alties because
The two Georgia statutes make no express provision for the market
transfer of a water use permit apart from the transfer of the title to the land
on which the water is used. The two statutes create a possibility for such a
transfer by their provisions authorizing the Division to approve a modification of a permit at the request of a permittee; apart from farm uses,44 5 this is
limited to situations where a change of circumstances requires more water
than has hitherto been used or where a modification will allow for a more
efficient use of the water.446 The provision on modifications thus seems to
contemplate a change in the pattern of use, but not a change in the type of
use. If so, a market for water permits is likely to be extremely circumscribed.
For surface water, the Division can revoke a permit because of non-use
of the water, the use of which is authorized by permit, for two consecutive
years without proper excuse. 447 This provision, however, is more likely to
prompt a permit holder to continue to waste water rather than to risk forfeiture. Even this limited possibility of forfeiture does not exist in the Ground
Water Act.
Georgia did initiate an experiment in economic incentives for water allocation management in the year 2000.448 The statute authorizes the use of
Id. §§ 12-5-45, -100.
Id. §§ 12-5-48, -101.
GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-106 (2001).
Id. § 12-5-52.
Id. § 12-5-107.
Id. § 12-5-53.
See infra text accompanying notes 451-58.
446. GA. CODEANN. §§ 12-5-31(i), -97(a) (2001).
447. Id. § 12-5-31(k)(4).
448. Id. § 12-5-540. See generally Kathy Pruitt, Bill Would Give Payments to Farmers
for Not Siphoning Off River in Drought,ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 17, 2000, at 10C; Laura
D. Windsor, Legislative Review, 17 GEO. ST. U. L. REv. 29 (2000).
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
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up to $4.5 billion of Georgia's share of the tobacco settlement to pay farmers in the Flint River basin to stop well irrigation during drought years to
prevent the drying of the river. The initiative for such payments lies with the
farmers, not the state. There have been reports of considerable irregulari449
ties-payments denied to eligible farmers and made to ineligible farmers.
Georgia authorizes emergency orders to deal with water shortages. The
standards that justify the issuance of emergencies are different in the two
statutes. For groundwater, the Division can issue such an order in any
"situation requiring immediate action to protect the public health or welfare," directing water users to take any action that Division deems necessary
to meet the emergency. 450 For surface water, the Director can issue such an
order when the water shortage is such "as to place in jeopardy the health or
safety of the citizens of such area or to threaten serious harm to the water
resources of the area. 4 51 The Director cannot issue such an order for surface
water except after a certified mailing to give notice to affected permit holders and a wait of five days after the mailing to allow a contest of the order.452 For groundwater, there is no requirement of prior notice or a hearing
except for farm uses.453 Such an emergency order can restrict any water use
permit.4 54 Farm uses have second priority in case of water emergenciesonly behind water for direct human consumption.45 5
These complex statutes represent a good beginning towards an adequate regulated riparian system. They establish in law the public nature of
water and provide a mechanism for managing water resources consistent
with the public trust as well as with promotion of private welfare. Thus far,
no one has challenged the constitutionality of the two statutes. Courts in
Georgia thus far have uniformly rejected challenges to the land use provisions of the Metropolitan River Protection Act of 1981456 as violating due
process or constituting a taking of property.45 7
449. Will Anderson, Flint River Farmers Bid in Water-Saving Plan, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Mar. 18, 2001, at 3C; Richard Whitt & Julie B. Hairston, Farmers Feel Sting of

Water Payoffs, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 2, 2000, at lB.
450. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-102 (2001).
451. Id. § 12-5-31(1)(1).
452. Id.
453. Id. § 12-5-102(a).
454. Id. §§ 12-5-31(l)(1), -102.
455. Id. §§ 12-5-31(l)(3), -102(c), -105(b)(4). With a certain irony, the legislature followed this provision with another provision that stated that "[t]he importance and necessity
of water for industrial purposes are in no way modified or diminished by this Code section."
Id. §§ 12-5-31(0(4), -105(b)(5).
456. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-440 to -457 (2001).
457. Threatt v. Fulton County, 467 S.E.2d 546, 550 (Ga. 1996) (holding there was no
taking of property). See also Pope v. City of Atlanta, 418 F. Supp. 665, 668-89 (N.D. Ga.
1976) (holding there was no denial of due process and no taking under the United States
Constitution); Pope v. City of Atlanta, 240 S.E.2d 241 (Ga. 1977) (finding authority for the
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Several major problems still exist, however, under the Georgia statutes
in their present state. First, the Georgia statutes do not attempt to manage
surface and ground waters conjunctively. That the two statutes are so similar and that they are both administered by the same agency perhaps ameliorates this problem. Yet the fact that they are separate statutes separately
administered and are not identical in all respects precludes fully rationalizing water management in Georgia.
An even more important failing of the two statutes is their near complete exemption of farm uses from the operation of the permit system if the
farm use began before July 1, 1988, and certain procedural steps were taken
before July 1, 1991.458 The statutes define "farm uses" as including water
used for the growing of any crop (including turf, trees, and ornamental
plants), for aquaculture or animal husbandry, and for the processing of perishable agricultural products. 459 The Division must issue special permits for
such privileged farm uses that are irrevocable, have no term, and are automatically transferred with title to the land on which the water is used. 460 The
Georgia statutes direct the Division to measure permits for farm uses by the
operating capacity of the withdrawal system. 46' The permits cannot include
a reporting requirement, but they are subject to investigations by the Division and can be suspended if the Division determines that the use authorized
by the permit unreasonably interferes with other users.462
Farm uses remain far and away the largest use of water in Georgia. The
virtual exclusion of farm uses from the scope of the two regulated riparian
statutes (which go far beyond the exclusions of certain uses in other regulated riparian states 463) prevents the rigorous implementation of the regulated riparian scheme such as is found in Florida. The common law principles of riparian rights and absolute ownership as developed in the Georgia
cases will continue to govern disputes over water allocation involving farm
uses-which constitute many or most disputes over water allocation.464 The
Georgia statutes do not even alter the common law prohibitions of use on
non-riparian or non-overlying lands. Indeed, the Protection Act (which includes the regulated riparian provisions for surface water) provides that
nothing in the Protection Act preempts private rights of action under the
act under the state constitution), appeal after remand, 249 S.E.2d 16 (Ga. 1978) (rejecting
due process and takings challenges), on subsequent appeal, 255 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. 1979) (ordering the grant of a permit on the basis that there was no proof of impact on the river); Bross,
supranote 394, at 307.
458. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-31(a)(3),-105(a) (2001).
459. Id. §§ 12-5-31(b)(3), -92(5.1).
460. Id. §§ 12-5-31(a)(3),-105(b)(1)-(2).
461. Id. §§ 12-5-31(a)(3),-105(b)(1).
462. Id. §§ 12-5-31(k)(7),-105(b)(1), (3).
463. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(a)(1).
464. See supra text accompanying notes 397-419.
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common law in general or specifically directed at suppressing a nuisance or
at abating pollution.4 65 While this provision is broad enough to preserve
riparian rights in full force for surface water, it has no application to the
Ground Water Act, leaving open the possibility of a court finding a partial
or total repeal of the absolute ownership doctrine by implication. So far, no
one seems to have raised this issue in a Georgia court.
The statutes also are almost completely silent regarding interstate
transfers, while the provisions relating to interbasin transfers are extremely
limited. The Director must give a preference to water usage within a water
basin over proposed interbasin transfers.466 There is no comparable provision in the Ground Water Act. There is no provision in either statute for
public or local participation in decision-making apart from participating in
public hearings when such hearings are required.4 67
E.

Louisiana

Water allocation law in Louisiana is, at least superficially, completely
different from the water allocation law of the other southeastern states.
Upon closer examination, however, Louisiana's water allocation law turns
out to be very similar to the reasonable use version of riparian rights.46 8 In
fact, the reasonable use theory has been subject to less legislative tinkering
in Louisiana than in any other southeastern state.
Louisiana adheres to the civil law tradition rather than the common law
tradition. 469 Louisiana, therefore, follows a form of riparian rights derived
from its civil code rather than from the common law. 470 This system continues to work well as water in Louisiana is relatively plentiful. Indeed, observers have concluded that Louisiana law is premised on its "perpetual

465. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-46 (2001).
466. Id. § 12-5-31(n).
467. Id. §§ 12-5-31(n)(2) (providing for public hearings regarding proposed interbasin
transfers), -95(c) (2001) (providing for public hearings for groundwater use regulations), 97(d) (2001) (same).
468. Commentators have concluded that the right to use water in Louisiana is in most
respects the same as riparian rights under the common law. See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER
LAW IN A NUTSHELL

212-14 (3d ed. 1997); Klebba, supra note 185, at 1791-1813; Ewell P.

Walther, Jr., Comment, Acquisition of the Right To Use Water, 29 TuL. L. REv. 554, 554
(1955).
469. See generally Shael Herman, The Contribution of Roman Law to the Jurisprudence
ofAntebellum Louisiana, 56 LA. L. REv. 257 (1995).
470. Doiron v. O'Bryan, 51 So. 2d 628, 632 (La. 1951); Long v. La. Creosoting Co., 69
So. 281, 282 (La. 1915). The apparent source of the Louisiana code provisions was C. Civ.
§ 644 (Fr. 1804). See Patrick H. Martin, Louisiana, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra
note 1, at 389; Jerry G. Jones, Comment, Water Rights in Louisiana, 16 LA. L. REv. 500, 503
(1956).
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availability. ' 47 As a result, litigation has focused on problems of drainage
and pollution rather than on the acquisition of the right to use water.472
The Louisiana Civil Code ("Civil Code") was revised in 1978, with
few substantive changes regarding water. One change, however, reclassified
running and navigable waters as "public things" belonging to "the state or
its political subdivisions in their capacity as public persons. 473 The provision apparently is a statutory adoption of the doctrine known in other states
as the "public trust., 474 It creates a likelihood that water that neither runs nor
is navigable is privately owned, or at least not subject to the local version of
the public trust. The federal courts have now held that under state law there
are no public rights to water in Louisiana that is not naturally navigable.47 5
It remains to be seen whether Louisiana's courts will agree.
As far as private uses of water are concerned, the Civil Code contains
three relevant provisions. The Civil Code provides that "[t]he owner of an
estate bordering on running water may use it as it runs for the purpose of
watering his estate or for other purposes. 4 76 An identical provision governs
running water which "runs over" the estate, except that the owner is bound
to return the water to its ordinary channel before it leaves the estate.477 Finally, the Civil Code provides that one cannot lawfully use one's property if
it interferes with the like use of a neighbor or causes any damage to the
neighbor.478
The Civil Code provisions, by their own terms, apply only to water
running in defined surface water bodies; the provisions do not apply to water that does not "run.' 4 7 9 The rights defined in the Civil Code are, like classic riparian rights, considered "accessory rights," which attach to riparian
lands because of their adjacency to the water source. 480 Apparently then, the
471. Levine, supra note 188, at 1128; Martin, supra note 470, at 389. See also Klebba,
supranote 185, at 1779; Walther, supra note 468, at 562.
472. See, e.g., Mossy Motors, Inc. v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 753 So. 2d
269 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Aydell v. Morales, 707 So. 2d 158 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
473. LA. Ctv. CODE ANN. art. 450 (West 1980 & Supp. 2002). See generally Klebba,
supra note 185, at 1800-13.
474. See generallyMartin, supra note 470, at 393-94.
475. St. Martin v. Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc., 224 F.3d 402 (5th Cir.
2000); Dardar v. LaFourche Realty Co., 985 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1993). See also Martin, supra
note 470, at 390.
476. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 657 (West 1980).
477. Id. art. 658.
478. Id. art. 667 (West Supp. 2002).
479. Hall v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 35 So. 976, 980 (La. 1904); State v. Bourdon, 535 So. 2d
1091, 1096 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Verzwyvelt v. Armstrong-Ratterree, Inc., 463 So. 2d 979,
984-85 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619, 621 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
See also Jones, supra note 470, at 505-07; Klebba, supra note 185, at 1793.
480. Delachaise v. Maginnis, 11 So. 715, 716 (La. 1892). See also Martin, supra note
470. at 390.
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right to use water cannot be conveyed
apart from the land.481 Prescription
482
applies to water rights in Louisiana.
Like so many other states committed to riparian rights, however, the
language of the Civil Code provisions does not clearly adopt either the natural flow theory or the reasonable use theory.483 One might think that the
obligation to return the water to its natural channel before it leaves the land
implicitly endorses the natural flow theory, but no Louisiana case has so
held. 484 Louisiana's few cases, 485 however, have applied reasonable use notions without explicit reference to the Civil Code provisions.486 On the other
hand, if only because of the plentifulness of water, withdrawals for use on
non-riparian lands are common in Louisiana and seem to be accepted by the
legislature and the courts, as well as other users, without any explicit statutory authority for such withdrawals.4 87 Whether one can transfer a riparian
right
apart from transferring the title to riparian land simply has not come
488
up.

481. See also LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 649, 650 (West 1980); Jones, supra note 470, at
504, 507-08; Klebba, supra note 185, at 1795-98.
482. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 758 (West 1980). See Crump v. Sabine River Auth., 737
So. 2d 720, 731 (La. 1999) (applying prescription to the diversion of water from its natural
channel cutting off the plaintiff's access to the water); Young v. Int'l Paper Co., 155 So. 231,
232-33 (La. 1934) (upholding a claim of prescription against a claim for damage for flooding adjoining land with polluted water); Becknell v. Weindhal, 7 La. Ann. 291 (1852) (holding that failure to object to an open obstruction of drainage implicitly waives the right to a
drainage servitude); Eubanks v. Bayou D'Arbonne Lake Watershed Dist., 742 So. 2d 113,
114 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding an action for damages for interference with surface drainage to be prescribed). See also Klebba, supra note 185, at 1792-95
483. See generally 4 ATHANASSIOs N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CtVIL LAW: PREDIAL
SERVtTUDES § 22 (1983).
484. Only one case might have put the point in issue, but the court did not cite the relevant Civil Code provision and declined to enjoin a diversion of a substantial amount of water
into a canal. Ilhenny v. Broussard, 135 So. 669 (La. 1931).
485. While Louisiana does not officially follow the rule of stare decisis for Civil Code
provisions, the bench and bar effectively treat the Civil Code and precedents much like statutes and cases are treated in common law states.
486. Long v. La. Creosoting Co., 69 So. 281 (La. 1915); Jackson v. Walton, 2 La. App.
53 (1925). See also Ilhenny, 135 So. at 669. See generally Klebba, supra note 185, at
1798-1800; Martin, supra note 470, at 390-91.
487. See, e.g., Jackson, 2 La. App. at 53. The legislature has explicitly authorized certain
non-riparian uses by statute. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:2(4) (West Supp. 2002) (waterworks companies), 33:841 (West 2002) (municipalities), 33:3815 (West 2002) (waterworks
districts), 38:2112 (West 1989) (irrigation districts), 38:2551-2572 (West 1989 & Supp.
2002) (certain special purpose districts), 38:3085.1-3085.8 (West 1989) (certain special
purpose districts), 45:61 (West 2000) (irrigation companies).
488. The closest we find is a riparian's grant of an easement of access to the waterfront to
a non-riparian. See Keeley v. Schexnailder, 708 So. 2d 838 (La. Ct. App. 1998). The court
upheld the right of access, but did not address whether it would uphold a grant of the right to
withdraw water. Id. at 843.
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For groundwater, Louisiana follows the absolute ownership rule.489
This result derives from another provision of the Civil Code. Section 490
reads, "[u]nless otherwise provided by law, the ownership of a tract of land
carries with it the ownership of everything that is directly above or under
it. ' ' 4 9 ° This language does not actually require that one's ownership be absolute, but that is how the Louisiana Supreme Court has interpreted it.49' The
court did indicate that the malicious or negligent waste of water would be
actionable.492 Louisiana courts have simply ignored these statutory provisions in cases regarding the pollution of groundwater, where torts such as
negligence and nuisance are routinely applied.493
The Louisiana Mineral Code ("Mineral Code"), enacted in 1974, is
even more explicit in supporting these conclusions. Article 8 of the Mineral
Code reads:
A landowner may use and enjoy his property in the most unlimited manner for the purpose of discovering and producing minerals, provided it is
not prohibited by law. He [sic] may reduce to possession and ownership
all of the minerals occurring naturally in a liquid or gaseous state that
can be obtained by operations on or beneath his land even though his
operations may cause their migration from beneath the land of another.494
Despite this sweeping language, other provisions of the Mineral Code
make clear that the rights conferred by this section are shared with
neighboring landowners and thus are reasonably limited by the rights of the
neighbors: "Landowners and others with rights in a common reservoir or
deposit of minerals have correlative rights and duties with respect to one
another in the development and production of the common source of minerals." 495 The Mineral Code then provides in article 10:
A person with rights in a common reservoir or deposit of minerals may
not make works, operate, or otherwise use his [sic] rights so as to de489. See Murphy, supra note 196, § 21.03.
490. LA. CMViL CODE ANN. art. 490 (West 1980). See generally Klebba, supra note 185,
at 1819-33; Levine, supra note 188, at 1128-33; Martin, supra note 470, at 392-93.
491. Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
492. Id. at 624.
493. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 762 So. 2d 644 (La.
Ct. App. 2000); Mossy Motors, Inc. v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 753 So. 2d
269 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Bartlett v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 683 So. 2d 1319 (La. Ct. App.
1996). See also Mongrue v. Monsanto Co., 249 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2001); Licciardi v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 111 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 1997).
494. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:8 (West 2000).
495. Id. § 31:9. See generally Eugene Kuntz, Correlative Rights of PartiesOwning Interests in a Common Source of Supply of Oil or Gas, 17 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAx'N 217
(1966).
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prive another intentionally or negligently of the liberty of enjoying his
rights, or that may intentionally or negligently cause damage to him.
This Article and Article 9 shall not affect the right of a landowner to extract liquid or gaseous minerals in accordance with the principle of Article 8.496
Finally, the Mineral Code goes on to provide in article 11:
The owner of land burdened by a mineral right or rights and the owner
of a mineral right must exercise their respective rights with reasonable
regard for those of the other. Similarly the owners of separate mineral
rights in the same land must exercise their respective rights with reasonable regard for the rights of other owners.497
Louisiana courts have not considered whether groundwater is included
within the purview of the Mineral Code, although Louisiana courts have
indicated in dicta in two earlier decisions that water, oil, and gas were subject to the same body of law. 498 Despite apparently embracing a rule of sharing in articles 9 through 11, these provisions are carefully expressed so as
not to contradict the absolute ownership approach of article 8. This is particularly explicit in the proviso at the end of article 10. Before enactment of
the Mineral Code, Louisiana courts in the oil and gas context had used the
499
general obligation of "good neighborliness" expressed in the Civil Code
to impose liability at least in the context of wasteful operation of a well.500
Whether this approach is still valid remains unclear, particularly regarding
groundwater.
Whether in the end Louisiana actually embraces the absolute ownership doctrine, some form of correlative rights, or the reasonable use theory
for groundwater may not be established for a long time given the relative
plentifulness of water. For the same reason, the legislature has not felt it
necessary to introduce a regulated riparian system for either surface water or
groundwater. Thus, among the southeastern states, Louisiana remains closer
to the classic common law of water rights for both surface water and
groundwater than any of the common law states in the region.

496. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:10 (West 2000).

497. Id. § 31:11.
498. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guar. Oil Co., 82 So. 206 (La. 1919); Adams v. Grigsby,
152 So. 2d 619, 622-23 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
499. LA. CMVIL CODE ANN. art. 667 (West Supp. 2002).
500. See, e.g., Higgins Oil & Fuel Co., 82 So. at 212.
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Mississippi

According to one source, at least nine eastern states have seriously
considered the possibility of adopting appropriative rights. 50 1 There has
been, however, only one abortive attempt actually to do so to date-when
Mississippi enacted an appropriation statute in 1956.502 The attempt ended
in 1985 with Mississippi's repeal of its appropriation statute, 50 3 after courts
in Mississippi had virtually ignored the
statute's existence during the
54
twenty-nine years the statute was in force. 0
Before these statutory adventures, Mississippi had followed the reasonable use version of riparian rights for surface water 50 5 and the absolute
ownership rule for groundwater. 0 6 Courts in Mississippi have evaded the
absolute ownership rule when the complaint concerns pollution rather than
the allocation of groundwater, turning instead to torts like negligence or
nuisance.50 7 Today the regulated riparian system that Mississippi has both
enacted and implemented presumably preempts these bodies of law, but
given the history with regard to the appropriative rights statute, one cannot
be entirely certain that courts will agree.
The current water allocation law of Mississippi is a rather standard
regulated riparian statute.50 8 Because Mississippi enacted its statute fairly
late compared to the regulated riparian statutes in most of the other states in
the region, it includes a number of advances in design. Thus, the Mississippi
statutory scheme mandates the conjunctive management of surface water
and groundwater. 50 9 The statute also is careful to declare that it creates a set
501. See MALONEY, AusNEss, & MORRIS, supra note 40, at 75-76 (listing Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin as having actively considered the adoption of appropriative rights). What is not
clear is whether these states were actually considering an appropriative rights system or a
regulated riparian system. See supratext accompanying note 139.
502. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-3(g)(2), 51-3-7 (1972, repealed 1985). See generally
Champion, supra note 100.
503. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to -15 (2001). See generally Murphy, supra note 196, §
21.07(e); Al Sage, Mississippi, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 445.
504. See Anderson-Tully Co. v. Franklin, 307 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Haisch v.
Southaven Land Co., 274 F. Supp. 392 (N.D. Miss. 1967); Phillips v. Davis Timber Co., 468
So. 2d 72 (Miss. 1985); Black v. Wiliams, 417 So. 2d 911 (Miss. 1982); Hinds-Rankin
Metrop. Water & Sewer Ass'n v. Reid, 256 So. 2d 373 (Miss. 1971); Downes v. Crosby
Chems., Inc., 234 So. 2d 916 (Miss. 1970). See generally supra text accompanying notes
97-110.
505. Miss. Mills Co. v. Smith, 11 So. 26, 27-28 (Miss. 1892).
506. Bd. of Supervisors v. Miss. Lumber Co., 31 So. 905 (Miss. 1902).
507. See, e.g., Bradley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 130 F.3d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 1997).
508. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to -55 (2001). See generally Murphy, supra note 196, §
21.07(e); Sage, supra note 503, at 445.
509. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1, -29 (2001). The statute's definitions of "surface water"
and "groundwater" are extremely general-all water occurring on the surface of the ground,
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of regulations under the state's police power, a provision that could prove
helpful if the statute were ever challenged as a taking. The same provision
that expressed the foregoing two provisions also expresses the policy that
the water be put to its fullest possible beneficial use, while at the same time
expressing the policies of preventing waste or unreasonable use, promoting
the conservation of water, and encouraging the investment of public and
private funds for the promotion and expansion of the beneficial use of wa5
ter. 1

In order to accomplish the foregoing ends, Mississippi's statutes create
a permit board ("Board") to administer permits for a number of purposes
relating to the use of water, including for the withdrawal and use of water.5 12 The statute requires all persons proposing to use water to obtain a
permit unless the statute provides a specific exemption. 13 Exemptions include the following:
(1) Persons who held valid appropriative rights on the effective date of
the regulated riparian statute and who took the
necessary proce514
dural steps to preserve the appropriative rights;
(2) Persons who use water only for domestic uses;515
(3) Persons who use surface water from impoundments not located on
continuous, free-flowing watercourses; 5 16 and
(4) Persons drawing water from a well with a surface casing diameter
5 17
of less than six inches, except for certain real estate developers.
The Board was directed to issue holders of appropriative rights a permit, and the holders must refile for a renewal of their permit every ten
years.5 18 It is not clear whether the renewal permit continues to carry forward the appropriative rights of the first permit or brings the water used
within the regulated riparian system. In any event, holders of appropriative
rights must comply with regulations promulgated to protect the public
and all water occurring beneath the surface of the ground respectively. Id. § 51-3-3(b), (n).
510. Id. § 51-3-1.
511. Id.
512. Id. § 49-17-28(1) (2001).
513. Id. § 51-3-5.
514. Id. § 51-3-5(2)-(3).
515. MIss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-7(1) (2001). "Domestic use" is defined as "the use of water
for ordinary household purposes, the watering of farm livestock, poultry and domestic animals and the irrigation of home gardens and lawns." Id. § 51-3-3(c) (1999).
516. Id. § 51-3-7(1). "Watercourse" is defined as "any natural lake, river, creek, cut, or
other natural body of fresh water or channel having definite banks and bed with visible evidence of the flow or occurrence of water, except such lakes without outlet to which only one
(1) landowner is riparian." Id. § 51-3-3(h).
517. Id. § 51-3-7(1).
518. Id. § 51-3-9(4).
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health or welfare. 519 The Board also can require a permit for any exempt use
(except for grandfathered appropriate
rights) in excess of 20,000 gallons per
' 520
area.
caution
use
"water
a
in
day
The Board's functions are limited to processing applications for new
permits or renewing existing permits. 521 Permits are to be issued for any
beneficial use.522 Beneficial use is defined simply as "the application of
water to a useful purpose as determined by the commission, but excluding
waste of water."5 23 Although, most permits expire after ten years,524 the
Board can give municipalities, other governmental units, or regulated public
utilities a longer permit to match the period of the amortization of their investment.52 5 If the permit holder applies to renew an expiring permit, the
Board must renew the permit unless continuation of the use would be contrary to the public interest. 526 Yet, the Board may modify any permit upon
sixty days written notice. 527 The statute does not specify any standards for
such a modification. The Board may revoke a permit for violation of its
terms or conditions.52 8 On the other hand, the Board is also authorized to
issue temporary or emergency permits whenever such a permit is "essential. 529
Mississippi's Commission on Environmental Quality ("Commission")
plays a prominent role in circumscribing the powers of the Board.53 ° The
Board has authority to allocate water only in excess of such established
minimum flows or levels that are to be set by the Commission. 531 "Established minimum flow" and "established minimum lake level" are defined
(somewhat unhelpfully) as "the minimum [flow] [lake level] for a given
[stream] [at a given point thereon] [lake] as determined and established by
the commission when reasonably required for the purposes of this chapter." 532 Both definitions also require that the Commission, in setting these
flows and levels, consider "generally accepted scientific methodologies. 5 33
The definition for "established minimum flows" further provides a particu519. Id.
520. Id. §§ 51-3-7(1), -11.
521. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-13, -15, -31, -33, -35 (2001). See generally Sage,
supra note 503, at 448-51.
522. MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-13 (2001).
523. Id. § 51-3-3(e).
524. Id. § 51-3-9(i).
525. Id. § 51-3-9(2).
526. Id. § 51-3-9(1).
527. Id. § 51-3-15(2)(c).
528. MIss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-15(2)(d) (2001).
529. Id. § 51-3-15(2)(b).
530. Id. § 49-2-5 (1999) (creating the Commission on Environmental Quality).
531. Id. § 51-3-7(2), (3).
532. Id. § 51-3-3(i), (j).
533. Id.
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lar formula that the Commission may use 53 4 and requires it to consider
"consumptive and nonconsumptive water uses, including, but not limited to,
agricultural, industrial, municipal and domestic uses, assimilative waste
capacity, recreation, navigation, fish and wildlife resources and other
535 ecologic values, estuarine resources, aquifer recharge, and aesthetics."
The Board is also forbidden to issue a permit for a use of water that
would cause the quality of a stream to fail to meet the applicable water quality standards at minimum stream flow, 536 or if the withdrawal of water
would impair the navigability of any watercourse. 537 Also, the Board may
not issue a permit that would require the "mining" of an aquifer unless the
permit holder has made a definite commitment to substitute water from another source that would not involve groundwater mining. 538 These standards
are also all likely to involve determinations made by the Commission rather
than the Board.
Potentially the most important power vested in the Commission is its
power to declare a "water use caution area., 539 The Commission is to declare a water use caution area whenever it determines (using generally accepted scientific methodologies) that the water in a water source is not adequate to meet current or foreseeable needs, or if an aquifer is subject to
groundwater mining. 40 The Commission must give notice of and conduct a
public hearing on the proposal to establish a water use caution area, including any proposed restrictions on water use with the caution area. 54 1 After the
conclusion of the public hearing, the Commission can establish the caution
area and restrict existing uses notwithstanding the permit for the use.542
The Commission is also vested with the authority to adopt regulations
to assure beneficial use and to minimize waste. 43 The Commission must
also create a state water management plan.5 " In order for it to acquire the
necessary information to enable it to perform its planning functions, the
Commission can require all permit holders to file periodic reports on actual
water usage. 545 The employees of the Commission and any other agency
534. MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-3(i) (2001) ("The average streamflow rate over seven (7)
consecutive days that may be expected to be reached as an annual minimum no more frequently than one (1) year in ten (10) years (7Q10).").
535. Id.
536. Id. § 51-3-7(4).
537. Id. § 51-3-7(5).
538. Id. § 51-3-7(6).
539. Id.. §51-3-11.
540. Miss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-11(1)(a) (2001).
541. Id. § §51-3-11(3),-51.
542. Id. § 51-3-11(3)(b).
543. Id. § 51-3-25(a), (d).
544. Id.§ 51-3-21.

545. Id. § 51-3-23.
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must protect the confidentiality of trade secrets or any other information
46
regarding business activities, subject to a fine of $1000 for each violation.
The Board must approve all changes in the place of withdrawal or use
before the change is made, but the fine for violating this requirement is only
$200 per day.547 No other provisions of the Mississippi regulated riparian
statute address changes in pattern of use. There is thus no express provision
regarding market transfers of water rights, although the provision regarding
change in the place of withdrawal or use could be interpreted broadly to
reach market transfers. The statute neither expressly repeals nor alters the
common law of riparian rights or of groundwater. Indeed the statute requires the Board to issue a permit in compliance with the terms of any
judgment by a court adjudicating the right to use water. 4 8
Finally, enforcement of the permits is vested in yet another commission, the Commission on Natural Resources. 549 Members of the Commission on Natural Resources or of the Board (or any person authorized by
either body) are authorized to enter onto and inspect any land to determine
whether the permit holder is complying with the permit. 550 Any violation of

a permit, or the submission of false information required to be reported by
the statute, is a misdemeanor subject to a fine of not less than $100 for each
day for each violation.55' In the alternative, the Commission on Natural Resources may also assess a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 per day for
each violation. 52 It may also seek an injunction in cases of "imminent and
substantial hazard" without needing to prove the absence of an adequate
remedy at law or the presence of future irreparable injury.5 3
G.

South Carolina

For surface water, South Carolina remains committed to riparian rights
in its reasonable use version.554 It applies the reasonable use rule both to
withdrawals of water from a watercourse and to discharges into a watercourse. 555 There is, of course, no right to discharge in violation of water
546.

See Miss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-44 (2001).

547.
548.
549.
550.

Id. § 51-3-45.
Id. § 51-3-47.
Id. § 51-3-55(1).
Id. § 51-3-43.

551. Id. § 51-3-55(2).
552. Miss. CODE ANN.

§ 51-3-55(3) (2001).

553. Id. § 51-3-55(5).
554. White v. Whitney Mfg. Co., 38 S.E. 456, 460-62 (S.C. 1901). See generally
Stephen A. Spitz, South Carolina, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, at
733-36; Edward P. Guerard, Jr., Note, The Riparian Rights Doctrine in South Carolina, 21
S.C. L. REV. 757 (1969).
555. United States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, 366 F.2d 915, 919 (4th Cir. 1966).
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quality standards. The relatively few cases regarding riparian rights in South
Carolina suggest that water supply generally is so much more than demand
that a common property system with little or no state regulation might still
be suitable in South Carolina.
Even without extensive litigation arising under riparian rights in South
Carolina, the state's legislature has intervened in the water allocation law of
the state. The South Carolina Surface Water Withdrawal and Reporting
Act"16 only requires people withdrawing water from surface sources to report the extent of their withdrawals, without any regulation whatsoever of
the withdrawals or uses involved. In contrast, the Interbasin Transfer of
Water Act ("Transfer Act")55 7 requires a permit for the transfer of water
from one river basin to another if the transfer involves the lesser of five
percent of seven-day, ten-year low flow of the watercourse from which the
water is taken or 1,000,000 gallons per day. 558 The Transfer Act grandfathers interbasin transfers in existence or under construction on the effective
date of the Transfer Act (December
1, 1984) if they are registered within six
559
date.
effective
the
of
months
The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control
("Department") is to issue a permit according to the usual standards of reasonableness found in regulated riparian statutes, but with special emphasis
on the needs of the basin of origin.5 60 Special provisions in the Transfer Act
are designed to assure the protection of the water quality in the basin of
origin. It also specifically protects the right of anyone in the basin of origin to recover damages for an injury to that person's riparian rights.562 The
permits are to last, in the discretion of the Department, between twenty and
forty years.563 The Department may modify or suspend the permits "for
good cause. ' ' 6 Permits can be renewed on the same basis as their initial
issuance. 565 Permits, however, cannot be transferred without the permission
of the Department. 566 Violations of the Transfer Act are a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine between $1000 and $10,000 per violation.56 7 The Department may obtain an injunction, but no special provision relieves it of
any of the usual requirements (such as proof that there is no adequate rem556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.

S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 49-4-10 to -80 (West Supp. 2001).
Id. §§ 49-21-10 to -80.
Id. § 49-21-20.
Id. § 49-21-50.
Id. §§ 49-21-10(1),-30(C), -30(F).
Id. § 49-21-30(D)-(E).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-21-30(G) (West Supp. 2001).
Id. § 49-21-40(A).
Id. § 49-21-40(B).
Id. § 49-21-40(C).

Id. § 49-21-40(D).
Id. § 49-21-70(A).
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edy at law or that there will be an irreparable injury) for obtaining an injunction. 68
While the Transfer Act is not specifically directed at interstate transfers
of water, the state legislature was certainly aware that the Act would reach
such transfers. It specifically authorizes the Department to negotiate interstate compacts pursuant to the Act, although the legislature would still have
to approve the compact. 569 Whether the Transfer Act will withstand a challenge under the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution has
not yet been raised in court.57 °
South Carolina has very little case law addressing the allocation of
groundwater. 571 Even without much evidenceof legal problems regarding
groundwater allocation in South Carolina and without any extensive regulatory intervention regarding surface water, however, the state's legislature
enacted a comprehensive regulated riparian statute for groundwater in
1969-the Groundwater Use and Reporting Act ("Reporting Act").572 This
Act goes much further than the Transfer Act in that it applies to all withdrawals and uses of groundwater, not merely to interbasin transfers.
The Reporting Act defines groundwater somewhat narrowly as "water
in the void spaces of geologic materials within the zone of saturation., 573 It
opens with a fairly standard policy declaration:
The General Assembly declares that the general welfare and public interest require that the groundwater resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent to which they are capable, subject to reasonable regulation, in order to conserve and protect these resources, prevent waste, and to provide and maintain conditions which are conducive
to the development and use of water resources.574
The Reporting Act requires the Department to establish a statewide
groundwater management program. 75 It also requires all persons withdrawing groundwater to register their withdrawals and uses with the Department. 76 The Reporting Act then charges the Department to monitor and
assess all groundwater withdrawals in the state.5 77 If the Department deter568. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-21-70(B) (West Supp. 2001).
569. Id. § 49-21-80.
570. Cf. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (applying the federal
commerce clause to strike down Nebraska's law prohibiting the interstate transfer of
groundwater).
571. See Spitz, supranote 554, at 735-36.
572. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 49-5-10 to -150 (West Supp. 2001).
573. Id. § 49-5-30(10).
574. Id. § 49-5-20.
575. Id. §§ 49-5-40, -110.
576. Id. §§ 49-5-40, -80 to -90.
577. Id. § 49-5-50.
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mines that excessive groundwater withdrawals threaten the natural resources of the state; the public health, safety, or economic welfare; or the
long-term integrity of the aquifer from which the water is withdrawn, the
Department is to declare a capacity use area in which withdrawals become
subject to permitting and regulation by the Department. 578 The Department
must develop a groundwater management plan for the capacity use area and
issue permits consistently with the plan. 579 One capacity use area-the
Coastal Plain Capacity Use Area-had already been established before the
Reporting
Act was enacted, and was continued in effect under the Reporting
80
Act5
581
The Reporting Act fully exempts from its scope the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

582

emergency withdrawals;
withdrawals for non-consumptive uses;
withdrawals for the purpose of wildlife habitat management; and
withdrawals for a single household for non-commercial use.

The foregoing exemptions extend not only to the possible permit requirement, but even to the registration requirement. Additionally, the Reporting
Act exempts from the permit
requirement (but not from the registration re583
following:
the
quirement)
584

(1) dewatering operations;
(2) new wells reaching crystalline bedrock in the Coastal Plain
Groundwater Management Area; and
(3) new wells replacing existing wells.
It also exempts certain aquifer storage and recovery wells regulated under
585 Finally, it authorizes the
the Underground Injection Control Regulations.
5 86
Department to exempt certain small wells.
The Reporting Act requires that all natural or artificial artesian wells
with a flow of more than 5000 gallons per day be capped, and a landowner
where the well is found is limited to using the water only to the extent actually necessary to meet that person's needs.587 The Reporting Act does not
include any provision regarding interbasin or interstate transfers or transfers
578.
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.

584.
585.
586.
587.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-5-60 (West Supp. 2001).
Id. §§ 49-5-30(11), -60(B), -60(C), -100.
Id. §§ 49-5-30(4),-150.
Id. § 49-5-70(A).
Id. § 49-5-30(7) (defining emergency withdrawals).
Id. § 49-5-70(B).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-5-30(6) (West Supp. 2001) (defining dewatering operations).
Id. §§ 49-5-30(2), -70(C)(1); 25A S.C. CODE ANN. REGs. 61-87 (1989).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-5-70(D).
Id. §§ 49-5-30(9),-130.
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of permits. It explicitly
declares that it in no way alters rights to use surface
588
water in the state.
Willful violations of the Reporting Act are a misdemeanor punishable
by a fine of not more that $1000 per day per violation.5 89 The Department
may also assess a civil penalty of up to $1000 per day per violation without
regard to its willfulness. 590 The Department further may obtain an injunction, but there is no special provision relieving it of any of the usual requirements (such as proof that there is no adequate remedy at law or that
there will be an irreparable injury) for obtaining an injunction. 9'
VII. CONCLUSION
Elsewhere, I have written about the forces driving change in water allocation law in many places around the world.592 Foremost among those
forces has been the burgeoning demand arising both from growing population and from changing patterns of use.5 93 Changing patterns of use have
included both increased withdrawals of water to use in agriculture and industry, and increased pollution resulting from human use of water. Recent
decades have seen some increases in the efficiency of water use as the cost
of using water has risen and a decrease of water pollution because of regulations and incentives pursuant to the Clean Water Act. 594 Nonetheless, much
more water is withdrawn today than fifty years ago, and the pollution loads
of water sources are heavier than they were seventy-five or 100 years ago.
As a result, many observers are convinced that shortfalls in meeting the
demand5 for water are becoming, and will continue to become, more com59
mon.
In this article, I have examined the patterns of legal change regarding
water allocation in the seven southeastern states-Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. With the excep588. Id. §§ 49-5-30(20),-140.
589. Id. § 49-5-120(A).
590. Id. § 49-5-120(B).
591. Id. § 49-5-120(D).
592. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting the Law of Water Management to Global
Climate Change and Other Hydropolitical Stresses, 35 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES Ass'N
1301 (1999).
593. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Population and Water in the Middle East: The Challenge and Opportunity for Law, 7 INT'L J. ENv'T & POLLUTION 72 (1997).
594. See, e.g., Robert Benjamin Naeser & Lynne Lewis Bennett, The Cost of Noncompliance: The Economic Value of Water in the Middle Arkansas River Valley, 38 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 445 (1998); Sherry J. Tippett & Craig O'Hare, Using Price To Limit Water
Use: A Case Study of the City of Santa Fe, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 169 (1999).
595. See generally ASHWORTH, supra note 9; Abrams, supra note 9, at 1405-46; Corbett,
supra note 9, at 454.
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tion of Louisiana and possibly Mississippi, all of the southeastern states
have experienced severe droughts in recent decades. 9 6 This fact perhaps
explains why in all of these states except Louisiana, the legislature has intervened to one degree or another. All of these states have enacted a variant
of regulated riparianism, ranging from what still appears to be only a nominal regulated riparian system in Alabama and Arkansas to fully developed
and fully implemented systems in Florida and Mississippi. Georgia and
South Carolina have enacted well-developed regulated riparian systems, but
apply them only to a minority of water users in the state.
In general, the pattern of enactment of regulated riparian systems in
these states support the unfortunate conclusion that such fundamental
changes in water allocation law are not likely to happen except in response
to a crisis perceived as such by most or all interest groups in the state. 5 97 In
theory there is no reason why a far-sighted legislature could not anticipate
developing problems and enact a regulated riparian system well in advance
of an actual crisis. Mississippi, which does not seem to have suffered widespread or severe droughts in recent decades, is perhaps an unusual example
in this regard. If so, it is somewhat surprising. It is clear that in all of the
southeastern states, the enactment of such a system came in response to a
widely perceived crisis and not in anticipation of the possibility of a crisis.
Louisiana's failure to act598is precisely because there has been too much
rather than too little water.
In addition to the problems of recurring and increasingly severe
droughts, several of the states in the region have become embroiled in interstate disputes. Given the strictures of the Federal Commerce Clause,5 99
596. The most recent has centered particularly on Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. See
Will Anderson, Waking up-to Water: Residents Forcedto Adapt to Routine in Response to
the Relentless Drought Crippling the North Georgia Area, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 15,
2000, at 1B; Richard Lezin Jones, Southeast Panting, Before the Dog Days, PHILA.
INQUIRER, July 16, 2000, at A3; Eliott Minor, State's Drought Threatens Rare Wildlife Species: Weather Tough on Amphibians, FLA. TIMES-UNION, June 5, 2000, at A-i; Charles Seabrook, Drought ParchesGeorgia, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 7, 2000, at IA; Charles Seabrook, Dry2K."State Failed To Plan for Drought, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 19, 2000, at
1A; Charles Seabrook, Wild Georgia:Drought ForcingCreatures To Change Feeding Habits, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 27, 2000, at 7HG; Maurice Tamman, Sand Drier than Dust:
Parts of Peach State Approaching Desertlike Conditions, with Rest Headed that Way,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 3, 2000, at 6E; Dave Williams, Despite Flooding, Water Use
Restricted: Georgia Lacking Any Form of Drought Plan, FLA. TIMES-UNION, June 25, 2000,
at A-1. This drought followed by only a decade the second most severe drought in the three
states in the twentieth century. Charles Seabrook, Atlanta To Get More Waterfrom Lanier,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 10, 1988, at IA.
597. See Abrams, supra note 185; Ray Jay Davis et al., Influencing Water Legislative
Development: What To Do and What To Avoid, 31 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 583 (1995).
598. See supra note 471.
599. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
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states that set about to regulate interstate transfers must apply the same (or
very nearly the same) regulations to water users within the state. Thus the
laws in several of the states-Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, and South Carolina-have more or less elaborate provisions addressing interstate or interbasin transfers, or both.600 And, of course, recurring droughts and increasing
demand create or exacerbate interstate disputes.
The problems driving the legal transition described in this article are
not going to go away. In fact, these problems are likely to become more
intense as global climate change increasingly impacts precipitation patterns. 60 ' Thus, one is likely to see all of the southeastern states, except perhaps Louisiana, continue to revise their water allocation laws in the direction of greater state management and regulation. States have enacted new or
revised regulated riparian statutes within the past dozen years and severalparticularly Georgia-are intensely engaged in reviewing their water allocation laws at this time. Given the failure of traditional riparian rights in the
face of water shortage,60 2 the impracticality of importing an appropriative
rights regime,60 3 and the unfeasibility of devising true markets for water,6 4
these changes are60 5likely to continue to involve the perfecting of regulating
riparian systems.

600. See supra text accompanying notes 237-40, 284-89, 329-32, 363-66, 554-68.
Georgia, currently embroiled in several interstate disputes, thus far has very little in its regulated riparian system that addresses the problem. See supra text accompanying note 459.
601. Dellapenna, supra note 592. See also Symposium, Safeguarding Our Water, 284
Sci. AM. 38 (2001); Symposium, Water Resources and Climate Change (PartI), 35 J. AM.
WATER RESOURCES Ass'N 1297 (1999), Symposium, Water Resources and Climate Change
(PartII), 36 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 251 (2000); A. Dan Tarlock, How Well Can
International Water Allocation Regimes Adapt to Global Climate Change?, 15 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 423 (2000).
602. See, e.g., MALONEY, AuSNESS, & MORRIS, supra note 40, at 72-75; Abrams, supra
note 185, at 257-70; Ausness, supra note 138; Butler, supra note 43; Holczer, supranote 43;
Looney, Update, supra note 185; Marlow, supra note 43; Rose, supra note 41; Carol M.
Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 261 (1990).
603. MALONEY, AuSNESS, & MORRIS, supra note 40, at 75-81; Robert H. Abrams, Replacing Riparianism in the Twenty-First Century, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 93, 97-98 (1989);
Davis, supra note 138, at 453-56; Dellapenna, supra note 1, § 8.05. See also Pisani, supra
note 50, at 15.
604. Dellapenna, supra note 80; Freyfogle, supra note 50, at 510-19; Carol M. Rose,
Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329 (1996). See also Howard
Shelanski & Peter Klein, EmpiricalResearch in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and
Assessment, 7 J. LAW & ECON. ORG. 335 (1995); Yoskowitz, supranote 181.
605. Beck, supra note 137; Dellapenna, supra note 10, § 9.03(a)(5)(D); Sherk, supra note

